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"All we know of the world is of the nature of theories,and all experience
can do is to change those theories. " - F.A. Hayek
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I. INTRODUCTION
If nothing else, the global financial disasters of 2008-09 demonstrate
that there is no such thing as a "free market." When equipped with the
proper institutions and organizations, and generating mutual trust through
transparency and accountability, markets can achieve tremendous material
success, in terms of innovation, economic growth, and a host of other
emergent benefits. When such ground rules and players are lacking, or even
abandoned, markets can and do degenerate into chaos. What is true for the
financial sector is equally true for other economic markets, if not to such
visibly dramatic effects: we all pay a substantial price by failing to
recognize the need to foster what more appropriately should be called
"enabled markets." Much of the formal enabling is done by government
policymakers.
This Article incorporates and expands upon an earlier co-authored
work on what Steve Schultze and I termed "Emergence Economics." ' In
that paper, we explained that markets are not Platonic ideals of efficiency
and equity, but the flesh-and-blood instantiation of ordinary human beings
engaged in every form of commerce and other social activities.2 Here I will
present some specific ways that U.S. policymakers should use teachings
from the latest thinking in economics to help create a conceptual
framework that can be used to grapple with current controversies in
communications law and regulation. In brief, those who make, implement,
and enforce public policy should be obliged to understand the way that
markets actually work, rather than merely assume outworn caricatures of
such knowledge.
This Article is divided into four parts. First, it provides a brief
overview of Emergence Economics, with an emphasis on the "rough
formula" of emergence-namely, that agents plus networks plus evolution
equals emergence. The market is explained as a multi-faceted, complex,
1. Richard S. Whitt & Stephen Schultze, The New "Emergence Economics" of
Innovation and Growth, and What It Means for Communications Policy, 7 J.TELECOMM. &
available
at
draft
of
manuscript
HIGH
TECH. 217
(2009) (initial
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1311904).
2. Id.at 223-31.
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adaptive system, coevolving with the government, and a mix of social
components that are human, networked, evolving, and growing. In
particular, newer economic thinking demonstrates the unique role of
technological change in creating and furthering innovation and economic
growth, and myriad non-pecuniary "net effects."
Second, this Article explicates the general concept of "Adaptive
Policymaking" by government agents. This concept is based on the premise
that economic markets, properly understood, can form part of the
foundation for a framework to inform policymakers as they assess,
formulate, and implement policy decisions. Some suggested guiding
principles are introduced, including a preference for being cautious,
macroscopic, incremental, experimental, contextual, flexible, provisional,
accountable, and sustainable. This Part outlines the visible hand of
government, in terms of the "public policy design space," which includes a
proposed adaptive toolkit to be used by policymakers. It also focuses on
how markets rely on, and are enabled by, trust-building institutions and
organizations, many of which, in turn, are crafted via the political market.
Third, this Article discusses devising a public policy design space
specifically for communications policy. After proposing a policy goal of
"More Good Ideas," and the shorter-term objective of "Harnessing
Communications Networks as Online Platforms," this Part looks at some of
the institutional and organizational challenges facing the FCC. Several
useful adaptive tools are suggested, including conceptual metaphors, the
fitness landscape, and a modular model.
Finally, this Article reintroduces a public policy framework built on
the fitness landscape, premised on "enabling without dictating"
evolutionary forces in the marketplace. It will explore how and why
policymakers generally should refrain from "tampering" with outputs and
outcomes, while considering in some situations "tinkering" with inputsnamely, by feeding the evolutionary algorithm, fostering agent
connectivity, shaping the fitness landscape, and enhancing market
feedback.
This treatment does not intend to provide a comprehensive theoretical
overview, or definitive answers to specific policy questions, but rather to
provide useful grounding for future adaptive policymaking. In Emergence
Economics, Schultze and I showed how market systems are more rich,
dynamic, and unpredictable than had been assumed by so-called "Old
School Economics" and its proponents. 3 Here I focus on how public
officials should not only look to an expansive view of markets, but also to a
more well-grounded view of policymaking. The laws, regulations, and

3. Id. at 224-27.
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principles that we fashion should be based on considerations that extend
beyond purely pecuniary economic motivations. So, markets are more
complex than we thought, and public policy is about more than markets.
All of this springs from myriad daily human interactions that often elude
the simplistic categories of "market" or "state."
Armed then with new insights from Emergence Economics, carefully
delineated policy goals and objectives, and conceptual models such as
fitness landscapes, legislators and regulators have a potential range of
tailored roles to play in the public policy space. These roles should center
on flexibly employing the various implements of an adaptive toolkit to
examine and decide difficult issues. In particular, the four suggested
"tinkering" implements-inputs, connectivity, incentives, and feedbackare key interrelated components of the toolkit. Moreover, these tools should
reinforce each element of the rough formula of emergence, fostering
positive emergent phenomena such as innovation, economic capital, and
social production, as well as the rich "spillovers" that carry unique personal
and community value.

II. THE EMERGENCE OF EMERGENCE ECONOMICS
Much of the field of economics is based on "framework, paradigms,
and doctrines." 4 Virtually all policymakers subscribe to a particular
economics doctrine, whether or not they are aware of it, and these doctrines
guide their thinking and deliberations. 5 For too long, too many U.S.
policymakers have assumed that what we previously have labeled "Old
School Economics"--increasingly outdated versions of economic theory
still deemed to be received wisdom in the policy world-accurately
represents the realities of the marketplace. As a result, current public policy
discussions often are rooted in the past, in the form of significantly
outdated economic and technological assumptions.
As it turns out, the rise of new economic thinking, along with
emerging technology platforms culminating in the Internet, together
directly challenge many of those chief assumptions. In particular, in a
rapidly evolving global marketplace, ideas and innovation are the fodder
that fuels a nation's economic growth. New technologies-novel products,
processes, and business plans-are the most important determinant of longterm economic growth, bringing along a raft of other personal and social
benefits. The overarching lesson for policymakers is that the tools of

4. ROBERT D. ATKINSON & DAVID AUDRETSCH, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FouND.,
ECONOMIC DOCTRINES AND POLICY DIFFERENCES: HAS THE WASHINGTON POLICY DEBATE
BEEN ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS? 3 (2008), available at http://www.itif.org/files/

EconomicDoctrine.pdf.
5. Id.
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government-when employed carefully, deliberately, and in the right
context-can successfully facilitate a more optimal environment for the
emergence of innovative new ideas, economic growth, and human freedom.
A.

The Roots of Emergence Economics

Emergence Economics is an umbrella term for the latest findings from
a wide variety of cutting-edge schools of thought, including complexity
science, behavioral economics, game theory, network science, new growth
theory, and competition theory. Emergence Economics offers the promise
of a well-grounded conceptual framework, a way of approaching and
understanding the growth-oriented network economy being brought about
by the Internet.6 That framework seeks neither to deterministically engineer
this dynamic economy, nor to blindly assume that it is evolving toward
perfect efficiency. However, with new frameworks come new ways of
seeing.
Old School Economics-the hoary verities commonly presented in
public policy debates-maintains, for example, that the market is linear and
always seeks equilibrium, that economic actors are perfectly rational, with
perfect knowledge of themselves and the marketplace, that production is
generated only by capital markets or government subsidy, that growth is
exogenous, and the whole of the economic system is always equal to the
sum of its parts.7 It turns out that every one of these key assumptions is
either overstated or plain wrong. Teachings from physics, biology,
psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and plain common sense challenge
much of the impressive intellectual edifice that has constituted Old School
Economics. "The emperor of high economic theory has no clothes." 9
It is time for economics to regain more of its roots in the human
element, and in turn, for law and policy to find their own footing in a more
grounded economic framework. To some, "the ultimate accomplishment
[of such a synthesis] would be to develop a theory that takes us from
theories of agents, networks, and evolution, all the way up to the macro
patterns we see in real-world economies."' 0 While such a comprehensive
theory does not yet exist, we can begin to see glimmers of what it might
become. That theory would encompass macroeconomic patterns as
emergent phenomena, that is, characteristics of the system as a whole that
6. For a more comprehensive overview of the following discussion, see Whitt &
Schultze, supra note 1, at 223-50.
7. Id. at 219.
8. Id. at224-31.
9. ROBERT H. NELSON, ECONOMICS AS RELIGION: FROM SAMUELSON
BEYOND 330 (2001).
10. ERIC BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH 167 (2006).

TO CHICAGO AND
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arise endogenously out of interactions between agents and their
environment.
Emergence Economics, in particular, helps us understand that
knowledge and technology are not just outputs from within the modem
economy, but also essential inputs that drive economic growth and
countless other social benefits. Further, game-changing, disruptive
innovations, along with numerous smaller, incremental inventions, tend to
emerge from the edges of the Internet. These innovations-which stem
from both supply-side and demand-side factors-in turn create far-reaching
benefits to unaffiliated entities in the form of "spillovers" and further inputs
and outputs throughout the social network. This sort of edge-driven,
broadly beneficial, mutually reinforcing activity thrives in an environment
of open "generativity," where no market player-whether government or
firm-can unilaterally pick winners and losers.
B.

The Complexity of Our Many-Sided Markets

1.

An Emergent Economy: Smith's "Invisible Hand"

The combined thinking behind Emergence Economics highlights
often-overlooked aspects of how markets really work, and the numerous
ways to look at markets based on one's perspective. First and foremost, we
live in an emergent economy. In essence, individual agents, acting through
interconnected networks, engage in the evolutionary market processes of
differentiating, selecting, and amplifying certain business plans and
technologies, which in turn generate a host of emergent economic
phenomena. This leads to the "rough formula" for emergence in a market
environment: agents + networks + evolution = emergence."
With more modem ears, one can equate Adam Smith's famous
"invisible hand" of the market with the concept of phenomena emerging
from a complex adaptive system (CAS). In particular, agents in the
marketplace interact in myriad unpredictable ways to select from among
different Physical Technologies (designs for working with objects), Social
Technologies (methods for organizing people), and Business Plans
(concrete commercial designs). 2 This coevolutionary process between
people, technologies, and offerings tends to drive the most effective and
meritocratic emergent solutions that best fit the current environment.

11. Whitt & Schultze, supra note 1, at 231. Importantly, this generic formula is not
limited to economics, but can be used to describe other forms of emergence by complex
adaptive systems, including activities by political and social agents.
12. Id. at231-50.
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Old School Economics claims that a sufficiently free market will
converge on a natural equilibrium.' 3 According to this theory, each rational
actor pursues its own self-interest with perfect knowledge and instant
speed. 14 Reality is far from this "ideal," however, and even in the context of
competitive markets, there are many possible outcomes. 5 Moreover, the
predicate of perfect competition leads to a steadfast belief in "the selfadjusting, self-correcting paragon of efficiency portrayed by orthodox
theory.' 16 Markets do not spring full-grown into the world, though, but
instead are artificial constructs we design by turns to encourage and restrain
our natural evolutionary impulses. 17 Further, Emergence Economics has
had the benefit of another one hundred years of physics theory and
experimentation, as well as considerable advances in studying evolution
and biological systems. 18 Indeed, "[s]ocial systems exhibit dynamic
patterns analogous to physical, biological, and computational systems."' 19
Thanks to complexity theory, we now know that markets are dynamic,
complex, non-linear, ever-evolving, imperfectly competitive, and highly
unpredictable.2 0
A Human Economy: Hayek's Constrained Planners
We also live in a human economy. George Lakoff nicely summarizes
the latest teachings on human rationality from neuroscience and behavioral
psychology:
Reason is commonly assumed to be conscious; disembodied;
2.

dispassionate; literal (fits the world directly); logical (leads from facts
to correct conclusions); universal; and self-interested. The cognitive
and brain sciences have shown that reason really is mostly
unconscious; physical (uses the brain); requires emotion; uses frames,
metaphors, and melodramatic narratives; varies depending on

13. Id. at 224-25.
14. Id. at 224-31.
15. For a timely critique of this aspect of Old School Economics, see

RICHARD
BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF

FINANCIAL INNOVATION 207-41 (2007) (detailing numerous flaws in the "perfect market
paradigm.").
16. JAMES CASE, COMPETITION 220 (2007).
17. Whitt & Schultze, supranote 1, at 55-56.
18. Id. at 7. Brian Arthur and others observe that six features of the market, and other
complex adaptive systems-dispersed interaction, no global controller, cross-cutting

hierarchical organization, continual adaptation, perpetual novelty, and out-of-equilibrium
dynamics-are the very elements that present difficulties for traditional economics. W.
Brian Arthur, Steven N. Durlauf & David Lane, Introduction, in THE ECONOMY AS AN
EVOLVING COMPLEX SYSTEM II, at 3-4 (Brian Arthur, Steven N. Durlauf & David Lane, eds.,
1997).
19. ROBERT AXELROD & MICHAEL COHEN, HARNESSING COMPLEXITY 21 (2000).
20. Whitt & Schultze, supranote 1, at 224-27.
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worldview; and
2 is used at least as much in the service of empathy as of
self-interest. '
Instead, human beings have "bounded rationality" (or, perhaps more
accurately, "bounded irrationality"), imperfect information, numerous
individual cognitive and emotional biases, and poor problem-solving
strategies. 222 Cordelia Fine puts it more bluntly: we have brains that are
vain, emotional, immoral, deluded, pigheaded, secretive, weak-willed,
bigoted, and vulnerable.23 As she articulates it, "[b]eing confronted with the
evidence of the distorting 2 4and deceptive window dressing of the brain is
unsettling, and rightly so."
On the other hand, research from behavioral science clearly
demonstrates that we are far more flexible and multi-faceted than Old
School Economics has assumed. 25 This built-in plasticity makes us agents
capable of adaptation to a wide range of circumstances. Humans are the
most "facultative" animals in the world, meaning we are able to alter our
behavior in response to significant environmental changes.26 This
capability obviously applies to policymakers as well as market players.
One obvious implication of our well-documented cognitive
constraints is that the modem economy is simply too complex for central
planning to work effectively. In particular, human beings have major issues
with knowledge coordination, deductive rationality, and accurate and
timely feedback.2 7 Hayek wrote often about the dangers of relying on
cognitively-constrained planners:
The economic problem of society is... a problem of how to secure the
best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends
whose relative importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it
briefly, it is a problem
28 of the utilization of knowledge not given to
anyone in its totality.

21. George Lakoff, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2008, at 4.
22. Whitt & Schultze, supra note 1, at 232-35.
23. CORDELIA FINE, A MIND OF ITs OwN: How YOuR BRAIN DISTORTS AND DECEIVES

202 (2008).
24. Id. Nevertheless, Fine believes we can rise above ourselves, by watching for
influences on our decision making, being more tolerant of opposing viewpoints, resisting
stereotypes, and remaining alert to the distortions and deceptions of our brains. Id at 209.
25. Whitt & Schultze, supra note 1, at 235-37.
26. Paul H. Rubin, The State of Nature and the Evolution of PoliticalPreference, 3 AM.
L. & EcoN. REV. 50, 53-60 (2001). Rubin argues that this facultative capacity is the basis of
economics. Id.

27.

BEINHOCKER,

supranote 10, at 422.

28. Friedrich August von Hayek, The Use ofKnowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV.,
519, 519-20 (1945).
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Obviously, this casts the concept of central planning into serious
doubt.2 9 Moreover, progenitors of large-scale schemes to improve the
human condition tend to regard themselves as far smarter and more
farseeing than they really are, and at the same time, regard their subjects as
more unintelligent and incompetent than they are in reality. 30 These same
planners "routinely... ignore the radical contingencies of the future,"
even
31
though no amount of planning can deal with those contingencies.
3.

A Networked Economy: Cerf's Innovation Without Permission

We also live in a networked economy, formed bottom-up by
interactions between people in a highly connected marketplace. Any
particular agent can have a link to other agents, which in turn link to others
through lines of communication, common tasks, market agreements, or
other relationships. This network economy thrives when there is space for
experimental evolution, in which new ideas emerge and technology is
constantly refined.
An open network of connections between agents can help create the
conditions for emergence to occur. For example, if I am developing a
product or working on a project, and I am already interconnected to various
degrees with many others, I am much more likely to connect with those
who have the knowledge or expertise that I need to work efficiently. I may
even benefit from the work of other agents, who do not require any
transaction at all,32 or with whom I never would have connected in a world
of isolated agents.
The Internet is a notable and perhaps unique form of network that
arose as a product of market and non-market forces. The Internet's
architecture-its modular, end-to-end, interconnected design-allows it to
operate as a platform for broad-based economic activities. Generally
speaking, no central gatekeeper exerts unilateral control over market
activities on the Internet, and much of the activity happens with users at the
edge of the network. In the words of Vint Cerf, the Internet allows
33
"innovation without permission."

29. Further, the "market" is no longer primarily domestic; it is increasingly global in
scale and interconnected with other nations' markets. This only adds to the overall
complexity and reduces the potential influence of any single agent-regardless of whether it
is a public or private actor.
30. See JAMES C. ScoTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE
THE HUMAN CONDITON HAVE FAILED 343 (1998).
31. Id.
32. Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin,or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE
L.J. 369,404-05 (2002).
33. US. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation Hearing on
"Network Neutrality, 109th Cong. 4 (2006) (statement of Vinton Cerf, Vice President and
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An Evolving Economy: Schumpeter's Creative Destruction

Further, we live in an evolving economy, which consists of a
population of firms differing one from another as a result of different
routines developed by each firm. These routines are analogous to the genes
of biological organisms, and influence the specific characteristics of the
output produced by the different firms (their phenotypes). Market processes
winnow by selecting the services and products of some firms-Physical
Technologies, Social Technologies, and Business Plans--over those of
others. The selected firms then become more successful than those not
selected.34 By one account, evolution is "elements adapting their state to
the situation they together create. 35
This is not a new concept. As Schumpeter put it,
The essential point to grasp is that in dealing with capitalism we are
dealing with an evolutionary process.... [It is a] process of industrial
mutation . . .that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure
from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a
new one. This process
of Creative Destruction is the essential fact
36
about capitalism.
Evolution, seen from the perspective of the system as a whole, offers
us an intermingling of stability and change, of equilibrium and apparent
disorder. The pace of evolution also varies widely with time; periods of
relatively slow, steady changes appear to be interspersed with periods of
dramatic shifts. In biology, Stephen Jay Gould popularized the notion of
"punctuated equilibrium," whereby most species originate in geological
moments of great change, and persist in stasis.37 Market economies show
similar behavior, as "plateaus of stagnation and bursts of achievement"
appear to express a standard pattern for human learning.38 This
phenomenon also follows a power law, where the frequency of extinctions
diminishes with the square of the size of the extinction.39
Chief Internet Evangelist, Google Inc.), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/cerf020706.pdf.
34. See RICHARD NELSON & SIDNEY WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC
CHANGE 266 (1982).
35. W. Brian Arthur, Out-of-Equilibrium Economics and Agent-Based Modeling, in 2
HANDBOOK OF COMPUTATIONAL ECoNOMICS 1551 (K. Judd & L. Tesfatsion, eds., 2005),
availableat http://www.santafe.edu/-wbarthur/documents/OutofEquilPaper-SFI.pdf.
36. JOSEPH ALOIS SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIETY, AND DEMOCRACY 82-83 (1943)
(internal citation omitted).

37.

STEPHEN JAY GOULD, PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM

(2007). Thomas Kuhn makes a

similar (if not related) observation about scientific development as "a succession of
tradition-bound periods punctuated by non-cumulative breaks." THOMAS KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
38. GOULD,supra note 37, at 272.

208 (2d ed. 1970).

39. This power law relationship that describes biological extinctions is virtually
identical to the pattern of extinctions among corporate firms. This is a startling result, and
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5.

A Growth Economy: Romer's Innovation Agenda
Moreover, we live in a growth economy, in which the chief currency
is ideas, and the mechanism for growth is innovation. A major goal of any
society should be to increase people's well-being. 40 Economic growth is a
key component to a country's well-being. In addition to raising the material
standard of living, growth yields significant social, political, and moral
benefits not priced by the market.
While Old School Economics tells us that productivity comes simply
from adding more capital, or generating greater efficiency, Emergence
Economics emphasizes ways in which new technologies endogenously
create better recipes for economic growth. Technological innovation has
proven to be the major impetus behind the productivity increases that
produce long-term economic growth.4' Mechanisms generating new ideas
are as important as access to abundant resources. In Paul Romer's words,
"technological change . . . lies at the heart of economic growth. ' ' 4 2 The
resulting emergent market phenomena include not just economic growth,
with all its concomitant benefits, but what we call "net effects." These are
innovation spillovers (positive externalities), peer production, and a whole
social layer of activity.
6.

A Political Economy: Coevolving Markets and Government
Finally, we live in a political economy. In Emergence Economics, we

explained that markets are not just emergent processes embodying certain
networked and evolving features.43 Markets are also political." Like the
market, the government is a CAS, akin to a living thing.45 This means that

poses a paradox: no biological species except for human beings can anticipate the future and
respond accordingly. Creatures cannot plan their own evolution. The implication is that
firms act as if at random, without intent and foresight. Apparently it is the structure of the
connections between firms-the networks across which the impact of firms' strategies
percolate-which is the feature ultimately responsible for the pattern of extinctions which
we observe. PAUL ORMEROD, WHY MOST THINGS FAIL 187-88 (2005).
40. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural
Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101 (2008).
41. Id. Such innovations are not merely of the "high level," disruptive variety, but every
form of innovative mid-level and ground-level products. See generally AMAR BHIDt, THE
VENTURESOME ECONOMY: How INNOVATION SUSTAINS PROSPERITY IN A MORE CONNECTED

WORLD (2008).
42. Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. OF POL. EcoN. S71, S72
(1990).
43. Whitt & Schultze, supranote 1, at 284-88.
44. Business is inherently political, and politics is-and always has been-marked by
the interests of commerce. See DEBORA L. SPAR, RULING THE WAVES 9-10 (2001).
45. "[G]ovemment is not a machine, but a living thing. It falls, not under the theory of
the universe, but under the theory of organic life. It is accountable to Darwin, not to
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economies and governments are two complex systems, coevolving with the
larger human culture as intertwined social constructs that rely upon each
other. Firms and governments together shape the creation of markets.46 The
government policymaker must devise the proper role for4 dealing
with an
7
emergent, network-connected, innovation-fueled economy.
Contrary to some views, the market does not exist in a Platonic state
of nature, pure and unconstrained. Our institutions-laws, regulations and
norms-helped create a place of trusted relationships, which in turn enable
people to trade and barter, buy and sell. Certainly, in the modern global
economy of the early twenty-first century, we have seen the significant
downside of this intertwined process, in the form of failed financial
institutions and collapsed financial markets. This Article will explore some
of the implications, for better and worse, of this coevolutionary process.

III. INTRODUCING THE CONCEPT OF ADAPTIVE POLICYMAKING
But regardless of politicalpersuasion, many economists are eager to

invoke-to hide behind-what they have come to believe is the
wondrous scientific rigorof received economic doctrine. This behavior
denies public policy of many valuable insights that a more honest

economics--an economics committed to the working out of the reasons
for particularpublic policies-couldoffer.nS

Economic theories certainly matter for public policy. For example,
because the Old School Economics model of rational actors does not
adequately describe economic reality, policy prescriptions built on this
model are necessarily flawed.49 At the same time, economics alone should
not inform the thought process of the policymaker, especially if that brand
of economics fails to appreciate its own value-laden ways of looking at the
world.50 Other socially-important elements must be included in the mix as
well in order to create an appropriate concept of the public good.
Newton." WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 56
(1908).
46. "One cannot overestimate the importance of governments to modem markets.
Without stable, more or less non-rent seeking states, modem production markets would not
exist." NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE ARCmTECTURE OF MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALIST SOCIETIES 3 (2001).

47. Whitt & Schultze, supra note 1, at 289-90.
48. DANIEL W. BROMLEY, SUFFICIENT REASON: VOLITIONAL PRAGMATISM AND THE
MEANING OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 18-19 (2006).
49. ROBERT D. ATKINSON, THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICA'S ECONOMY: LONG
WAVES OF INNOVATION THAT POWER CYCLES OF GROWTH 247 (2004).
50. See, e.g., DUNCAN K. FOLEY, ADAM'S FALLACY: A GUIDE TO ECONOMIC THEOLOGY,
at xiv (2006) ("[T]he economic way of thinking is just as value-laden as any other way of
thinking about society, and can foster dangerous mistakes of judgment.").
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That said, we need to forge a different way of thinking about the
conjoined public/private worlds, and in particular how our nation's policies
can link the public purpose of government with the entrepreneurial and
innovative capacity of the private sector. 5' Between the Platonic ideals of
Perfect Government and Perfect Market is the imperfect, messy, but
necessary muddle of agents coevolving and coadapting. It would be a
mistake, however, to think of this place between traditional "Left" and
"Right" political positions as a thin, unpromising ground of compromise.
Relying to a large degree on the dynamics of the private market-as
enabled and channeled more fully by tailored public inputs-is an
exceedingly robust position to occupy.
A.

Policymakeras Adaptive Agent
According to Merriam-Webster, "policy" is defined as "a high-level
overall plan embracing the general goals and acceptable procedures
especially of a governmental body., 52 More broadly, Barbara Cherry and
Johannes Bauer call public policy "the art of determining a mix and dosage
of instruments that can achieve the desired objectives. 53 Daniel W.
Bromley explains public policy as collective action in "restraining,
liberating, and expanding the opportunities and capacities of each of us to
engage in [individual action]".54 In brief, "all 55[public] policies involve
deliberate attempts to change people's behavior.,
One unstated assumption by many in government and industry is that
public policy is merely the sum total of enforceable government laws and
regulations. For example, Cherry and Bauer provide an alternative
definition of policies as "legally enforceable rules created to effectuate the
achievement of certain goals. 56 This Article seeks to challenge that
assumption, and among other things, rescue the concept of policy from the
black-and-white world of "to regulate or not to regulate." We should adopt
51. ATKINSON, supranote 49, at 242-43.
52. Policy - Definition from the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/policy (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
53. Barbara A. Cherry & Johannes M. Bauer, Adaptive Regulation: Contours of a
Policy-Model for the Internet Economy, Address at the 15th Biennial Conference of the
International Telecommunications Society (Sept. 15, 2004) at 3 (transcript available at
http://www.quello.msu.edu/images/uploads/wp-04-05.pdf). The full paper, developed from
this address, can be found at http://quello.msu.edu/complexity/cherry-bauer.pdf.
54. BROMLEY, supranote 48, at 150; see also id. at 23. Bromley observes that policy is
"nothing but a word we apply to a continual process of redefining - reconstructing - new
realms of individual and group action." Id. at 150-51. He sees the policymaking process as
"an exercise in practical inference," aimed at achieving describable future outcomes. Id. at
14.
55. DEBORAH STONE, POuCY PARADOx: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 13

(rev. ed. 2002).
56. Cherry & Bauer, supra note 53, at 12.
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a broader definition that utilizes a mix of governmental, quasigovernmental, and private actors, employing a broad spectrum of policy
options that operates under the express or implied authority of the
government. For example, policymakers deferring to market forces in a
particular situation versus formal, legally-binding requirements still carries
the imprimatur of government in achieving a particular policy objective.
Not just laws and regulations, but other formal and informal
instrumentalities-and not just government, but third-party groups
(gradations and degrees of institutions and organizations)--collectively can
produce something we call "public policy."
Another point worth emphasizing here is that we are operating within
several wide and concentric circles of community. I would like to think that
the schools of thought that constitute Emergence Economics together are
bigger, deeper, and richer than Old School Economics. At the same time,
Emergence Economics is but one facet of a bigger, deeper, and richer
social fabric that binds us all. Homo economicus, even properly understood,
is but one facet of who we are as humans. Our public policymaking should
never lose sight of that fundamental fact.
As mentioned above, many scholars conclude that economic sectors
and policymaking systems are coevolving CASs, each shaping, but not
fully determining, the other.57 In essence, regulation coevolves with the
industry it governs. s8 For example, communications regulation has
coevolved with the telecommunications sector.59 Stated differently:
Public policies evolve partly in response to changes in perceived
demands and opportunities, changes that may result from the evolution
of private technologies and market structures or from other identifiable
shifts in objective conditions. Public policies may reflect not
60 changes
in objective conditions but shifts in values, or understanding.
To Cherry and Bauer, the chief challenge is to adopt "sustainable
policy," which is both adoptable and achievable. Because policies are
outputs of and inputs to the coevolving CASs, we need to modify our
expectations of what policies realistically can achieve by shifting emphasis
from static optimization of parameters to an evolutionary paradigm that
emphasizes adaptability.6' In particular, market sectors featuring rapid and
dynamic technological change, such as telecommunications, challenge the
policymaker's ability to predict, control, and manage the system's
57. See, e.g., id. at 2-3.
58. MARTIN FRANSMAN, THE NEW ICT ECosYsTEM: IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE 73
(2007).
59. Thus, "the conceptual framework within which telecoms regulation has evolved
does not include endogenous innovation as part of its logical fabric." Id. at 14.
60. NELSON & WINTER, supra note 34, at 372.
61. Cherry & Bauer, supra note 53, at 3.
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behavior.6 2 Policies have "feedback effects on the [political
and economic]
63
problem.,
policy
initial
the
modify
thus
constraints-and
This rapidly accelerating change poses a particularly troubling
challenge to traditional policymaking. Devising public policy is made
much more difficult given the pace of transformations in complex systems
like the economy-the faster the pace, the more likely serious gaps will
appear between the system's behavior and our lagging management
capabilities. 64 As one author has argued, "[t]he arms race of coevolving
fitness landscapes requires constant adjusting to the coevolving fitness65
landscapes. There is no rest for the agents in a complex adaptive system.,
As I shall explore further, this fact of the "social acceleration of time"
carries significant implications for how we design our market and political
institutions.66
For these and other reasons, where markets at least are contestable,
Emergence Economics suggests broadly a preference for relatively minor
tinkering with the market environment (fostering organic, bottom-up
solutions), rather than relatively major tampering with the evolutionary
process (producing a more managed, hierarchical, top-down approach).6 7
This carries several implications. The first rule of adaptive policymaking is
caution, for many of the reasons articulated above. Beinhocker also warns
us that, if the newer forms of economic thinking are still in their youth,
then their application to public policy "is in its infancy. 6M The teachings of
these disparate, yet related schools, can give us profound insights, and yet
there is much still to be understood. If anything, this suggests further
caution by policymakers, who may arm themselves with lessons not yet
firmly established by fact and analysis.
A second observation is that there is no optimal policy outcome.
Again, policymaking is a CAS "involved in a coevolutionary dance with
other complex adaptive systems in society, including business and
economic systems., 69 Embedded within coevolving, interconnected social
systems like technologies, markets, and policies, the government
62. Barbara A. Cherry, The Telecommunications Economy and Regulation as
Coevolving Complex Adaptive Systems: Implicationsfor Federalism, 59 FED. COMM. L.J.
369, 375 (2007).
63. Johannes Bauer & Steven S. Wildman, Looking Backwards andLooking Forwards
in Contemplatingthe Next Rewrite of the CommunicationsAct, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 415, 419

(2006).
64.

THOMAS HOMER-DIXON, THE INGENUITY GAP

290 (2000).

65. J.B. Ruhl, Law's Complexity: A Primer,24 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 885, 903 (2009).
66. See generally WILLiAM E. SCHEUERmAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE SOCIAL
ACCELERATION OF TIME

(2004).

67. Whitt & Schultze, supra note 1, at 304-14.
68. BEINHOCKER, supranote 10, at 428.
69. Cherry & Bauer, supra note 53, at 20.
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policymaker cannot hope to account for multiple dimensions of all possible
variables, constraints, and contingencies. Indeed, some suggest that
policymakers should focus more on creating the proper process for arriving
at a decision, rather than prejudging the substantive outcome of the
decision itself.70 The market often seems to find a way to solve many of its
problems, while governments tend to endure a "fog of policymaking."
Third, there is no permanent policy outcome. The concept of "policy"
connotes to some a timeless, placeless edifice of impermeable truth. To the
adaptive policymaker, however, policy is incremental puttering with
market inputs (time and space dependent) and includes appropriate ways to
gauge and act upon feedback. We need to shift our mental model from the
static to the dynamic coevolution of policy and the economy.7'
A fourth observation is that the range of policy options is greater than
we imagine. Even within the confines of what is carried out in the
"regulatory" institution, there are a variety of options for regulators to
explore. For example, Ruhl points out that much regulation "is based on
'front-end' decision making premised on the belief that we can predict and
assess all the consequences of a decision and take measures to facilitate the
positive effects and mitigate the negative effects. 72 These simplified frontend models are relied on at the expense of procedures and standards for
"'back-end' monitoring of, and adaptation to, change through time and
space. 7 3
Finally, accountability matters. Policymakers, and the rest of us,
would be wise to heed the work of researchers studying accountability of
those who prognosticate for a living. Some, like Philip Tetlock, claim "[i]t
is possible to define empirical and logical standards of accountability that
transcend partisan wrangling and that allow us to gauge the judgmental
performance of experts, from diverse points of view, on common
metrics. 74 We should hold our policymakers accountable to "standards of
evidence that command broad assent across the spectrum of reasonable
opinion. ,71 While acknowledging that "[flew of us look pretty under the

70. See Paul Kouroupas, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, Global Crossing Limited,
Process over Substance: Why Regulatory Process Is More Important than Substantive
Regulatory Decisions, Address to the Int'l Telecomms. Soc. 17th Biennial Conference (June
25, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.imaginar.org/its2008/28.pdf).
71. Cherry & Bauer, supra note 53, at 26. Or as Deborah Stone puts it, "[p]olicy is
more like an endless game of Monopoly than a bicycle repair." STONE, supra note 55, at
261.
72. Ruhl, supra note 65, at 907-08.
73. Id. at 910.
74. PHImIP TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: How GOOD IS IT? How CAN WE
KNow? 217 (2005).
75. Id.
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cognitive microscope, 76 Tetlock 77
believes we should commit to
"fundamental tests of good judgment."
This Article will address in a later Part the institutional challenges
posed by some insights from public choice theory. For now, it is worth
noting that policymakers are beset by powerful influences to favor the
status quo over change and progress. Robert D. Atkinson observes that
during periods where new techno-economic systems are emerging,
"organizations, institutions, laws, governments, the built environment,
attitudes, and culture lag behind," with most of society still "committed to
old ways of doing things, old investments, old skills, old institutional
arrangements, and old attitudes., 78 During this transitional period, however,
"some do not just passively wait, many actively resist the change as it
threatens entrenched ways of doing and established economic positions.
Moreover, old economy stakeholders, whether in business and government
or as consumers and workers, usually have more power than innovators. 79
Policymakers should jump the lag and refrain from aligning with the old
forces against the new.
B.

Taking an Adaptive Stance: Nine Principles

What are some basic elements for government to take an adaptive
stance in the policy realm? Here are a few suggested overlapping principles
to keep in mind as we begin to sketch out the policy design space and its
various interrelated components. Obviously these are easy enough to say,
but far more difficult to put into practice successfully.
1.

Cautious

Again, the first watch word for adaptive policymaking is caution. As
we have already seen, the market environment is an immensely complex
place, and poses huge challenges to our human information gathering and
processing systems, our deductive reasoning capabilities, and our feedback
mechanisms.80 The record of long-range economic predictions over the last
two decades is one of obvious failure. 8' In addition, the fitness function
policymakers bring to bear may tend to reflect power hierarchies-state
power, corporate power, or both-rather than the broader influences of
individuals and society acting in the marketplace.8 2
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.at 236.
Id.at 230.
ATKINSON, supranote 49, at 26-27.
Id. at 27.
BEINHOCKER, supranote 10, at 422-23.
HOMER-DIXON, supra note 64, at 295.
BEINHOCKER, supranote 10, at 426-28.
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All decisions are based on models, and all our models are wrong. A
model is a simplification, an abstraction, a selection, which inevitably is
83
incomplete and thus incorrect. "Likeness to truth is not the same as truth."
We need humility about the limitations of our knowledge. John Sterman
notes that "[s]uch humility is essential in creating an environment in which
we can learn about the complex systems in which we are embedded and
work effectively to create the world we truly desire. 84 But caution should
not be an excuse for indecision. Doubt should be embraced as an ally of
good policy, by directing us to reassess our evidence, consider our
alternatives, and plan as best as possible for the inevitable contingencies.
Policymakers must act, even if by deciding not to act.
2.

Macroscopic
The adaptive policymaker should also have the big picture in mind, at
all times. Pierre de Vries notes that "[t]he incompleteness of any model of a
complex system and the necessity for complementary perspective
suggest[s] that policymakers take a big picture approach: a broad view of
how problems might be solved., 85 We should avoid the "narrow, eventoriented, reductionist world view most [of us] live by.",86 "There are no side
effects-only effects. 87 Feedback loops shape the structure in which we
find ourselves. We need "to expand the boundaries of our mental models,"
in order to "see the patterns of behavior created by the underlying feedback
structure...., 88
This macroscopic view necessarily becomes a window into how best
to create and disseminate the products of innovation. "Technological
innovation . . . is a primary contributor to [a nation's] long-term wellbeing, ' , 89 including economic growth, and yet most policymakers pay little
heed to these facts. Taking the deep view of today and the broad view of
tomorrow will help policymakers more fully appreciate that successful
plans and programs should be rooted in driving innovation.

83. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 16,334
(1998). Bernstein cautions that our faith in risk management encourages us to take risks we
otherwise would not take, such as driving more aggressively with seatbelts fastened. Id.at
335.
84. John D. Sterman, All Models Are Wrong: Reflections on Becoming a Systems
Scientist, 18 SYs. DYN. REv. 501, 501 (2002).
85. Pierre de Vries, Internet Governance as Forestry: Deriving Policy Principles from
Managed Complex Adaptive Systems 18 (August 12, 2008) (unpublished manuscript
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1229482).
86. Sterman, supra note 84, at 504.
87. Id.at 505.
88. Id. at 511.
89. Benjamin & Rai, supranote 40, at 108.
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3.

Incremental
Policymakers also must learn to take small steps, demonstrating "an
experimental approach to social change." 90 The best policymaking process
is not revolutionary but evolutionary, and evolution typically proceeds in
iterative measures. Each step should build on experience and practical
knowledge. Karl Popper also has observed the distinction between "utopian
social engineering" and piece-meal democratic reform. 91 Large leaps are
dangerous because they invite much greater exposure to uncertainty.92 Even
micro-level behaviors matter and can have
profound and unexpected effects
93
system.
a
of
macro-performance
on the
4.

Experimental
Along with the relative caution of small steps comes the relative
boldness of novel steps. The combination of uncertainty and constraints on
predictability creates the necessity for policymakers to experiment. 94 A
willingness to experiment using a diversity of approaches helps protect
against the unknowns. 95 In particular, policy decisions should not be treated
as enduring mandates, but as a series of experiments that compete to evolve
over time. Two key elements make policy work the "science of muddling
through," namely feedback and accountability. 96 Adaptive strategy suggests
that policymakers should levy many small bets, in a trial-and-error (or
better, trial-and-success) fashion.97 Finally, the inevitability of failure must
be accepted.98 Indeed, "an experimentalist spirit is best maintained when
90. ScoTT, supra note 30, at 345.
91. KARL POPPER, Piecemeal Social Engineering (1944), in POPPER SELECTIONS 304,
307-11 (David Miller ed., 1985).
92. RicHARD G. LIPSEY, KENNETH I. CARLAW & CLIFFORD T. BEKAR, ECONOMIC
TRANSFORMATIONS:

GENERAL

PLATFORM TECHNOLOGIES AND

LONG TERM ECONOMIC

GROWTH 534 (2005).

93.

BEINHOCKER,

supra note 10, at 428. On the other hand, excessive incrementalism

may be problematic where circumstances are not stable and change is coming fast. HOMERDIXON, supranote 64, at 303.
94. Cherry & Bauer, supra note 53, at 29.
95. Moreover, reducing uncertainty is not always a legitimate objective to be factored
into decisions. After all, the market environment itself already is uncertain and is part of the
fundamental economic challenge to industry players.
96. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through ", 19 PuB. ADMIN.
REV. 79 (1959). As we shall see in Part V.B.4, I view "feedback" as transparency
(information) plus accountability (responsibility); "connectivity" then adds the various lines
of communication between citizen and policymaker and between citizens themselves. See

also Martina Eckardt, Explaining Legal Change from an Evolutionary Economics
Perspective,9 GERMAN L.J. 437 (2008).
97. Hayek's notion of competition as a trial-and-error discovery process is akin to
Popper's concept of testing scientific hypotheses through falsification. See Eckardt, supra
note 96, at 447 n.27.
98. Cherry & Bauer, supra note 53, at 29.
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Contextual

Good policy is well-grounded and context-dependent.1° The more
general a theory is, the less empirical content it will have since, by ignoring
the specific context in which many problems arise, it becomes impossible
to analyze them in depth."'' Context matters. We also need a sound
empirical basis for acting, or refraining from acting. Richard Lipsey is
correct that the most useful policy advice is "context-dependent, there
being no simple set of policy rules that apply to all countries, times, and
circumstances."'' 0 2 On the other hand, in the face of great uncertainty, one
author recommends adopting a less complex "coarse" policy response that
addresses a wide range of unforeseeable environments, even if in
suboptimal fashion. 10 3 "Precision and focus in addressing the known comes
at the cost of reduced ability to address the unknown. ' 'l °4 However, merely
incorporating context into our policies is not the same as devising a "no
size fits all" approach.
6.

Flexible
Deep uncertainty about complex systems like markets, or especially
the Internet, implies the need for flexibility, since one cannot be sure of
either the nature of the problem or the best solutions.'0 5 One should plan on
surprises (allow for "the largest accommodation to the unforeseen" 106), and
plan on human inventiveness (allow room for future improvements after
further experience and insight). 10 7 Lipsey discusses how policymakers
should have both "design flexibility" (an ability to revise the internal
structure of policies and programs) and "delivery flexibility"
(an ability to
10 8
change course or cut off particular flawed projects).

99. JONATHAN ZrrrRAiN, THE FUTuRE OF THE INTERNET AND How TO STOP IT 157

(2008).
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Cherry & Bauer, supra note 53, at 28.
LIPSEY, CARLAW & BEKAR, supra note 92, at 501.
Id. at 21.
See BOOKSTABER, supra note 15, at 232-240.
Id. at 236.
de Vries, supra note 85, at 18.
ScoTT, supra note 30, at 345.
Id.
LIPSEY, CARLAW

& BEKAR, supra note 92, at 534.
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Provisional

Adaptive policymakers should favor reversibility. After all,
"[i]rreversible interventions have irreversible consequences."'09 Many
neoclassical theories presuppose that market actions are inherently
reversible, which is not accurate. As the passage of time and the evolution
of markets invariably invalidate the premises of regulation, policymakers
should build in "review checkpoints. ' ' l ° This would allow policies to be
corrected, or even reversed, over time. As Aldo Leopold puts it, "[t]he first
rule of intelligent tinkering is to keep all the parts.'
8.

Accountable
The adaptive policymaker next must adapt-monitor the market, and
adjust accordingly. Coping with uncertainty means learning from
form,
experience. Policymakers should state their beliefs in testable
12
monitor their forecasted performance, and honor reputational bets.'
It is easy to obtain confirmation for nearly every theory, if we look for
it, but the relevant criteria of the scientific status of knowledge is its
falsifiability, refutability, or testability. 113 For example, Einstein's theory of
gravitation is refutable by empirical evidence, as opposed to astrology or
the Marxist theory of history. Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt
to falsify it or refute it. Incremental adjustments in regulation at the "back
end" of the process, for example, allow for changes based on experience
and
with actual impact, as opposed to the significant "guesstimates"
14
analysis."
front-end
for
required
often
rationality"
"bounded
9.

Sustainable

Barbara Cherry talks about how sustainable polices are those rules
that are both "politically adoptable and for which the desired policy goals
are reasonably likely to be achievable. . . . [This] requires heightened
awareness and understanding of the constraints limiting fulfillment of
'adoptability' and 'achievability.""' Further, the policy must be able to
survive the agency process itself. As Ruhl observes, agencies are not often
rewarded for their flexibility, openness, and willingness to experiment,
ScoTr, supra note 30, at 345.
de Vries, supra note 85, at 26.
ScoTr, supra note 30, at 345 (quoting Donald Worster, NATURE'S ECONOMY 289
1994) (quoting American ecologist Aldo Leopold)).
TETLOCK, supra note 74, at 230.
KARL POPPER, Science as Falsification, in CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE
GROWTH OF ScIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 36 (1963).
114. See Robert L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro, Improving Regulation Through
IncrementalAdjustment, 52 KAN. L. REV. 1179 (2004).
115. Cherry & Bauer, supranote 53, at 26.
109.
110.
111.
(2d ed.
112.
113.
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monitor, and adapt." 16 Thus, the surrounding organizations and institutions
must evolve as well to accommodate these changes. In order for adaptive
management to flourish in administrative agencies, "legislatures must
empower them to do it, interest groups must let them do it, and the courts
17
must resist the temptation to second-guess when they do in fact do it.''
C. Preparinga Policy Design Space: The "Visible Hand" of
Government
As we have seen, "[p]ublic laws, policies, and organizations are an
important part of the environment that shapes the evolution of private
sector activities.,"' 8 Generally speaking, market forces-buying and
selling, bartering and trading, competing and collaborating-are a natural
phenomenon. They have emerged as part of our biological and cultural
heritage as social animals. From both sources we have derived an in-built
desire to fashion new things from the raw materials of our environment,
and use them to achieve the necessaries (and options) of life." 9 Our basic
human emotions are also part of our evolutionary makeup: when we want
20
to possess more, it is greed; when we want to protect more, it is fear.'
Markets, however, are something quite different. They are conceptual
constructs that require institutions and organizations to buttress (or in some
cases reign in) our natural desires, and direct them to productive ends. "We
create the market as a reflection of our characteristic propensity to 'truck
and barter."",12' There are many ways to design markets, some more
conducive than others to the constructive flow of market forces. As we
shall see, these institutions and organizations are a material instantiation of
our commercial values, like trust, honesty, and integrity. The balancing of
intentions shows up in our laws, which, I would surmise, probably
originated from a simple need to protect ourselves and our things from the
covetous designs of our neighbors.
Defining a policy design space is intended to articulate all those
components necessary to successfully achieve policy ends in a dynamic
market environment. Because the policymaking function is a complex
116. J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management- Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J. L. Sci.
& TECH. 21, 30-31 (2005).
117. Id.at3l.
118. NELSON & WINTER, supra note 34, at 371-79.
119. See, e.g., MICHAEL

TOMASELLO, THE CULTURAL ORIGINS OF HUMAN COGNITION

39-

41, 53-54 (1999) (arguing that cultural and biological evolution in humans created a toolswielding animal creatively shaping its environment).
120. See, e.g., JAAK PANKSEPP, AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE, THE FOUNDATION OF HUMAN

AND ANIMAL EMOTIONS 321 (2004) (greed and fear evolved in the human brain to address
different aspects of the environment).
121. FOLEY, supra note 50, at 216.
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system, each component constitutes a separate set of decisions to be made,
which in turn feeds back on the other decisions in dynamic and sometimes
unpredictable ways.122 This concept is similar to the cycle process of
decision making in J.B. Ruhl's "adaptive management" approach. 23 Here I
combine the policy goals and objectives, various organizations and
institutions, competing frames and tools, and proposed projects, all
contributing to the overall non-linear process in numerous and often
unpredictable ways.
1 24
The pioneering work of John Kingdon can be a helpful guide here.
Kingdon identifies three separate process "streams" that flow through the
political system: problems, policies, and politics. 25 The "problems" stream
includes certain societal conditions that are defined by some as problems in
need of a policy solution. 12 6 The "policies" stream includes a wide variety
of ideas floating around in a "policy primeval soup," waiting for the
opportunity to be heard. 127 Finally the "politics" stream is the players
working inside and outside the formal administrative and legislative
processes. 28 Each process stream is independent of the others, yet can be
brought together at certain "policy windows" in an interactive "coupling"
to be recognized
that enhances the prospects for competing policy 1solutions
29
and added to the political agenda for final action.
As Kingdon and others make clear, it is impossible in the political
context to separate completely those (positive) judgments of fact from
(normative) judgments of value. While statements of fact and value
typically are intertwined in the heat of the political process, they are not the
same thing.' 30 Kingdon notes for example that policy problems are defined,
and not just discovered, and contain a "perceptual, interpretive element.' 3'
122. See generally D. Linda Garcia & Ellen B. Surles, The Rise and Fall of Media
Ownership Issues: A Network Perspective of the Policy Field (Oct. 6, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://dlindagarcia.comlwp-content/uploads/tpre-entry.doc).
123. See Ruhl, supra note 116, at 34 (identifying four core functions: defining problem
and objectives, select models, select players, and monitoring and evaluating performance).
124. See generally JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES
(2d. ed. 2003). Kingdon has been located within the "pluralist" tradition of political science,
with his emphasis on the two separate domains of the political process and the policy
community. See ANDREW S. McFARLAND, NEOPLURALISM: THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL
PROCESS THEORY 128-30 (2004).
125. KINGDON, supranote 124, at 16-18.
126. Id.at90-115.
127. Id. at 116-144.
128. Id. at 145-164.
129. Id. at 165-195.
130. Geoffrey M. Hodgson, What is the Essence oflnstitutionalEconomics?, 34 J. ECON.
Iss. 317, 319 (2000).
131. KinGDON, supra note 124, at 110. Under another possible formulation, I see three
separate forms of analysis: (1)positive analysis: how the world works; what is; (2)
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A key flaw in policymakers' thinking is to confuse and conflate these
difficult as it may be, should be to pry
separate analytic steps; their job,
132
possible.
as
best
as
them apart
In crafting a policy design space, we first need to distinguish between
the different elements. The components I will suggest here include the why
(purpose, goals, and objectives), the how/who (institutions and
organizations), the which/when/where (tools), and the what (projects). The
goals are the largest, longest-term elements to be accomplished. As an
example, one policy goal could be to land a human being on the planet
Mars. The policy objectives are the intermediate term aims (building and
testing a rocket ship to send to Mars). The organizations are the public and
private players involved (Congress, NASA, contractors, and subcontractors), while the institutions are the legal and non-legal instruments
used (laws, regulations, contracts, and technical standards). The tools are
the practical mechanisms utilized for achieving all of the above (computer
programs that model different components of the rocket ship), while the
projects are the specific, short-term aims (devising elements of the engine
that will power the rocket).
As it turns out, the why component is the largely normative task of
formulating issues to be addressed, which correlates roughly to Kingdon's
"problems" stream. The how and who components match up well to
Kingdon's politics stream, while the what component of specific policy
prescriptions is similar to his policy stream. 133 It is one of this Article's
contentions that policymakers often overlook the rich variety of players,
processes, and tools available to help achieve their ultimate policy agenda.
In Kyle Dixon's words, they "conflate[] norm generation with
implementation of those norms.' 34 Thus, consistent with our discussion
thus far, the chief aim is to be bold about the vision of goals and objectives
(the ought), while more modest yet flexible and open-minded about the
particular programs and tools used to accomplish them (the is).
normative judgments: describing our understanding of standards or norms; what ought to be;
and (3) policy prescription: what policies should be adopted; what is to be done.
132. One example is the generation of economic output (largely a positive judgment),
versus the distribution of economic output (largely a normative judgment). Foley insists that
"any attempt" to separate the positive and the normative in political economics is "futile"
because our attitudes towards capitalism and its social logic cannot be distinguished from
our analysis of its workings. FOLEY, supra note 50, at 215. Nonetheless, we can try.
133. Kingdon's analysis does not expressly include a counterpart to my suggested
"adaptive toolkit" and its framing mechanisms, although it appears he may subsume those
elements within the problem definition stream.
134. KYLE D. DIXON, THAT'S THE QUESTION: REMEMBERING INSTITUTIONAL
COMPETENCIES IN A NEW ERA OF PROGREssIvE FCC REGULATON 1 (2009) (original
emphasis omitted), available at http://fcc-reform.org/sites/fcc-reform.org/files/dixon20090105.pdf. Dixon suggests that policymakers "take a breath" between these two acts. Id.
at 11.
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1.

The Whys of Policymaking: Purpose, Goals and Objectives
Initially, we must develop the rationale for taking a public policy
position. As I have explained, government policies and economic forces
coevolve together. The context is all-important. Our goals and objectives
should be wedded to our understanding of any specific drawbacks in
society, which our best analysis tells us is unlikely to be corrected, save
some policy input.
The why of policymaking admittedly is a singularly subjective
component of the entire process. There is "no universal, scientific, or
objective method of problem definition," nor is there one for approaching
policy goals and objectives in a purely apolitical way. 135 Certain conditions
come to be seen as problems based on nothing more than our individual
values and beliefs. 136 Our goals and objectives typically are defined in
politics. And yet, our approach still can be grounded, to the extent possible,
in concrete concerns about our daily lives. In this Article, I will assume that
our overarching policy aim is to achieve the "public good," which should
be defined as encompassing the sum total of personal, social, cultural,
educational, economic, and democratic values worth37 having. Together
these overlapping values support "human flourishing.'
Private markets are one important way of achieving the public good
(as an input), and a highly constructive activity in its own right (as an
output). But there is more to life than buying and selling goods and
services, and the obvious material benefits that result. Contrary to the way
many people today interpret Adam Smith, it is a fallacy to treat the
economic sphere as separate from the rest of social life. 138 Monetary

135.
STONE, supra note 55, at 133, 231. Bromley makes the strong case that
policymakers should utilize "abduction," or reasoning by inference from effect to cause. In
seeking out the reasons - the why - for something, we are diagnosing the possible causes
for certain empirical regularities, using testable hypotheses, which then allows us to select
an appropriate path to achieve our ultimate goal. BROMLEY,supra note 48, at 23-24, 96.
"The essential purpose of abduction is the production of belief about specific events." Id. at
24. One important implication is that abduction is not self-referential, but instead is
externally grounded in the world it seeks to explain. Id. at 114.
136. Id. at21.
137. For one of many (blatantly naturalistic) philosophical approaches to "human
flourishing," or collective activities geared towards the ultimate end of human good, see
OwEN FLANAGAN, THE REALLY HARD PROBLEM: MEANING IN A MATERIAL WORLD 7-13
(2007) (discussing six ways of making meaning in our lives: art, science, technology, ethics,
politics, and spirituality); see also DANIEL C. DENNETr, FREEDOM EvoLvEs 302 (2003)
(ever-evolving human freedom is "the capacity to achieve what is of value in a range of
circumstances"); MARK JOHNSON, THE MEANING OF THE BODY: AESTHETICS OF HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING 264, 272-74 (2007) (noting that embodied meaning emerges from relations
and connections grounded in human/environmental coupling).
138. FOLEY,supra note 50, at xiii.
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incentives are only part of the human story, 139 and there are many things
40
worth having that have little to no obvious short-term economic worth.'
At bottom, public policy is about the public good, however one chooses to
define it. New policies emerge from governmental processes not due to
some sudden realization of the economic efficiencies involved, but because
of a collective commitment to how the future ought to be constituted.14 ' As
a result, the public good should be informed by the best policies from
numerous related fields such as sociology, history, political science and
psychology. However, the various schools within Emergence Economics
public good, both
should provide a basic foundation to help us achieve the 142
benefits.
non-economic
and
success
economic
of
in terms
Further, some set up a strict dichotomy between the polis (the
political community) as opposed to the agora (the economic
community).143 I submit that such a rigid separation of activities is
needlessly artificial. In many modem discussions, each community has
been drained of the vitality, scope, and centrality that were their
provenance in ancient Greece. For starters, we should not overlook the
larger "community" of free individuals that subsumes both. Also, the polis
was not just the political arm of the state, but rather the self-sufficient
community of citizens. 44 Similarly, the agora was the social center and
139. See KEN BINMORE, NATURAL JUSTICE 193-94 (2005) (nothing prevents our planning
to use markets whenever markets are appropriate, but a society that relies only on markets is
leaving much of its potential unfulfilled).
140. Dick Teresi tells the story of physicist Robert Wilson's testimony before Congress
in support of building Fermilab, the world's largest particle accelerator. Dick Teresi,
ForeignPolicy, Flemish Painters,and PharoahPlacement: The Many Purposesof Science,
IN CHARACTER, Winter 2005, availableat http://www.incharacter.org/article.php?article= 18.
Despite the best prodding efforts of congressional backers of the $250 million project,
Wilson refused to justify it on national defense or other grounds. "It has nothing to do
directly with defending our country except to make it worth defending." Id.
141. See BROMLEY, supra note 48, at 18, 143.
142. "Let [the public interest] be an empty box, but no matter; in the polis, people
expend a lot of energy trying to fill up that box [with foresight, planning, and conscious
effort]. The concept of public interest is to the polis what self-interest is to the market."
STONE, supra note 55, at 21.
143. Bromley points out that this "demarcationist vision" is foundational to the claim
that the science of economics is separate from (and superior to) the art of governance and
politics. BROMLEY, supra note 48, at 199. Stone identifies the agora (unfavorably) with
rational decision-making models and autonomous, self-interested individuals. STONE, supra
note 55, at 15-34. That view apparently is influenced by Old School Economics, and no
longer should be seen as the way that markets and individuals really operate. At the same
time, I would agree generally with Stone's comparably favorable assessment of the polis as
characterized by constant and forthrightly political striving to achieve the public interest. Id.
As Bromley puts it, society should decide what it wants before consulting economists to
determine how to get there. BROMLEY, supra note 48, at 211.
144. See Steve Basson, Beware Greeks Bearing Gifts: The Greek Agora Revisited as a
Discontinuous Subject of Historical Knowledge, in LIMITS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61

communal heart of the polis, not just the marketplace. In essence, the agora
is the public space where many forms of discourse and exchange took place
within the polis.' 45 This view mirrors what Benkler calls "The Great
Agora," which facilitated the unmediated conversation of the many with
the many,146 and should inform our more robust conceptions of the market
under Emergence Economics.
First, then, we must explicate the overall purpose for our policy
activities: to achieve the goals and objectives laid out in the previous
Section. The why here is straightforward: we seek to discipline the market
behavior of particular economic agents, either to do things that they would
not otherwise do, or refrain from doing things they otherwise would do.
This can be accomplished directly or indirectly, by various means.
Next, we must develop our policy goal. This is the most ambitious,
longest time-scale element to be accomplished, and is intended to influence
large-scale technological change. In our example, the one goal is landing a
spaceship on Mars. A goal constitutes a normative statement-the ought
we decide we wish to achieve.
The objectives are the more concrete, intermediate-term aims to meet
the goal, in this case, building and testing a rocket ship capable of being
sent to Mars. One can break down the objective component into three
stages: design, implementation, and performance. 47 Lipsey cautions that
' 48
these objectives should be "clear, unambiguous, and single-minded."'
but still
Importantly, adverse side-effects should be expected as inevitable,
49
accepted if social benefits are judged to be greater than the costs.
I will explore each of these three components later in this Article in
the context of communications policy.

ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE SOCIETY OF ARcmTEcTURAL HIsToIANs AUSTRALIA AND

NEW ZEALAND 14-19 (2004). The polis gave rise to a new sense of individual and collective

being, and to spaces of free action and speech to serve each citizen's "political conditions of
life." Id.at 15.
145. Id.at 16 (The agora was "a space of multiple and overlapping activities whose
juxtaposed and interacent orders of political, religious, commercial and urban possibility
denote a complex discourse of collective space").
146. See Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of
Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 565

(2000).
147. See LIPSEY, CARLAW & BEKAR, supra note 92, at 540-41 (discussing what the

authors call "focused policies"--encouraging the development of specific technologies or
products-which corresponds well to this Article's concept of "objectives").
at 539.
148. Id.
149. Id.

Number 3]

ADAPTIVE POLICYMAKING

2. The "Hows" and "Whos" of Policymaking: Institutions and
Organizations
It is not enough to understand the teachings of Emergence Economics,
and what it takes to be an adaptive policymaker. There is the concomitant
need to have the ability and will to translate that understanding into actual
policy-Kingdon's "politics" stream. As we shall see, this is where trustbuilding institutions and organizations become so critical. Without the
proper players and rules at the table, the actual policy outcome will falter,
regardless of the level of understanding by policymakers.
Further, as pointed out earlier, it is a fallacy to think of the "free
market" as some blissful, natural realm comprised of nothing but happy
buyers and sellers. Markets are created mechanisms, a combination of our
evolutionary-derived market forces and our chosen institutions and
organizations. The latter do not spring to life unbidden-they develop over
time at that place where the economic and the political come together. 5 °
Markets require an institutional infrastructure to enable and sustain them.'51
In turn, our policymakers craft the rules and players of the economic
game-the "visible hand" of the government at play. Blocher makes the
point well: "[fiar from being a place where individuals costlessly and
perfectly pursue their self-interest, the marketplace turns out to be
that regularize interactions and lower
populated with 5institutions
2
transaction costs.'

150. See Rubin, supra note 26, at 2 ("Social structure, property rights, and rule-like
behavior are older than Homo sapiens, so that it is not meaningful to talk about human
beings existing solely as individuals in an environment with no political or legal structure.
There was never a time when human beings existed with no rules."). Bromley even claims
that there is "no such thing as the market," but instead "arenas of exchange that are the
product of prior human creation." BROMLEY, supra note 48, at 32-33. He, too, would agree
that any market is a social construct. Id.
151. Barbara Cherry, Institutional Governance for Essential Industries Under
Complexity: Providing Resilience Within the Rule of Law, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
2009), available at http://lgst.wharton.upenn.edu/cmcl/papers/2008/
(forthcoming
cherry.pdf. As Douglass North summarizes the point, "[t]he structure, whether of individual
markets or an entire political/economic system, is a human-made creation whose
functioning is neither automatic nor 'natural."' DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE
PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 162 (2005).
152. Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 835, 838
(2008). For the same reason, to be pro-market and pro-business are two separate things. To
support working markets is to favor institutional and organizational design and tailored
policy inputs that collectively enable markets to operate in an optimal fashion for as many
participants as possible. To be pro-business, by contrast, is to favor only one side of a multifactored equation, in the process downplaying the other ingredients that make for a strong
and vibrant market economy (one can make a similar observation about those advocating
only "pro-consumer" policies). If the financial crises of 2008-09 have demonstrated
anything, it is that U.S. policymakers tend to side too often with those waving the probusiness banner, at the expense of the larger interests of a healthy marketplace. One
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Lipsey, for one, shows that the success of a policy is not determined
solely by its blueprint, but also depends on the specific context in which the
policy is implemented-the institution and the organization.'5 3 Policies that
work well are designed to operate within the institutional competencies of
organizations that will administer them. Thus, a policy that looks good on
paper still4 may run aground due to poor organizational or institutional
15
choices.

In this Part, we will look more closely at the hows and whos of
policymaking: the institutions and organizations, respectively. In some
respects, we will be guided by thinkers adhering to the New Institutional
Economics (NE).
a.

The InstitutionalPlaforms:Rules of the Game
Much of human interaction and activity is structured in terms of overt
or implicit rules-the how of accomplishing something. These rules of the
game have been called institutions. As Hayek reminds us, "[m]an is as
much a rule-following animal as a purpose-seeking one.' 15 5 Rules defined
broadly can include norms of behavior and social conventions on one end
of the scale, as well as legal rules on the other end. All markets are social
institutions, not abstract entities, which operate in a given framework of
law, taxation, and social obligations or expectations. 56 A legal code, a
57
farmer's market, and a crop rotation are examples of institutions.1
Moreover, incentives drive markets. And institutions are the incentive
structure of economies.1 58 Belief systems constitute the "internal
representation[s] of the human landscape," and institutions the "external

challenge going forward is to resist the urge to adopt either pro- or anti-business (as opposed
to market-enhancing) financial policies.
153. LIPSEY, CARLAW & BEKAR, supra note 92, at 522, 527.
154. Id.at 540. Nelson and Winter similarly observe that the particular institutions and
procedures for arriving at and modifying policy decisions determine the way in which the
various social forces are translated into new policy departures. NELSON & WINTER, supra
note 34, at 372. The authors note that "[s]ometimes the institutional machinery for making
policy seems to take on a life of its own." Id.
155. 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF THE
LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY, RULES AND ORDER 11 (1973). To
a certain extent, we become who we are "in virtue of what the prevailing institutional
arrangements predispose - indeed, often force - us to become. BROMLEY, supra note 48, at
47-48.
156. DIANE COYLE, THE SOULFUL SCIENCE: WHAT ECONOMISTS REALLY Do AND WHY IT
MATTERS 161 (2007).
157. David Schwab & Elinor Ostrom, The Vital Role of Norms andRules in Maintaining
Open Public and Private Economies, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES
INTHE ECONOMY 213 (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008).
158. NORTH,supranote 151, at vii.
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manifestation of that representation. ' 59 Douglass North observes that
"[iinstitutions structure human interaction by providing an incentive
structure to guide human behavior. But an incentive structure requires a
theory of the way the mind perceives the world and its functioning so that
the institutions will provide those incentives.' 160 Because institutions are
always imperfect16incentive systems, the analytical framework should take
that into account. '
"Today's financial world is the result of four millennia of economic
evolution," including "financial intermediation" fostered by various
institutional innovations. 162 Our evolved ability of abstract reasoning has
allowed us to create institutions like money, markets, and cities to help
reduce or even overcome transaction costs, notably the costs of searching
for resources, obtaining information, and negotiating and enforcing
transactions. 163 Institutions also provide the foundation of social trust
among strangers.' 64 This is important because "high-trust societies exhibit[]
higher rates of investment and growth.' ' 165 Human beings have inherited a
built-in psychology that makes them inherently suspicious of strangers, and
yet we are still able to benefit enormously from institutional arrangements
that make it reasonable to trust strangers as honorary friends.' 66 "[A]lmost
all of the institutions of modem society can be understood as dedicated to
an utterly unnatural division of labor between strangers.' 6 7 In these ways,
healthy institutions
contribute to the free flow of goods, services, and ideas
168
in society.
History clearly shows "how difficult it is for societies to evolve viable
and sustainable institutions of capitalism and how fragile and contingent
these institutions are.' ' 169 Government is necessary to establish the legal
159. Id. at49.
160. Id. at 66.
161. Id. at 67.
162. NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD
341 (2008).
163. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-92 (1937).
164. PAUL SEABRIGHT, THE COMPANY OF STRANGERS: A NATURAL HISTORY OF
ECONOMIC LiFE 244 (2004).
165. Paul J. Zak & Stephen Knack, Trust and Growth, 11 ECON. J. 295, 297 (2001),
availableat http://www.neuroeconomicstudies.org/pdf/Trust/20and%20Growth.pdf.

166.

SEABRIGHT,

supra note 164, at 243.

167. Id. at 244. On the other hand, fairness and a sense of equity appear to have roots in
our evolutionary past. See BINMORE, supra note 139, at 193-94 (exploring the evolutionary
origins of the human fairness norms that form the basis for our notion ofjustice).
168. Blocher, supra note 152, at 846. Geoffrey Hodgson believes that "[i]n a world of
incomplete and imperfect information, high transaction costs, asymmetrically powerful
relations, and agents with limited insight, powerful institutions are necessary to enforce
rights." Geoffrey Hodgson, What are Institutions?,40 J. ECON. ISSUES 1, 15 (2006).
169. FOLEY, supra note 50, at 224.
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institutions that allow for efficiency in both market transactions and the
formation of firms.'170 Markets and institutions are not "spontaneously
generated social phenomen[a]" and "'human nature' seems just as likely to
evolve stagnant, predatory power hierarchies as it is to create a progressive
capitalism."' 171 Yet, until recently, many commentators largely ignored
questions of institutional design when advocating policy goals, and in
particular, determining how to design government institutions that have the
best chance of pursing particular social goals and implementing sound
policy. 72 Thus, market capitalism requires conscious political effort to
foster the trust-generating institutions necessary to make it function at all.
i.

Institutions Defined

Institutions have been defined in a rich variety of ways. North
analogizes that "[i]nstitutions are the rules of the game; organizations are
the players; it is the interaction between the two that shapes institutional
change., 173 Alston says that "institutions are the informal norms and formal
laws of societies that constrain and shape decision-making,"'' 74 while
Bromley adds that they are "the means whereby the collective control of
individual action is given effect."' 175 Nelson insists that "the social
technologies that are employed in an economy are enabled and constrained
by things like laws, norms, expectations, governing structures and
mechanisms, customary modes of transacting and interacting."' 76 Hodgson
claims that institutions include "[1]anguage, money, law, systems of

170. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 40, at 111-12. "The historical problem of facilitating
stable capital, labor, and product markets eventually required governments... to produce
general institutional arrangements . . . around property rights, governance structures [for
controlling competition], rules of exchange, [and conceptions of control]." FLIOSTEIN, supra
note 46, at 27.
171. FOLEY, supra note 50, at 224. The economy essentially is embedded in, and
contingent upon, prevailing political norms and processes. BROMLEY, supra note 48, at 202.
172. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 40, at 106.
173. NORTH, supra note 151, at 59 (internal citation omitted). North broadly defines the
institutional framework as the political structure (how we develop and aggregate political
choices), plus the property rights structure (defines formal economic incentives), plus the
social structure (norms and conventions that define informal incentives in the economy). Id.
at 49.
174. Lee J. Alston, A Frameworkfor Understanding InstitutionalAnalysis in Law and
the Social Sciences 4 (American University of Paris, Working Paper No. 36, 2006) (on file
with author).
175. BROMLEY, supra note 48, at 31.
176. Richard R. Nelson, What Makes an Economy Productive and Progressive? What
Are the Needed Institutions? 8 (Sept. 24, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://www.hbs.edu/units/tom/docs/rnelsonI.pdf).
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the
weights and measures, table manners, and firms.' 77 In brief, whatever
78
parameters employed, institutions "make up the stuff of social life."'
Although there is some disagreement over what specific instruments
constitute institutions, 79 the single most important characteristic of
institutions is that they both constrain and enable behavior. Hodgson finds
that "the individual is socially and institutionally constituted."' 80 To some,
institutions amount to metaphorical prisons within which inmates act, or
the behavior of the inmates themselves. 18 North similarly finds that "the
performance characteristics of any market are a function of the set of
constraints imposed by 182institutions . . . that determine the incentive
structure in that market.'
The important takeaway is that there is a wide and often
underappreciated range of human instruments that can be utilized in
support of policymaking. 183 The NIE school has been wrestling for years
with questions about the appropriate institutions for a market economy.
Neoclassical economics generally was dismissive of institutions, and has
lacked empirical data about their role. By contrast, institutions constitute
"the alpha and the omega" of NIE, because they help determine economic
performance. 184 In particular, institutions-from law and contracts to norms
and codes of behavior-can reduce information uncertainty and transaction
costs. 8 5 "[D]ifferent institutional arrangements will lead to different
trajectories, different combinations of static and dynamic performance
characteristics-including [different] prices . . . , the diversity of services
to the market, and
available, the rate at which new services are introduced
186
content."'
and
services
to
access
of
the ubiquity
ii.

A Gamut of Institutional Choices

The market consists not just of formal systems of coordination, but
public and private codes of conduct, including "antecedent patterns and
177. Hodgson, supra note 130, at 327.
178. Id.at 2.
179. Nelson argues that it is "a very heterogeneous bag of things that are being called
institutions." Nelson, supra note 176, at 4. He questions a clean distinction between
institutions and organizations, as North and others find. Id at 10.
180. Hodgson, supra note 130, at 327.
181. Hodgson, supra note 168, at 8.
182. NORT, supra note 151, at 76.
183. Some believe that institutions should not be seen merely as tools of regulators, but
complex social processes in their own right. STONE, supra note 55, at 351.
184. Alston, supra note 174, at 2.
185. NIE also abandons neoclassical assumptions about perfect information and zero
transaction costs. Jedidiah Brewer, et al., Law and the New InstitutionalEconomics: Water
Markets andLegal Change in California,26 J.L. & POL'Y 183, 183-84 (2008).
186. Bauer & Wildman, supra note 63, at 433.
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norms of social trust, community, and cooperation, without which market
exchange is inconceivable.' ' 7 These formal and informal institutions of
social interactions differ by degrees of coercion, flexibility, and
accountability, and formal versus informal constraints. Researchers are
now beginning to catalog88 the growing literature on various innovative
approaches to regulation.'
Of course, our most formal, authoritative, and enforceable institution
is law. Sources of law include constitutions, statutes, and judge-made (or
common) law. "[L]aw is fundamentally about levering human behavior in
directions it might not go on its own.',189 Legal rules also can be viewed as
mechanisms that individuals can utilize to deal with scarcity and conflict in
the environment. The rule of law is an emergent property of the
legal/policymaking system, 19° which has evolved in variation, selection,
and retention phases.' 9'
The particular form of law can make a genuine difference in
outcomes. Paul Zak shows, for example, that institutions based on English
common law tend to be more flexible and successful than institutions based
on the Napoleonic civil codes. 92 Common law as an institution owes its
longevity to the fact that it is not a final codification of legal rules, but
rather a set of procedures for continually adapting broad principles to novel
circumstances. 193 Other commentators have shown that statutory
interpretation of a law is a complex adaptive system, which must either
187. ScoTT, supranote 30, at 351.
188. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Robert A. Kagan, Introduction, in REGULATION AND
REGULATORY PROCESSES xxii-xxvi (Cary Coglianese & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2007)
(summarizing "new directions in regulatory design").

189. Owen D. Jones, On the Nature of Norms: Biology, Morality, and the Disruption of
Order, 98 MICH. L. REv. 2072,2073-74 (2000) [hereinafter Nature of Norms]. While the law
is about regulating human behavior, Jones has written elsewhere how it lacks an
independent theory of how humans actually behave. See Owen D. Jones, Proprioception,
Non-Law, and BiologicalHistory, 53 FLA. L. REv. 831 (2001) [hereinafter Proprioception].
190. See Cherry,supra note 151.
191. See Mauro Zamboni, From 'Evolutionary Theory and Law' to a 'Legal
Evolutionary Theory', 9 GERMAN L. J. 515 (2008).
192. Paul Zak, Introduction, in MORAL MARKETS, supra note 157, at xv. One author
reports that common law countries (with judge-made law traditions) experience faster
economic growth than civil law countries (with legal code traditions), reflecting the
common law's greater orientation toward private economic activity and the civil law's
greater orientation toward government intervention. See Paulo G. Mahoney, The Common
Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right (Jan. 2000) (UVA School of Law,
Working Paper No. 00-8); see also Mark White, Legal Practice and Economic Adaptation:
Common Practice and Roman Practice Compared (Feb. 17, 1997), (unpublished manuscript,
on file with
the Federal
Communications
Law Journal) available at
http://geocities.com/WallStreet/7891/praxix.htm (Common Practice, which permits what it
doesn't prohibit, enables more innovation and economic growth than Roman Practice,
which prohibits what it doesn't permit).
193. SCOTT,supra note 30, at 357.
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evolve or collapse,' 94 while still others find that "transformative change" is
at the heart of the ever-evolving common law process. 195
Putting aside formal law, the next set of institutions involves power
that is wielded not by those elected to office, but rather those who
administer the laws. Regulations are those government policies ostensibly
based on statutory law, but which typically provide far more detailed
guidance to market players.' 96 The two fundamental choices of when to
apply regulation are ex ante (before the fact) and ex post (after the fact).
Beyond traditional "command and control" legal instruments, which
are the usual focus of any administrative law textbook, the policy world
begins to look a bit fuzzy. Nonetheless, there exists a gamut of other policy
institutions which until recently have received markedly less attention. One
example is the policy principle. Principles are even more flexible than ex
post regulations, but often do not carry the same coercive effect.' 97
Another type of less formal institution is the bully pulpit, or raised
eyebrows. Rather than formally and expressly apply a regulatory
requirement on a particular actor or industry, policymakers instead can rely
on their authority (and the implicit threat to wield it) in order to compel
action. 98 This type of policymaking sometimes may not be witnessed in
openly public contexts, but its impact on market agents nonetheless can be
very real.' 99
194. See Jeffrey G. Miller, Evolutionary Statutory Interpretation: Mr. Justice Scalia
Meets Darwin, 20 PACE L. REv. 409 (2000).
195. ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, EVOLUTION AND THE COMMON LAW 2-5 (2005).
196. See Regulations - Definition from the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,
www.meriam-webster.com/dictionary/regulations (last visited Apr. 18, 2009) (regulation is
"a rule or order issued by an executive authority or regulatory agency of a government and
having the force of law.").
197. Kenneth Jull & Stephen Schmidt, Preventing Harm in Telecommunications
Regulation: A New Matrix of Principles and Rules Within the Ex Ante Versus Ex Post
Debate 13 (2008) (unpublished manuscript presented at the 19th European Regional
Conference of the International Telecommunications Society, Rome, Italy, September 1820, 2008, on file with author). The FCC's Internet Policy Statement is one such set of
principles, although the actual scope of applicability and enforceability is yet to be decided
by the courts. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Internet Policy Statement, FCC 05-151 (rel. Sept. 23, 2005).
198. See Bully Pulpit - Definition from the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,
available at http://www.merriam-webster.comldictionary/bully/2Opulpit (last visited Apr.
18, 2009) (a bully pulpit is "a prominent public position (as a political office) that provides
an opportunity for expounding one's views").
199. Then-FCC Chairman Michael Powell employed this approach when he suggested,
first in a speech, then later in a law review article, the four "Internet Freedoms" that
broadband providers should adopt under his "informal guidance." Michael K. Powell,
Chairman, FCC, Address to Voice on the Net Conference (Oct. 19, 2004) (prepared remarks
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-253325Al.pdf); see
also Michael K. Powell, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principlesfor the Industry,
3 J. TELECOMM. HIGH TECH. L. 5, 11-12 (2004).
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Then there are those institutions that bring together public and private
regulation of the marketplace. The "stronger" version is co-regulation,
where the government and the private sector each carve out a specific role
for themselves. Ofcom, the British telecommunications regulator, recently
undertook a comprehensive survey to determine when and how to employ
co-regulation. 200 The "weaker" public/private institutional approach is selfregulation, which delegates rulemaking and enforcement functions entirely
to the regulated firms or other third-party groups. 20 1 Angela Campbell
defines self-regulation as industry doing one or more of the functions of
regulation-legislation, enforcement, and adjudication.2 °2 The goal of self
regulation is to lower transaction costs, provide a principled structure to
facilitate negotiations, and provide some measure of predictability and
reliability to a framework that avoids the escalation and politicization of
disputes and understanding. 20 3 The claimed "pros" of self-regulation
include greater efficiency, flexibility, incentives to comply, and cost
savings versus a government role; the claimed "cons" include industry
subversion of the process, inadequate enforcement and sanctions, and lack
of compliance and anti-competitive conduct by bad actors. 204 The success
of self-regulation can depend on industry incentives and expertise, the
ability to audit activities, objective standards, a fair process, and public
participation. 20 5 Business has an obvious interest in adopting systems of

200.

OFFICE OF COMM.,

INITIAL ASSESSMENTS

OF WHEN TO ADOPT SELF-

OR CO-

REGULATION: CONSULTATION (Mar. 27, 2008) (U.K.) (seeking public comment on proposed
regulations), available at http://www.itu.int/ituweblogs/treg/content/binary/condoc.pdf; see
also OFFICE OF COMM., IDENTIFYING APPROPRIATE REGULATORY SOLUTIONS: PRINCIPLES FOR
ANALYZING SELF- AND CO-REGULATION: STATEMENT (Dec. 10, 2008) (U.K.) (laying out
situations where self-regulation and co-regulation are more likely to work well), availableat

http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/coregulation/condoc.pdf
201. Coglianese & Kagan, supranote 188, at xxiii.
202. Angela J. Campbell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 711, 71415(1999).
203. PHILnP J. WEISER, EXPLORING SELF REGULATORY STRATEGIES FOR NETWORK
MANAGEMENT, FLATIRONS SUMMIT ON INFORMATION POLICY 7 (2008), available at
http://www.silicon-flatirons.org/documents/publications/sumniits/WeiserNetwork
Management.pdf. Weiser explores various self regulation models, including FCC-related
examples. Id. at 21-24.
204. Campbell, supranote 202, at 715-720.
205. Id. at 757-761. Similarly, Kyle Dixon and Ray Gifford talk about "private trust
systems," which include "ongoing industry consortia, standard-setting organizations, and
other entities designed to build trust among typically antagonistic parties for their mutual
benefit." These systems create a framework for channeling business tensions productively
and predictably, even as compared to public regulation. Kyle Dixon & Ray Gifford,
Complementing Advocacy with Private Trust Systems and Other Long-Term Collaboration,
CONVERGENCE COMPASS LEGAL UPDATE 1 (Kamlet Sheperd & Reichert, LLP Feb. 2008),
available at http://www.kamletshepherd.com/UserFiles/File/March%20Convergence%20

Compass.pdf.
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self-regulation whenever it can stave off more costly forms of
governmental regulation. 6
From co- and self-regulation we then move into the world of
increasingly private activity, reliant more on contractual arrangements and
even handshakes over statutes or regulations. In particular, all economic
activity, to some degree, utilizes codes of conduct and standards. These are
stand-alone measures adopted by industry players which are intended to
demonstrate a common way of carrying on business. Examples include the
IEEE (originally the Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers), an
international engineering body of nearly 400,000 members which develops
the industrial standards that enable, among other things, modern
communications networks. °7 Despite the lack of coercive governmental
authority, industry standards still compel a certain constraint on market
behavior based on developing consensus.
Social norms are the final, and in some ways the most intriguing,
form of institution. One can view norms as the shared understanding within
a group of people of how to live and work together. °8 They are behavioral
regularities, based on networks of mutual beliefs of approval or disapproval
of conduct. 20 9 These "rules of conduct [] constrain self-interested behavior
and [] are adopted and enforced in an informal, decentralized setting. '2 1° In
a broader sense, social norms are a "common expectation and practice
regarding behavior in a particular relationship setting," such as people
paying taxes, or criminals going to jail.21

206. Coglianese & Kagan, supra note 188, at xxiii. There is some evidence that the
embrace of self-regulation by corporations is motivated largely by pervasive fear and
anxiety about state coercion, rather than the costs or efficacy of regulation. Jodi L. Short,
Coercive State Anxiety and the Rise of Self-Regulation 58 (Georgetown Law Faculty
Working Paper 1340053, 2009), abstractavailableat www.ssm.com/abstract=1340053.
207. IEEE - IEEE Standards Association, http://www.ieee.org/web/standards/home/
index.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2009). At last count, the IEEE had nearly 1,300 different
standards development projects underway. Id.
208. DANIEL FRIEDMAN, MORALS AND MARKETS: AN EVOLUTIONARY ACCOUNT OF THE
MODERN WORLD 19 (2008). Friedman goes on to explain how our hunter-gatherer ancestors
had a behavioral toolkit that included egalitarianism, sharing meals, and hospitality and gift
exchanges; these "spot exchanges" of favors eventually turned into the central marketplace
of the bazaar. Id.at 24-35.
209. See Hodgson, supra note 168, at 5. One commentator finds that sources of
regulation include "organizational code," or behavioral, strategic, and legal norms arising
spontaneously. Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Organizational Code: A Complexity Theory
Perspective on Technology and Intellectual Property Regulation, 11 J.Tech. L. & Pol'y xv
(2006).
210. Paul G. Mahoney & Chris W. Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social Evolution:
Is the FittestNorm Efficient?, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 2027, 2030 (2001).
211. Id.at 2032.
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Importantly, norms evolve,212 derived from natural selection shaping
the brain.21 3 Evolved human fairness norms lie at the root of our notions of
justice. 214Thsilknom,
This is likely because strongly held norms, such aas fair dealings,
can reduce the need for more costly formal transaction mechanisms, like
contracting and enforcement instruments. Sanctions and reputation effects
can deter serious cheating.21 5 However, questions remain concerning how
informal constraints evolve, and their relationship to change in formal
rules.21 6 For example, experts debate how much norms evolve as a result of
conscious, deliberate change, and how much of that evolution is
incremental, and non-deliberate in nature.2 17
Social capital is the term used for that set of informal values or norms
shared among members of a group-such as reliability, honesty, and
reciprocity-that permit cooperation among them. 218 Many informal
sanctions rely on social ties and outcomes such as reputational loss. 219 Our
open, self-organizing economic system is effective only because, most of
the time, most of its participants abide by internally motivated "positive"
values, such as trustworthiness, fairness, and honoring commitments.2 2
External institutions intervene when there is a deviation from a given
standard-such as excessive greed or unduly risky behavior-thereby
reinforcing values-based expectations. "[T]rust is a cognitive assessment
tool that suggests... it would not be unwise22to make oneself vulnerable to
another for the prospect of a potential gain.", '
There was never a time when humans lived with no rules, or when
222
such rules were created de novo. Indeed, "without any norms or rules

212. NORTH, supranote 151, at 50.

213. Jones, Nature of Norms, supra note 189, at 2074.
214. BINmORE, supra note 139. Binmore explains that "social contracts," the "set of
common understandings that allow the citizens of a society to coordinate their efforts," are
based on our capacity for empathetic identification with others. Id. at 3, 113-16.
215. FRiEDMAN, supranote 208, at 20-21.
216. NORTH, supranote 151, at 74.

217. Id. at76.
218. Jones, Nature ofNorms, supra note 189, at 2079-80.
219. Zak & Knack, supra note 165, at 295, 298-99, 300, 317. Because firms embedded
in a particular social group will be more sensitive to such informal sanctions, one policy
takeaway is to foster denser ties between agents.
220. Oliver Goodenough & Monika Gruter Cheney, Preface: Is Free Enterprise Values
in Action?, in MORAL MARKETS, supra note 157, at xxiii.

221. Erin Ann O'Hara, Trustworthiness and Contract, in MORAL MARKETS, supra note
157, at 175, 176. Adam Smith believed that "[w]here people seldom deal with one another,
we find that they are somewhat disposed to cheat, because they can gain more by a smart
trick than they can lose by the injury which it does their character." Adam Smith, Lecture on
the Influence of Commerce on Manners (1766), reprinted in REPUTATION: STUDIES INTHE
VOLUNTARY ELICrrATION OF GOOD CONDUCT 17 (Daniel B. Klein ed., 1997).

222. Rubin, supra note 26, at 52.
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related to the private exchange of goods, a Hobbesian state of nature
exists. ' 223 On the other hand, "[n]orms of honesty, integrity, [and]
reliability lower transaction costs. '224 "[H]istorically, the best results seem
to have come from modest and limited efforts to build institutions such as
central banks, social security, and antitrust authorities to deal with specific
problems. 22 5 These efforts show an attempt to balance unbridled selfinterest with larger social obligations, so as to promote the market's overall
benefits more widely.
For purposes of this Article, the takeaway is that "[s]ocial control...
often [can be] achieved through social norms-informal, decentralized
systems of consensus and cooperation-rather than through [commandand-control measures]. ' ' 226 Indeed, laws can inform norms, and vice
versa. 227 One scholar even argues that "there is no sharp difference between
social norms and law; rather, all rules begin as norms of some sort and as
complexity grows, some norms become enforced as laws. 228 Nonetheless,
the very real "difference between a norm and a rule is the presence of229a
[formalized] sanction [enforced by the state]: the OR ELSE condition."
The force of informal constraints is "derived from the beliefs of its
citizens. ' Guilt and shame can become norm enforcement mechanisms,
and in turn, leaders can use those emotions to enforce norms.231
iii.

Selecting the Right Institutional Approach
Now that we have briefly reviewed the varied taxonomy of
institutions, it would be useful to at least touch on some ways to think
about choosing the appropriate institutional approach for any particular
policy situation. The adaptive policy challenge is to align the institutional
platforms so that we have the best achievable policy balance: maximum
adaptability and flexibility, with some form of accountability, and minimal
223. Schwab & Ostrom, supra note 157, at 207.
224. NORTH, supra note 151, at 75. By contrast, some norms, such as racial
discrimination, can inhibit positive market outcomes, and have obvious negative social
impacts.
225. FOLEY, supra note 50, at 225.
226. Mahoney & Sanchirico, supra note 210, at 2027-28. Bromley concurs that the
"informal" end of the spectrum - "the norms, habits, standard practices, customs, traditions,
and conventions [ ] provide important boundaries to, and parameters for, much individual
and collective action...." BROMLEY, supra note 48, at 22-23.
227. Alston, supra note 174, at 3
228. PAUL H. RUBIN, DARwINIAN POLrrIcs: THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGIN OF FREEDOM 82
(2002).
229. Schwab & Ostrom, supra note 157, at 214.
230. Alston, supra note 174, at 4.
231. "[M]any business managers regard the risk of informal social sanctions as far more
salient and economically threatening than even the risk of regulatory penalties." Coglianese
& Kagan, supra note 188, at xxii.
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formality and factional control.232 In Barbara Cherry's language, we need
"regulatory resilience. 23 3
At their heart, institutions are about power, "the capacity to affect
others to get the outcomes one wants." 234 However, as Joseph Nye has
taught us, relying solely on the direct use of force-in his case, military
power-can be costly and potentially dangerous. Nye introduced the
concept of "soft power"-relying on diplomacy and cooperation-as
compared to the more traditional "hard power" of military force. 235 From
an institutional vantage point, we can interpret Nye's "hard power"
approach as relying primarily on the government's ability as a political
entity to bring formality, rigidity, coercion, accountability, and
enforceability to a situation.236 For our purposes, one can draw a parallel
between "hard" public policy, typically traditional laws and regulations,
and the "softer" institutions that by varying degrees are less formal or
coercive.
The diagram below shows the public/private space occupied by
certain policy institutions. The inverted pyramid illustrates the key tradeoffs involved in selecting certain forms of authority over others, as well as
the market's increasing reliance on more informal institutions. The diagram
reveals, for example, how shifting further up the institutional stack, away
from the more rigid and politicized laws and regulations, comes at the
expense of losing some elements of coercion and accountability.

232. See STONE, supra note 55, at 235 (commenting that "[tihe most important problem
in the design of rules is the tension between precision and flexibility"). To Bromley, "the
real dynamism of democratic capitalism is that the existing institutional arrangements are
regarded as the indispensable malleable architecture for adaptation." BROMLEY, supra note
48, at 74.
233. Cherry, supra note 151, at 2.
234. Interview by Peer Schouter with Joseph S. Nye Jr., Theory Talk #7: Joseph Nye on
Teaching America to be More British 2 (May 15, 2008), available at
http://theorytalks.fileave.com/TheoryTalk7_Nye.pdf.
235. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power, FOREIGN POLICY, Fall 1990, at 153.
236. While Nye does not use these precise words in describing "hard power", I argue
that the use of military force and other aggressive actions clearly involve each of these
concepts in some way.
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Institutions: An Inverted Pyramid of Options

According to some commentators, relying on more collaborative
administrative regimes with supportive stakeholders "increase[s] creativity,
' 237
improve[s] implementation, and heighten[s] democratic participation.
On the other hand, some argue that such projects will lack legitimacy
because the stakeholders' self-interests undermine such collaborative
endeavors, compared to a rule-bound, deterrence-based system.2 38 The
challenge is to balance the flexibility and adaptability of soft power
solutions, with legitimacy and accountability (by both policymakers and
economic actors), and the potential for enforceability of hard power
solutions. As one pair of researchers summarizes it:

237. Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54
DUKE L.J. 913, 949-50 (2005).
238. Id. at 950-51. Of course, in retrospect, placing trust in financial bodies to develop,
on their own, the appropriate standards for lending money-from financial derivatives to
home loans-was a colossal mistake, one from which we undoubtedly will be learning for
many years.
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The implication for newer approaches to regulation seems clear. At the
same time that these approaches temper the rigidity that can
accompany conventional regulatory strategies, they present particular
needs for effective monitoring and enforcement since they are being
used, inherently, in contexts where firms' private interests do not
with the overall demands society places on
comport 23completely
9
business.

There are a number of important considerations when addressing this
public/private space. An initial issue is generating the desired level of
accountability, both for public and private agents. For example, what
recourse does an economic agent have if a government official is using
"soft power"--such as the bully pulpit described above-in an attempt to
coerce certain market behavior from that agent? Appellate courts normally
would deny review because of the amorphous and informal nature of the
coercion. On the other hand, it would be far too legalistic and burdensome
to establish a formal review mechanism for such informal actions. Of
course, soft power can work both ways, so economic agents have the
ability to use the same types of informal institutions to push back on or
persuade the government agents.
A second significant issue is making policies more adaptable.
"[I]nstitutional change is much slower and culturally more complex than
technological or economic change," and includes "[o]vercoming the inertia
of vested interests, long-held ... dogmas, cultural views, practical routines
and ingrained habits., 240 As a result, "when we can only guess at the extent
of our ignorance, realizing that we are almost certain to be confronted with
unknown unknowns, it makes sense to build buffering capacity into our
institutions: that is, to give them the slack and resources they need to
respond to surprises."24 ' Institutions should be powerfully shaped by
242
practical skills, to be "multifunctional, plastic, diverse, and adaptable."
Conversely, laws and "regulations that are too blunt and inflexible could
create additional costs that other measures might avoid while still achieving
the [policy] goals [and objectives]. 24 3
239. Coglianese & Kagan, supra note 188, at xxvi.
240. CARLOTA PEREZ, TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTIONS AND FINANCIAL CAPITAL: THE
DYNAMICS OF BUBBLES AND GOLDEN AGES 165 (2002).
241. HOMER-DIXON, supra note 64, at 290.
242. ScoTr, supra note 30, at 353. Atkinson points out how new growth theory
"suggests that the development of new institutions to boost innovation will require both
experimentation and evaluation of public policies as we attempt to find our way in this new
era of knowledge-based economics." ATKINSON, supra note 49, at 248. After all,
"innovation takes place in the context of institutions and as such shifts the focus of
economic policy toward creating an institutional environment that supports technological
change, entrepreneurial drive, and higher skills." Id. Thus, "a host of new policy tools can
boost productivity and innovation." Id. at 249.
243. ATKINSON & AUDRETSCH, supra note 4, at 23.
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A related adaptability problem is what has been called the social
acceleration of time. 2 " William Scheuerman posits that the technological
changes brought about by broadband networks and the Internet,
"represent[] the most obvious manifestation of a broader set of social and
economic trends having far-reaching implications for the temporal horizons
of human existence. ' 245 His thesis is that many traditional notions about
liberal democracy, including the separation of powers between executive,
legislative, and judicial branches, rest on assumptions about temporality,
which become increasingly problematic with the heightened pace of
modem social life. In particular, social acceleration undermines the role of
elected legislatures vis-A-vis powerful executives and courts. To
Scheuerman, the challenge is to establish "[a] viable political system,
outfitted with [institutions that allow] rich possibilities for freewheeling
deliberation and inclusive interest representation.",246 One possible
implication is that we should rely more on softer power institutions, like
norms, over laws, because the former are more decentralized and adaptable
to change.247
A third issue is fostering market incentives. To Paul Romer, the "most
important job for economic policy is to create an institutional environment
that supports technological change. 248 The rule of law and informal norms
can ensure that productive economic behavior will be rewarded.249
Aligning market incentives involves a mix of pecuniary self-interest, nonpecuniary self-interest, and third-party interest. Raising trust levels also
raises the possibility of mutually beneficial arrangements and their
economic predictability. The ultimate goal is for the adaptive policymaker
to find potential mutuality of interests between disparate market agents.
A fourth issue is dealing with the echoes of the past. Public and
private "players [alike] are constrained by path dependence-the limits to
choices arising from the combination of beliefs, institutions, and artifactual

244. SCHEuERMAN, supra note 66.

245. Id. at xiii.
246. Id. at 195; see also Cherry, supra note 151, at 19-21 (stating that social acceleration
undermines the rule of law and threatens liberal democracy).
247. See SCHEuERMAN, supra note 66, at 209-17.
248. Paul M. Romer, Address at the Stanford Alumni Assoc. Conf. in London, Beyond
Classical and Keynesian Macroeconomic Policy (Apr. 5 1997) (transcript available at
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/research/faculty/news-releases/Romer.Paul/London-Speech
.html); see also Paul M. Romer, Beyond Classicaland Keynesian Macroeconomic Policy,
POLICY OPTIONS, July-Aug. 1994, at 2, available at http://www.iisec.ucb.edu.bo/
amercado/clases/macroeconomiamaestria/lecturas/Beyond classical and keynesian_
macroeconomic_policy.pdf.
249. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ROBERT E. LITAN & CARL J. SCHRAMM, GOOD CAPITALISM,
BAD CAPITALISM, AND THE ECONOMICS OF GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 48-52 (2007).
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structure that have been inherited from the past. 25 ° Path dependency is an
enduring lesson derived from studying the past.25' In the case of laws, for
example, we can see that legal path dependencies serve as a selection and
retention mechanism which can lead to lock-in effects, preventing the
future application of superior legal rules.
Thus, by balancing these and other considerations, we should be able
to sketch out the right institutional framework to drive innovation and
economic growth. Paul David has explored one possible avenue:
There is thus a case to be made for devoting greater attention to
matching the technological innovations of the Internet by mobilizing
other, nontechnologically implemented modes of regulation. Greater
consideration surely is worth directing to the design of legal, political,
and social rule structures and administrative procedures, of the kind
that proved to be efficacious in supporting successful economic
exploitation
of previous technical advances in communications
252
networks.

b.

The OrganizationalPlatforms:Players of the Game
In addition to institutions (the rules of the political/economic game),
we also have the entities which actually play the game. These players
correlate to Kingdon's "garbage can model of organizational choice,"
which carries his conception of a process characterized by "organized
anarchy., 253 As with institutions, I will provide only a brief overview of the
identity and role of various organizations, with an emphasis on what some
have called the "political market."
i.

Organizations Defined
Organizations are groups of individuals bound together by a common
purpose to achieve certain agendas. To some, organizations comprise a
special kind of institution, with additional features including criteria to
establish their boundaries, principles of sovereignty, and chains of
command.254 In addition to government actors, they include political,
250. NORTH,supra note 151, at 80.
251. Id. at77.

252. Paul A. David, Economic Policy Analysis and the Internet: Coming to Terms with a
Telecommunications Anomoly, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATnON TEcHNOLoGiES 148, 164 (Robin Mansell, et al. eds. 2007).
253. KINGDON, supra note 124, passim. Kingdon sees organizations not as computers
solving problems, but as garbage cans into which a mix of problems and possible solutions
are poured. Id. One implication is that administrative decisions cannot be understood in
purely rational terms, but rather in the three process streams and their precise mix in the
garbage can. ld; see also G. David Garson, "Garbage Can" Models: Multiple Stream
Theory, http://faculty.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/PA765/garbagecan.htm (last visited Apr. 18,

2009).
254. Hodgson, supranote 168, at 8.
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social, and educational bodies, like corporations, political parties, law
firms, trade unions, and universities.2 5 Much like institutions,
organizations run the gamut from formal to informal, accountable to nonaccountable, fixed to flexible.
Each organization is its own complex adaptive system, 256 which
among other things means we should look beneath the surface to recognize
the actions of the disparate players within. The treatment of an organization
as a social actor should not ignore the potential conflict within the
organization.257
The most important takeaway is that organizational perspectives
dictate how one looks at a policy issue. Whether you are a corporate CEO,
a public interest advocate, a political appointee chosen to run a government
agency, or a career bureaucrat in that same agency, what you see depends
on where you stand.
Political Bodies as Organizations
Political bodies are an obvious player in the market. Government sets
the ground rules, controls the subsidy and tax flows, and assigns the
burdens of accountability. In the United States, the triumvirate consists of
the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Our
republican form of government owes much of its intellectual origin to
James Madison, who in The FederalistNo. 10, explained how politics tend
to be captured by "factions," or special interests.2 58 Madison famously was
deeply suspicious of the twin dangers of majority and minority tyranny in
popular democracy, and called upon a republican form of government to
protect the natural rights of citizens against both kinds of factions.2 59 Our
three-headed system traces its intellectual origins as well to Madison's
concern about creating the checks and balances of political power.
federal
apparatus-the
administrative
the
Some
believe
Administering
government.
branch
of
a
fourth
bureaucracy-constitutes
complex policies requires a wide variety of expertise, including
ii.

255. Id. at 9.
256. Eve Mitleton-Kelly, Ten Principles of Complexity and Enabling Infrastructures,in
COMPLEX

SYSTEMS

AND

EVOLUTIONARY

PERSPECTIVES

ON

ORGANISATIONS:

THE

APPLICATION OF COMPLEXITY THEORY TO ORGANISATIONS 23 (Eve Mitleton-Kelly ed.,
2003).
257. Hodgson, supra note 168, at 10.
258. THE FEDERALISTNo. 10 (James Madison).
259. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE,

7-8 (1997).

For an

entertaining and illuminating account of how democracy can be viewed as serving the same
function in political systems that sexual reproduction serves in biological systemsenhancing resistance to parasites-see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Is Democracy Like Sex?, 48
VAND. L. REV. 1635 (1995).
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technological, commercial, financial, and administrative skills. 260 Various
public sector organizations have different capabilities based on
constitutional differences, power relations between various special interest
groups, quality of civil servants, and accountable "learning by doing" in
operating specific policy instruments.2 6'
In addition to the federal government, we also have the states,
counties, cities, municipalities, and other smaller political bodies. While
beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that to Professor Barbara
Cherry, the reality of social acceleration should lead us to approach the
concept of federalism with fresh eyes.262 In particular, Cherry argues that
"further evolution in the federalism regime is required to improve the
adaptive properties of the U.S. policymaking processes to provide
sustainable telecommunications policies., 263 So the allocation of authority
to political organizations-between federal and state agents-still should
presume a sharing of regulatory power between federal and state
governments, and preserve a role for local and regional experimental
behavior.2 4
iii.

Corporations as Organizations
A corporation is a creature of the state, given the legal fiction of an
265
artificial person. "A corporation has no individual corporeal existence.,
Originally, corporations were formed in the United States by state
governments to undertake tasks that appeared too risky or expensive for
individuals or governments. State governments created corporations and
gave them special legal status.266 With their original purpose eventually
disappearing, corporations became more popular as a means of reducing

260. LIPSEY, CARLAW & BEKAR, supra note 92, at 522.
261. Id. at 521-22.
262. Cherry, supra note 151, at 25-26.
263. Barbara Cherry, The Telecom Economy and Regulation as Coevolving Complex
Adaptive Systems, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 369, 372 (2007).
264. Others suggest this sharing should not extend to ceding exclusive rights to the
states, given the "exploration/exploitation" dilemma. There is a tension between copying
tested strategies and the search for better, untested strategies. Based on this view, devolution
to the states does not always increase variance, leading to better solutions. Overall, we
should prefer the "fallback" of minimum federal standards (exploitation), while allowing
searches for different approaches (exploration). See Donald T. Homstein, Complexity
Theory, Adaptation, and AdministrativeLaw, 54 DuKE L.J. 913,941-43 (2005).
265. Tamara R. Piety, Market Failure in the Marketplace ofIdeas: Commercial Speech
andthe Problem That Won't Go Away, 41 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 181, 201 (2008).
266. Richard Calland, Prizing Open the Profit-Making World, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW
214,217(2007).
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transaction CoSts. 2 6 7 Corporations now exist primarily to create wealth for
their shareholders.268
Despite the fact that corporations are not natural persons, the Supreme
Court granted them rights under the Constitution as human beings,
beginning in 1886 with County of Santa Clarav. Southern Pacific Railroad
26 9
CO.
The right to free speech amounts to the right to contribute money to
politicians and parties, and, in essence, to create what can be called a
political market. By treating corporations as natural persons, one significant
implication is that we have granted them political power they otherwise
would not be able to exercise.
The easy assumption is that only the government can be a hierarchy,
and thus improperly attempt to impose ill-fitting, top-down solutions on the
market. Yet, corporations too are hierarchies, with similar constraints about
reaching and imposing flawed judgments. 270 It may even be dangerous to
assume that companies behave "rationally," since the interests of owners,
managers, employees, and shareholders do not always align. 271 Regulation
can be public or private, and the impact on other agents in the market can
267. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 163 (the existence of transaction costs led to the
emergence of the firm).
268. Some have suggested changing the ways that corporations operate, by redefining
their purpose as "hamess[ing] private interests to serve the public interest." Corporation
20/20, http://www.corporation2020.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2009). Corporation 20/20 is an
organization seeking to "embed social purpose in the organizational 'genetics' of corporate
structure."
Corporation
20/20:
Designing
for
Social
Purpose,
http://www.corporation2020.org/overview-settingstage.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2009)).
269. 118 U.S. 394 (1886). After years of declining to address the question, the U.S.
Supreme Court concluded that corporations are persons within the intent of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. A recent book points
out the mysterious circumstances under which Chief Justice Waite had that language
inserted into the headnotes of the case (and not the text of the decision itself). See THOM
HARTMANN, UNEQUAL PROTECTION: THE RISE OF CORPORATE DOMINANCE AND THEFT OF

HUMAN RIGHTS (2002). The way in which today's assumptions about the powers of the
corporation rest on the somewhat shaky ground of history should remind us of the pathdependency discussion in the previous section.
270. In terms of complexity theory, companies are emergent entities which cannot totally
be described in terms of their stakeholders (management, shareholders, and customers).
271. See BOOKSTABER, supra note 15, at 239-40. In a classic work of political science,
two analysts examine the Cuban Missile Crisis through the lenses of three different policy
models and their presumptions: the Rational Actor Model (unitary, deliberate choice), the
Organizational Behavior Model (organizational behavior and outputs), and the Government
Politics Model (bargaining games among political players). GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILn,
ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (2d ed. 1999). The
authors conclude that while the models provide three different explanations of the same
happening, at another level the conceptual "lenses" employed with each model produce
quite different occurrences, influencing "the character of the analyst's puzzle, the evidence
assumed to be relevant, the concepts used in examining the evidence, and what is taken to
be an explanation." Id. at 387-88. We should be equally cautious about assuming certain
behaviors in the context of large corporations.
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be much the same: constraints on the freedom of choice and action.
Corporations serve as private sector hierarchies when they provide a
"visible hand" in making a myriad of economic decisions.272 Ideally, as
Beinhocker puts it, the evolutionary process then eventually "filters up into
the 'thin layer' of the market," where Adam Smith's "invisible hand" (or,
in this Article's language, the evolutionary algorithm) can provide the final
word on selecting and amplifying business plans.273
However, a modem day corporation usually is highly centralized, and
can, at best, only incompletely mimic the forces of the market. Such
corporations survive and even flourish because, in part, it tends to be less
expensive to run a hierarchy than to try to use the entire market.2 74 In the
context of corporations as economic agents, the saving grace is the
incentives provided by the market itself. Subject to market forces of
competition and innovation, successful corporations have no choice but to
respond accordingly. The market disciplines the behavior of the
corporation. 275 As Paul Romer put it, "[n]o system of comprehensive
central planning, neither one controlled by a government, nor one
controlled by the managers of a single firm, can hope to be as robust and
reliable a mechanism as competition among many actual and potential
firms for purchases by final users. 276 Nonetheless, when those market
forces are artificially constrained or even removed, a firm may be no better
positioned than a state when it comes to creating-and destroyingeconomic value.2 77
iv.

Other Organizational Bodies

In discussing organizations that wield institutional authority, the
tendency is to focus on political and corporate entities. Yet there are other
272. Alfred Chandler introduced the notion of large vertically integrated companies
employing the "visible hand" of management, replacing the "invisible hand" of the market.
ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND, THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BuSINESS (1977).
273. BEINHOCKER, supra note 10, at 422.
274. JOHN MCMILLAN, REINVENTING THE BAZAAR: A NATURAL HISTORY OF MARKETS
168-70 (2002).
275. One sociologist posits that the primary mechanism regulating a firm's behavior is
not price competition, but the "search for stable interactions with competitors, suppliers, and
workers." Under this Darwinian-sounding view, profit maximization is replaced by
promotion of the firm's survival in an uncertain environment. See FLIGSTEIN, supra note 46,
at 16-18.
276. Test. of Paul Romer, United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1232, at
8 (D.D.C. 2003), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f219100/219128.htm.
277. In addition, firms themselves have path-dependent trajectories. LnSEY, CARLAw &
BEKAR, supra note 92, at 77-82. As we shall see in Part V.B., this observation calls for a
public policy that introduces additional economic inputs and incentives to incite a pluralism
of market choices.
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types of relevant bodies as well. Self-regulating organizations (SROs) are
established by industry sectors, usually to promulgate voluntary regulations
or codes of conduct. 278 Standards bodies like the IEEE also occupy this
space. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) is an interesting example of an entity that professes to operate
outside the ordinary public policy realm, as a "not-for-profit public-benefit
corporation," but until recently was under the imprimatur of the United
States.279 Self-described public interest organizations also provide a voice
for those who seek a more robust place for the "public interest" in
economic activity. Once one pays attention to the activities that support
innovation, for example, a number of non-market organizations (e.g.,
universities and government research and development support programs)
are involved along with market organizations.280
It should be noted that while less formal organizations, such as user
groups, normally cannot generate more formal, coercive, and accountable
institutions, such as laws, the reverse is not necessarily true. This
observation can be one key to the flexibility of adaptive policymaking.
v.
Political Markets: Where Private and Public Agents
(Supposedly) Collide
Democracy is an evolving system of policy ideas, where one counts
on the evolutionary workings of the democratic process to select and
amplify those ideas that will best serve society. 281 Democracy itself is
in
based on the premise that the common sense of its citizens "should,
' 282
"
land.
the
of
policies
and
laws
the
modify
continually
mediated form,
Nonetheless, political markets are inherently imperfect. Indeed,
"[m]arket failure is to be expected in public policy markets too. ' 283 Some
argue that political markets tend to be less efficient than economic
markets. 284 For example, Coase believes that there are government failures
278. For a detailed assessment of the spectrum of self- and co-regulatory bodies in the
Internet space, see JONATHAN CAVE, CHRIS MARSDEN & STEVE SIMMONS, RAND EUROPE,
OPTIONS FOR AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNET SELF- AND Co-REGULATION (2008), available

at www.rand.org/pubs/technical-reports/2008/RANDTR566.pdf (presenting twenty-one
separate case studies across the range of SROs).
Numbers,
Names
and
Assigned
Corporation
for
Internet
279. See
http://www.icann.org/en/about/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
280. Nelson, supra note 176, at 5.
281.

BEINHOCKER, supra note 10, at 450.

282. ScoTT, supra note 30, at 357. By the same token, "institutional change is best
understood as the essence of public policy" - that is, "thinking about, weighing, and
ultimately choosing among alternative institutional setups that will give rise to alternative
imagined and plausible futures." BROMLEY, supra note 48, at 72.
283. MASHAW, supra note 259, at 11.
284. NORTH, supra note 151, at 54-55.
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as well as market failures, and that the choice between markets and
institutions shall depend on a detailed study of the opportunity costs in each
specific case. 285 North similarly observes that "political markets reflect
imperfect knowledge between principals and agents, and are typically
characterized by high [transaction costs]." 286 The dilemma, he says, is that
"the government is not a disinterested party in the economy.' '287 Seen from
this perspective, the result is that changes in laws or regulations do not
always lead to "efficient" outcomes. 288
Mancur Olsen believes that policy decisions can be explained by
looking at politics as a competition between the private interests of specific
groups, rather than as a process for delivering the public interest.2 89 In the
process of institutional change, the winners and losers (the demand side of
legislation) each have incentives to lobby government (the supply side) in a
bargaining process. Changes in either demand or supply side forces will
result in institutional change. 290 Consumers, citizens, and users tend not to
be as effective in this bargaining process. Consumers, in particular,
generally are unaware of possible policy moves (informational issues), can
be unwilling to act because they approve of the process (if not the
outcome), have difficulties taking collective action, and/or have insecure
political rights. 291 The result is a system where the large and well-organized
players usually trump all others.
Public choice theory (or "positive political theory") adopts this view
of the political market as akin to the competitive struggles of the economic
market.292 First propounded by James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Kenneth
Arrow, and George Stigler, the theory posits that different incentives and
processes operate when goods are sold through political means rather than
through purely economic means. 293 The political appropriation and
distribution of goods is attractive because it concentrates its benefits and
disperses its costs. The few become active partners of their own benefits, to

285.

COYLE,

supra note 156, at 210.

286.

NORTH,

supra note 151, at 79.

287. Id. at 67.
288. Eckardt, supranote 96, at 441.
289. See MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOoIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (rev. ed., 1971).
290. Alston, supranote 174, at 9.
291. Id. at26.
292. Political choice theories are based on Schumpeter's idea of democracy as
competition for political power. See, e.g., Eckardt, supra note 96, at 443.
293. William F. Shughart II, Public Choice, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECONOMICS (2008), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicChoice.html.
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the detriment of the many whose wealth is tapped. Politicians hear nothing
from the many, and much from the few. 94
The logic of collective action leads to "rent seeking," where
beneficiaries seek financial advantage on the basis of their participation in a
certain interest group.2 95 Economic distribution of benefits works in a
fashion opposite from political rents; the benefits go to the many and the
costs are concentrated on the few in the free market. Where the costs to
organize the general citizenry are high, and the costs to organize "factions"
are low, special interest legislation tends to be prevalent. This particular
variation of the "Prisoner's Dilemma," the best known game of strategy in
social science,296 states that all are compelled to participate in the political
process because the best outcome-everyone else should give up rent
seeking-will not happen.
"Public choice theory conveys the message that political institutions
are imperfect for many of the reasons that markets are imperfect:
[including] asymmetric information, transactions costs, [and] free-rider
problems. 29 7 As Eckardt explains:
[T]he selection mechanisms of the legislative system limit the variety
of viable statutory innovations. The rules laid down by the constitution
define the relevant political selection environment. They determine
what kind of problems
298 can be treated by legislation and what actors are
formally involved.
Further, all policies and programs are liable to be captured by their
administrators, clients,
and politicians, all of whom seek to run them for
299
their own benefit.
If this is a true representation of the political market, public choice
theory yields an especially pessimistic perspective for innovation policy.
After all, "future industries and innovators do not have a seat at the

294. Adam Smith himself articulated his skepticism about the motives of govemment
policies that interfere with the operation of the market, based on the view that economic
policies are dominated by "merchants and master manufacturers ....
To widen the market
and to narrow the competition is always the interest of the dealers." ADAM SMrrH, 1 AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 266-67 (4th ed., 1776).
295. Shughart, supra note 293, at 3; see also The Language of Economics - Dictionary
and Research Guide, http://www.123exp-business.com/economics/ (search "rent-seeking")
(last visited Apr. 18, 2009) (in rent-seeking, firms seek to profit through manipulation of the
economic environment rather than through trade and the production of added wealth).
296. See Avinash Dixit & Barryu Nalebuff, Prisoners' Dilemma, THE CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA

OF ECONOMICS

(2d. ed., 2008), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/

PrisonersDilemma.html.
297. J. Gregory Sidak, The Dismal Science of Law, 1992 PUB. INT. L. REv. 121, 124
(1992).
298. Eckardt, supra note 96, at 461.
299. LIPSEY, CARLAw & BEKAR, supra note 92, at 535.
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lobbying table, as they either do not exist or exist in only nascent form. 3 °°
This is problematic because small entrepreneurial fu-ms are most likely to
be the source of disruptive innovations, and yet have little ability to
influence the political process. By contrast, "large incumbents are generally
better organized and have more lobbying clout than upstarts,"
giving
30
incumbents a disproportionate influence over innovation policy. '
Public choice theory opens up for debate important questions, such as
"the motivation of politicians and officials, the importance of incentives in
public life as well as private choice, the influence of special-interest
groups, and ultimately the broad question of how our collective political
institutions shape economic outcomes.03 0 2 Nonetheless, the overall vision
painted is particularly grim: "a world of greed and chaos, of private selfinterest and public incoherence . . . a vision that makes all public action
deeply suspect., 30 3 The result, some suggest, is the notion that "no
appealing version
of democracy is possible and that no possible version is
3 4
very appealing.
And yet, does public choice theory adequately and fully explain all
political activity? For example, is legislation simply a commodity to be
bought and sold as a means of placating interest groups? Public choice
theory says yes, but this ignores other possible factors, including the
legislator's pre-existing belief system and/or a desire to provide constituent
services. Kingdon, for one, insists that the content of ideas is an integral
part of government decision making, and prevails on its own merits, rather
than through political pressure.3 °5 Stone agrees. "Political fights are
conducted with money, with rules, with votes, and with favors, to be sure,
but they are conducted above all with words and ideas. 30 6
300. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 40, at 141. As Schumpeter put it: "Technological
change involves substantial losses sustained by those who own specific assets dedicated to
the existing technology." ATKINSON, supra note 49, at 192 (quoting Joel Mokyr, Cardwell's
Law, 23 RESEARCH POL'Y 561, 564 (1994) (quoting Joseph A. Schumpeter)); see also JOEL
MOKYR, THE GIFTS OF ATHENA: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 220

(2002) (throughout history, technological progress runs into a powerful foe in the
incumbents' "purposeful self-interested resistance to new technology.")
301. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 40, at 113.
302. COYLE, supra note 156, at 208.
303. MASHAW, supranote 259, at 4.

304. Id. at 12.
305. KINGDON, supra note 124, at 125. The author continues:
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and
when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed,
the world is ruled by little else .... I am sure that the power of vested interests is
vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas.
Id. (quoting JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST,
AND MONEY 383 (1936)).
306. STONE, supranote 55, at 34.
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Moreover, some point out that, while tunnel vision and bad faith by
policymakers never can be discounted, "empirical evidence does not
support the extreme vision of some public choice theorists-that
government officials will always do the bidding of powerful interests who
supply them with money, clout, or whatever they maximize. '30 7 To the
contrary, there is strong evidence that successful lobbying is "more often
about activating a legislator who already agrees with the lobbyist than
about persuading undecided legislators or bringing around legislators who
were initially opposed., 30 8 Gaining political attention by framing an issue a
certain way undoubtedly involves the exercise of power,3°9 but influence is
not quite the same thing as control.31 °
Public choice theory is based on traditional neoclassical economics,
and a conventional model of collective action which says that citizens are
merely self-interested wealth maximizers, organizing themselves into
interest groups for the purpose of extracting rents from the government. 31
Obviously there is some truth to that observation, if not the theoretical
grounding. But the politics inherent in policy can run the other way as
well. As Dan Kahan demonstrates, for example, the behavior of elected
officials tends to be "limited by informal norms that discourage
unconstrained efforts
to redirect public resources toward one's own
32
constituencies." 1
Just as large corporations are not the sum total of economic life,
government is not the sum total of political life. One open question is
whether Madison's checks-and-balances system should be updated to
benefit today's imperfect economic and political markets, especially in a
society no longer rooted in agrarian life. Beyond Madison's formal
application of checks-and-balances, perhaps we need informal constraints
that will redirect behavior to produce more felicitous outcomes.31 3 A
possible approach is to engage a third political force as a check against
307. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 40, at 163. Bromley refers to "the dimwit conjecture"
as the assumption that politicians by definition "are not amenable to reason and rational
thought about important social problems." BROMLEY, supra note 48, at 124. He further
observes that there are many legitimate reasons for particular political actions, only some of
which pertain to achieving economic efficiency. Id. at 119.
308. MCFARLAND, supra note 124, at 139-40.
309. Id. at 140.
310. Id.
311. Eckardt, supra note 96, at 440.
312. Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, in
MORAL SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION IN

ECONOMIC LIFE (Herbert Gintis, et al., eds.) 339, 364 (2005). Kahan also warns that policies
designed to frustrate public choice pressures may be counterproductive because they also
indicate that we expect political actors to engage in such behavior. Id.
313. NORTH, supra note 151, at 68.
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government and corporate factions, consisting of individual users (in
economic markets) and individual citizens (in political markets). From this
insight there are two general pathways forward: elevating that new faction
by adding it to the current mix in a more organized and influential manner,
or lowering the old factions by bringing government and corporations
down further to the level of individual citizens/consumers. A mix of both
options can be explored as well.
In the spirit of creating and elevating a new faction, several
commentators have discussed concrete ways for the federal government to
make innovation a centerpiece of our policymaking agenda. 3 14 Of course,
as we have just seen, the institutions and organizations one utilizes are
critical to the success of the endeavor. As one example, author John Kao
has suggested that the United States needs to embrace innovation as a key
national priority. He suggests various governmental mechanisms to enable
it, such as a National Innovation Advisor, a National Innovation Council,
and an Office of Innovation Assessment.3 15 While a laudable goal, it is not
just a matter of layering this concept onto the existing institutions and
organizations-the federal bureaucracy-and expecting it all to succeed.
The "innovation agenda" deserves some novel thinking about the
infrastructure and processes to
appropriate ways to mold the government's
316
best achieve our goals and objectives.
The Which, When, and Where: A Toolkit of Frames, Models,
3.
and Tools
In the world of adaptive policymaking, we have institutions and we
have organizations. The next pieces of the puzzle are the various methods
that the players use to carry out their policy goals and objectives. In the
following policy design space, they are referred to as the which,
when, and where elements, which amount to the mental screens necessary
to assess one's constraints and opportunities in the marketplace. These

314. See, e.g., ROBERT ATKINSON & HOWARD WiAL, BOOSTING PRODUCTIVITY,
INNOvATION, AND GROwTH THROUGH A NATIONAL INNOVATION FOUNDATIOn (2008) (paper

for the Brookings Found. & Info. Tech. & Innovation Found.), available at
http://www.itif.org/files/NIF.pdf; see also Benjamin & Rai, supra note 40, at 114.
315. JOHN KAO, INNOVATION NATION: How AMERICA IS LOSING ITS INNOVATION EDGE,
WHY IT MATTERS, AND WHAT WE CAN Do TO GET IT BACK 217-37 (2007).

316. Similarly, Robert Atkinson and Howard Wial have promoted the concept of
establishing a National Innovation Foundation. ATKINSON & WIAL, supra note 314.

However, they caution appropriately that this new body would neither run centrally-directed
industrial policy, nor give out "corporate welfare," but instead would work cooperatively
with various agents "to foster innovation that would benefit the nation but would not
otherwise occur." Id. at 41. For a different yet equally thoughtful approach, see Benjamin &
Rai, supra note 40, at 14-79 (proposing a new, trans-agency executive entity with authority
to compel other government agencies to consider innovation as a policy priority).
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cognitive frames, maps, and worldviews are conceptual "tools," best used
to understand or interpret the moves of others. 317 A key point is to be open
to many options; after all, a toolbox containing only wrenches may be full,
but it is not optimal. Three categories of useful implements in the "adaptive
toolkit" will be introduced here: conceptual frames, models of imagined
futures, and enabling tools.318
a.

ConceptualFrames
Owen Jones reminds us that "[r]eality is notoriously impervious to
taxonomy., 319 Nature stubbornly refuses easy classification and
stratification, and yet we humans have little choice but to pursue that
treacherous path. Most people think about the world largely in terms of
implicit conceptual models that have significant consequences for the
content of their thought. 320 The totality of assumptions in a person's mind
constitutes his or her "reality model., 321 We are born organizers, bent on
conceptually slicing and dicing our way through life in bite-sized chunks,
separating out the me from the we, and the market from the state. And yet,
while it is true that more is different, it is far too easy to give in to the
temptation to treat different aspects of life as if they never touch:
Categories are human mental constructs in a world that has only
continua. They are intellectual boundaries we put on the world in order
to help us apprehend it and live in an orderly way.... [W]e can know
reality only by categorizing it, naming it, and giving it meaning....
[N]ature doesn't have categories; people do.322
As we put together our adaptive policy toolkit, first it will be useful to
equip ourselves with conceptual frames to make the task somewhat easier.
Humans are literal creatures, and our adaptive brains cannot easily handle
certain ways of thinking. Indeed, we have no choice but to construe the
world by virtue of conceptual blends we achieve through biology and
culture.32 3 When it comes to ways of understanding, "metaphors and stories
317. FLIGSTEIN, supra note 46.
318. Only recently have I discovered that Patricia Longstaff employed the "toolkit"
metaphor back in 2002 to describe the various strategic "tools" that businesses and
policymakers should utilize to better deal with issues in the communications sector. P.H.
LONGSTAFF, THE COMMUNICATIONS TOOLKIT (2002). While the actual elements of our

respective frameworks are dissimilar, her then-prescient reliance on complex systems,
evolutionary theory, and the basics of network technology largely mirror the foundational
structure of my own approach.
319. Jones, Nature ofNorms, supra note 189, at 2072.
320. ALLISON & ZELIKOW, supra 271, at 3-4.
321. DIETRICH DORNER, THE LOGIC OF FAILURE: RECOGNIZING AND AVOIDING ERROR IN
COMPLEX SrrUATIONS 41 (Rita & Robert Kimer, trans., 1996) (1989).
322. STONE, supra note 55, at 378-79.
323. GILLES FAUCONNIER & MARK TURNER, THE WAY WE THINK: CONCEPTUAL
BLENDING AND THE MIND'S HIDDEN COMPLEXITIES

390 (2002). "From weaponry to
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are far more potent . . . [to us] than ideas., 324 "Metaphorical, [and]
frame[s]-based . . . reasoning . . . developed in the course of human
evolution to allow us to function as well as possible in everyday life. 325 As
abstract matters," but
a result, "we are not manufactured ...to understand
326
instead crave the tangible and the palpable.
The metaphoric language we have been employing is one such
example. Talk of algorithms and environments, processes and platforms,
makes it somewhat easier to conceptualize what is actually taking place
when the micro-level activity of millions of human beings emerges into the
macro-level activity of "the market. 3 27 The analogy of companies as
persons has even become a legal doctrine.
Because our entire mental machinery (another metaphor) is embodied,
we cannot think or speak without employing a vast array of mental models
of the world.32 8 But we can use this fact to our advantage. The main value
of conceptual models, Carlota Perez points out, is to serve as a tool "to help
organize the richness of real life but not to hammer facts into tight
boxes. 3 29 Political reasoning too is "metaphoric meaning," part of33a0
struggle to control which images of the world govern policy.
Policymakers should use this vital knowledge to craft and utilize
conceptual language that resonates with other market agents. Having "no
more than a very blunt and fuzzy instrument . . . with which to ask

ideology, language to science, art to religion, fantasy to mathematics, human beings and
their cultures have, step by step, made blends, unmade them, reblended them, and made new
blends." Id. at 396.
324. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE xxviii (2007); see also RICHARD OGLE, SMART WORLD: BREAKTHROUGH
CREATVTY AND THE NEW SCIENCE OF IDEAS 61-64 (2007) (explaining that it is unavoidable

that scientists use paradigms as frames or maps to make sense of the world, even if they
both reveal and conceal).
325. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED
MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 527 (1999).
326. TALEB, supra note 324, at 132.
327. As noteworthy examples already mentioned, John Kingdon describes setting
political agendas as involving three policy "streams," a "policy primeval soup," and a
"garbage can" model of organizations. KINGDON, supra note 124, at 16-17, 77-79, 116-17.
328. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 325, at 58-59. More problematically, when for
example we see a nation as a coordinated, living human being, we rarely remember that we
are reasoning by metaphor. ALLISON & ZELIKOW, supra note 271, at 402.
329. PEREz, supranote 240, at 160.
330. STONE, supra note 55, at 381. "Political reasoning is reasoning by metaphor and
analogy [and category-making]. It is trying to get others to see a situation as one thing rather
than another"; it is a constant struggle over the criteria for classification, the boundaries of
categories, and definition of ideals. Id.at 9, 11. Obviously this Article, and countless others,
can be seen as a manifestation of this struggle.
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questions33 and against which to assess regularity
expect." 1
b.

. . .

is all that one can

ImaginedFutures

Emergence Economics tells us that prognostication and planning are
difficult, if not impossible, to get right. The inevitable personal limitations
of information, perception, and cognition, coupled with a dynamic and
unpredictable environment, makes failure far more common than success.
Attempting long-range planning can also clash with the adaptive principle
of making contextual, evidence-based decisions. Still, appreciating this
reality should not lead to decisional paralysis. Those making public policy
must do what they can to peer into the fog and discern some patterns that
can help shape analysis. There are a number of possible ways to project
into the present and future, using a mix of reason and imagination, to solve
problems. I will briefly touch on three that are based more on policy option
scenarios rather than outright predictions.
Peter Schwartz has devised what he calls "the art of the long view,"
which is premised on developing and using scenarios to help cabin
uncertainty and improve decision making. 332 This multi-stage process
involves (1) identifying a focal decision, (2) listing the key factors
influencing the success or failure of that decision, (3) listing the driving
forces (social, economic, political, environmental, and technological) that
influence the key factors, (4) ranking the key factors and driving forces
based on relative importance and degree of uncertainty, (5) selecting the
potential scenarios along a matrix, (6) fleshing out the scenarios, (7)
assessing the implications, and (8) selecting leading indicators and
signposts. 13 An important takeaway here is that the use of scenarios can
help identify the various environmental forces that can affect
implementation of a policy decision, reducing to some degree the
uncertainty that otherwise surrounds that process.
Closer to the near-term, Richard Ogle talks about utilizing "the ideaspaces of the extended mind," which he identifies as including qualities
like imagination, intuition, and insight.334 As Ogle sees it, reason proceeds
cautiously and looks backward, while the imagination and its allied

331. PEREZ, supra note 240, at 161.
332. PETER SCHWARTZ, THE ART
GEORGANTZAS

OF THE LONG VIEW (1996); see also NICOLAs C.
& WILLIAM ACAR, ScENARiO-DRIVEN PLANNING: LEARNING TO MANAGE

STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY (1995) (discusses Comprehensive Situation Mapping (CSM) as
one form of scenario planning); GILL RINGLAND, SCENARIO PLANNING: MANAGING FOR THE
FUTURE (2d. ed., 2006) (introduces scenario planning tools).

333. SCHWARTZ, supra note 332, at 241-47.
334. OGLE, supra note 324, at 6.
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capacities look more boldly forward.335 More specifically, the Cartesian
model of thinking is based on continuity, because logical and probabilistic
reasoning cannot abide gaps. 3 36 By contrast, creative breakthroughs
typically involve leaps into the unknown.33 7 Because the imagination is the
mind's supreme faculty for dealing with the future, and it reaches places
where reason cannot go, Ogle suggests ways to harness the imagination to
improve one's decision-making abilities. 338 As Ogle quotes Einstein,
339
"Logic will get you from A to B, imagination will take you everywhere."
Finally, Thomas Homer-Dixon argues for the necessity to develop a
"prospective mind ... comfortable with constant change, radical surprise,
and even breakdown., 340 He sees each of these as inevitable features of our
world, requiring us constantly to anticipate a wide variety of futures. "We
need to exercise our imaginations so that we can challenge the
unchallengeable and conceive the inconceivable." 34' He also argues:
"Precise prediction is impossible because our complex and nonlinear world
is full of unknown unknowns-things we do not know that we do not
know. 342 But a mind open to numerous possibilities is better equipped to
anticipate and deal with change than a mind closed off to such possibilities.
The figure below, then, is one way to combine these three approaches
pictorially.

335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Id. at 113.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 249.

340. THOMAS HOMER-DIXON, THE UPSIDE OF DowN: CATASTROPHE, CREATIVITY, AND
THE RENEWAL OF CIVILIZATION 268 (2006).

341. Id. at 282.
342. Id. at 283. Interestingly, Homer-Dixon favors constructing more resilient, selfsufficient, distributed networks as a public good against the uncertainty of the future. Id. at
283-84.
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C.

The Enabling Tools
The adaptive toolbox also can contain the four "tinkering" tools

introduced previously in Emergence Economics: feeding the evolutionary
algorithm,

fostering connectivity between agents, shaping the fitness

landscape through incentives, and enhancing market feedback
mechanisms. 4 In Part V below, I will take a closer look at these enabling
tools, and address some anticipated questions about their efficacy in
particular situations.

4.

The What: Projects

Finally, we have the operational end product, the specific output of
3
This element responds most directly
the policy design space: the projectw.
to the what policy question, and mirrors Kingdon's "policy primeval soup"
of proposals. 3 4' After all the analysis and debate, the project is where policy
turns into concrete action. Ideally, each project should be a blend of
techniques based on the projected best combination of institutional
accountability, flexibility, and enforceability. Good projects also are
context-specific and supported by a mix of theory, measurement, and
subjective judgment. 346
The best projects would be rooted in the nine adaptive policy
principles suggested earlier.3 47 The way to construct and implement a
project is to assess the evidence of the market landscape, and shape the
343. Whitt & Schultze, supra note 1, at 308-14.
344. The synonymous term "program" sounds too entrenched and long-term; "project"
better connotes the more provisional nature that I am trying to emphasize.
345. KINGDON, supra note 124, at 116-17.

346. LIPSEY, CARLAw & BEKAR, supra note 92, at 505.
347. See supra Parts III.B.1-9.
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implementation to match the circumstance. If at all possible, projects
should be limited by time and geography. In particular, use of the "sunset"
approach, whereby programs automatically terminate after a certain period
of time, compels policymakers to overcome the inevitable inertia of most
government programs.3 48 Indeed, while from a public choice perspective it
is almost impossible to stop entrenched interests from influencing policy
outcomes, regular reappraisals of programs can shine helpful light, and
give opportunities to weigh in on competing interests. Such pluralism is
important as a means of exploring all possible avenues, plausible and
otherwise.
IV. DEVISING A DESIGN SPACE FOR COMMUNICATIONS POLICY
In Emergence Economics, we suggested that newer and developing
strands of economic thought can help us discover some conclusions about
guiding goals and objectives for communications policy. In the dynamic
and unpredictable processes of the market, communications policy stands
out as having a profound impact on our economic-and overall-well49
being.
The case for a government technology policy requires accepting the
proposition that it is socially desirable to attempt to influence the pace
and/or direction of technological change. 350 A set of optimal technology
policies is not possible, given the conditions of uncertainty and endogenous
change. Instead, policy must be based on a mixture of theory,
measurement, and an unavoidable component of subjective judgment.3 5'
This is where the setting of goals and objectives enters the picture,
premised in part on normative considerations.
As we have seen, technological, economic, and policy change
coevolve in the larger social environment that binds us together as
interacting human beings. As markets and technologies have their
respective design spaces, so does public policy. We should see the policy
realm much as we have described the economic realm. While there are
"fundamental differences between markets and the political sphere," 352 both
share similar social elements. Both employ the evolutionary algorithm of
variation-selection-amplification, and both collectively dictate the outcome

348. Some, like the Competitive Enterprise Institute, have even suggested sunsetting the
FCC itself. Clyde Wayne Crews, Op-Ed., Sunset the FCC?, WASH. TMES (D.C.), Apr. 15,
2005, at A13 availableat http://cei.org/gencon/019,05273.cfin (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
349. Whitt & Schultze, supra note 1, at 290-91.
350. LIPSEY, CARLAw & BEKAR, supra note 92, at 504.
351. See generally id.at 499-525.
352. Alexander Mingst, EvolutionaryPoliticalEconomy and the Role of Organizations3
(Andrissy Univ. Working Paper Series No. XXII, 2008).

Number 3]

ADAPTIVE POLICYMAKING

for the larger social environment.353 Where markets have an economic
design space, comprised of Business Plans (BPs), Physical Technologies
(PTs), and Social Technologies (STs) competing and adapting to the
environment, the parallel is the "policy design space" (or Kingdon's
"garbage can" of choice 354), comprised of various institutions,
organizations, and tools--elements of the adaptive toolbox.
Obviously the communications policy space is an immensely
complicated area, and a complex adaptive system in its own right. As a
result, this Article will not address in great detail many facets of the
system's operation. Instead, it will focus on the components of the
communications policy design space that can benefit most directly from the
teachings of Emergence Economics, as well as the various non-pecuniary
social benefits. In particular, the choices of institutions and tools by a
policymaker like the FCC can have a profound impact on whether and how
the normative policy goals and objectives actually are achieved in the
marketplace.
A.

The Goal: More Good Ideas

"Defining [positive] goals is the first step in dealing with complex
situations., 355 Purely from an economic standpoint, the open dissemination
of and access to information, particularly through the Internet, plays a
critical role in innovation and economic growth. Virtually all countries
benefit from new ideas created throughout the world. The open flow of
information helps ensure that an idea engendered in one place can impact
economies globally. 356 Because of the nonrivalry and increasing returns on
ideas, growth in the world's stock of knowledge drives the underlying rate
of growth in every country that is exposed to it. Ideas equal growth, and all
its emergent benefits.357 As will be explained further below, one suggested
policy goal generally applicable to the communications sector is "More
Good Ideas."
353. See generally Eckardt, supra note 96, at 457-58.
354. See KINGDON, supra note 124.
355. DORNER,supra note 321, at 43.
356. See generally Charles I. Jones, Growth and Ideas (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 10767, 2004), in lB HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 1063, 1072 (P.
Aghion & S. Durlauf eds., Elsevier 2005), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/-chad/
JonesHandbook2005.pdf. Thomas Jefferson was prescient on this point. See Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON (Andrew Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905), available at http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/al_8_8sl2.html (Nature made it possible "[t]hat
ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe... like fire, expansible over
all space, without lessening their density in any point, and like the air in which we breathe,
move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation.").
357. Whitt & Schultze, supra note 1, at 263-70.
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1.

The Potential for Good Ideas
Knowledge significantly outweighs the traditional inputs to the
production process of land, labor, and capital. 58 In turn, as North observes,
"[t]he growth in the stock of human knowledge is the fundamental
underlying determinant of the upper bound of human well-being. ' ' 359 Ideas
are understood to be a classic public good; we all benefit from useful
inventions. 360 As intellectual or mental goods, ideas also are often essential
inputs into other activities.361 An adaptive society must find and maintain
the means to explore new ideas. 362 Mechanisms generating new ideas,
which in human society are expressed culturally, "are as important as
access to abundant resources for economic growth and economic
adaptation." 363 Ideas also are the currency of cyberspace. 364 As a result, as

pointed out in an earlier Article, we should want "More Good Ideas" to
serve as a proxy for maximizing society's capacity for productive change,
and hence economic growth and well-being.365
There can be differing views on what constitutes a good idea, or how
many such ideas are adequate. From the public policy perspective, the
notion of "More" is the quantity function, which involves generating an
optimal number of inputs available to and from agents in the larger social
system. The notion of "Good" is the quality function, which involves the
evolutionary function of social agents identifying, selecting, and
amplifying the ideas they desire. The policy premise I am suggesting here
is that the quantity function of ideas in the market (or larger society) may
be lacking, so that some public role is required. 66 This is because
information as a public good is likely to be undervalued by both the market

358. ATKINSON, supranote 49, at 266.
359. NORTH, supranote 151, at 78.
360. Kahan,supra note 312, at 363.
361. Brett M. Frischmann, Speech, Spillovers, and the First Amendment, 2008 U. CI.
LEGAL F. 301, 310-12 (2008). In most conversations, we are aiming at understanding, not
just knowledge, and the path of ideas tells a story of constant conversation, elaboration, and
disagreement. DAvID WEINBERGER, EVERYTHING IS MISCELLANEOUS: THE POWER OF THE
NEW DIGITAL DISORDER 202-03 (2007).
362. GEERAT J. VERMEIJ, NATURE: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY 308 (2004).
363. Id.at310.
364. ZrrrAiN, supranote 99, at 161.
365. Whitt & Schultze, supra note 1, at 297-99.
366. KiNGDON, supra note 124, at 116-17 (discussing the policy primeval soup as a place
where ideas float around in policy communities). The goal of "More Good Ideas" can be
extended to the political market as well; maximizing the quantity of policy ideas maximizes
the ability to get quality policy solutions discussed, accepted, and implemented. See STONE,
supra note 55, at 34 ("Ideas are the very stuff of politics. People fight about ideas, fight for
them, and fight against them.... Moreover, people fight with ideas as well as about them.").
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and the political system. 367 Put in rough terms, the More is where tailored
public policy may need to enter the picture, while the Good is where the
market (properly buttressed by enabling institutions and organizations)
should be in command.368 As we shall see, this dichotomy can lead to
government "tinkering" to provide additional inputs, connectivity,
incentives, and transparency to the market. These enabling elements can
help improve opportunities for More Good Ideas to be created, heard, and
adopted.
2.

Clashes in the "Watering Hole of Perceptions"

One reasonably may challenge the notion that we should leave the
quality function of More Good Ideas solely or primarily to the market, or
even to society at large. For example, some behavioral economists question
the ordinary person's ability to sort through different ideas to reach the
right decisions, and then to learn from mistakes made. These economists
seek a more active role for policymakers to help individuals frame
decisions correctly; 369 in essence, to determine just what constitutes a good
idea. In the view of Dan Ariely and others, we need more than just raw
information: we need tools to help us make better decisions.
Ariely observes that we are far less rational than traditional economics
supposes, and that "market forces" alone are powerless to help us learn
from our many cognitive mistakes. 370 However, because our "decision
illusions" are both systematic and predictable, Ariely believes that
policymakers can develop strategies, tools, and methods to help us make
better decisions.371 Others agree that "introspection cannot overcome the
biology that shapes our thoughts., 372 In essence, our mental limitations
prevent us from accepting our mental limitations.3 73 If true, a "feedback
mechanism" function should include a role for the policymaker to "guide"

367. See Frischmann, supra note 361, at 305. Frischmann observes that speech, which
includes all forms of communications as both activity and thing, regularly generates
externalities. Id. at 310. These uncaptured spillovers lead to a persistent risk of
underparticipation in the speech process, and underproduction of the speech itself. Id. at
315, 320.
368. Id. at 317 (endorsing the notion that, "[iun a decentralized manner that is different
from but perhaps analogous to the market, these choices 'filter' beneficial from harmful
ideas").
369. DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS 239-44 (2008).

370. Id. at 239.
371. Id. at240-41.
372. ROBERT A. BURTON, M.D., ON BEING CERTAIN: BELIEVING YOU ARE RIGHT EVEN
WHEN YOU'RE NOT 159 (2008).
373. Id. at 159.
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the way to74 better thinking processes, without necessarily instilling better
3
thoughts.

It may be instructive here to touch on this "quality function" question
in the context of the psychological presumptions behind our courts'
treatment of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution., First
Amendment doctrine presumes a decidedly "white box" model, where
citizens face a "marketplace of ideas" of full transparency and total
information. The doctrine has its roots in the famous dissenting opinion of
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Abrams v. United States,3 75 where he
posited that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas. 376 Interestingly, Justice Holmes never employs the phrase
"marketplace of ideas" in his dissent, and he treats the concept
provisionally, as a "theory" based on an "experiment., 377 Later
employment of the metaphor of the "'marketplace of ideas' embodies two
key assumptions-a) that ideas compete, and (b) that they compete on the
basis of their truthfulness. 3 78 The presumption is that "good ideas flourish
and bad ideas fail. 3 79
374. These concepts are particularly well established in the context of the political
process. See, e.g., BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES
CHOOSE BAD POLICIES (2007); RICK SHENKMAN, JUST How STUPID ARE WE?: FACING THE
TRUTH ABOUT THE AMERICAN VOTER (2008); DREw WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE
ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE FATE OF THE NATION (2007). Some claim that we should
trust markets because we should be pessimistic about the irrationality of voters in a
democracy; despite its defects, we should embrace the free market because it still outshines
the democratic alternatives. CAPLAN, supra, at 350. However, this should not be seen as an
"either/or" scenario, but rather a division of labor between markets and government based
on their relative strengths.
375. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
376. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). One can go back further to John Milton's famous
defense of the freedom of the press with his rhetorical query, "who ever knew Truth put to
the worse, in a free and open encounter?" JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644), availableat
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/j oumalism/j6075/edit/readings/areopagitica-milton.htmi.
377. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes stated in full that:
[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.
It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.
Id.
378. Chip Heath, Chris Bell & Emily Sternberg, Emotional Selection in Memes: The
Case of Urban Legends, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1028 (2001).
379. Blocher, supra note 152, at 824. As another author notes, "people who stand near
the holes in a social structure are at higher risk of having good ideas." Ronald S. Burt,
Structural Holes and Good Ideas, 110 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 349, 349 (2008), available at
http://www.joumals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/421787. Burt's research shows that
opinions and behaviors are more homogenous within than between groups, so individuals
connected across different groups are more familiar with alternative ways of thought and
behavior, which gives them more options to select and synthesize from alternatives. See
generally id."New ideas emerge from selection and synthesis across the structural holes
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In reality, however, the "ideas market" does not often work that way.
Initially, some question whether our view of the right of free expression
should turn on a commerce-based metaphor.380 More critically, it is not
obvious that the market always allows a sufficiently robust level of
competition between ideas. It is a false assumption, for instance, that
everyone has access to the market. The metaphor depends on a neoclassical
concept of atomistic individuals engaged in a perfectly costless and
efficient exchange of ideas; 38' this overlooks the difficulties in creating a
truly robust marketplace. There are considerable transaction costs, in terms
of the time and expense necessary to find, evaluate, and obtain (let alone
produce) good ideas or products.382 Institutions can help or hinder an
individual's attempts to overcome these transaction costs.
It is certainly not clear that the truthfulness of an idea is a proper, or
even achievable, criterion.383 Among the unstated assumptions are that truth
is objective and discoverable, truth is always among the ideas in the
marketplace and always survives, and people can perceive (or even want)
the truth.3 4 To the last point, as we have seen, at best, users also operate
under bounded rationality and have a variety of cognitive constraints and
shortcomings. Ideas propagate using a variation-selection-retention
approach, and "emotional selection" is an additional means of competition
based on the ability of a meme to tap common emotions.38 5 Philip Tetlock's
extensive research demonstrates that the user side of the "marketplace of
ideas" equation has at least three major imperfections "that permit lots of
nonsense to persist for long stretches of time,, 38 6 namely, that consumers
can be unmotivated to be discriminating judges of claims and
counterclaims, can have the "wrong motives" of buttressing prejudices
rather than pursuing truth, and can suffer from cognitive constraints or task
difficulty constraints.38 7
between groups. Some fraction of those new ideas are good." Id. at 350. Theoretically at
least, the Internet offers one way to fulfill this role of bridging different groups.
380. CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 17-18 (Free Press
1993) (1970).
381. Blocher, supranote 152, at 825.
382. Id.at 825-26, 831.
383. Frischmann, supra note 361, at 303 n.6. (As Frischmann explains, because "Truth"
varies, "arguably, it is the variance in Truths (or perspectives on truth) that the metaphorical
Marketplace supports.").
384. W. Wat Hopkins, The Supreme Court Defines the Marketplace of Ideas, 73
JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 40, 44-46 (Spring 1996).
385. Heath, Bell & Sternberg, supra note 378, at 1029-30.
386. TETLOCKsupra note 74, at 231.
387. Id. at 231-32. There is also disturbing evidence that false beliefs can influence
people's attitudes even after they are understood to be false. John G. Bullock, The Enduring
Importance of False Political Beliefs (Mar. 14, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla~apa~research-citation/0/9/7/4/5/p97459_
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Recent analytical and empirical work suggests that the marketplace of
ideas may be closer to what I would term a "watering hole of perceptions,"
where participants with unequal access mix and match truth and error in
unpredictable ways. One small example is the persistent meme that thenVice President (and former presidential candidate) Al Gore claims to have
"invented the Internet." Mr. Gore's statement in a 1999 interview about his
service in the U.S. Congress included the comment that he "took the
initiative in creating the Internet. 3 8 Given Gore's extensive legislative
work on the "information superhighway," including funding the
predecessor academic networks and commercializing the Internet
backbone, that statement appeared noncontroversial, at least to the
interviewer. Yet through repeated misstatements fed by his political
opponents and a complicit press, the notion that Gore claims to have
"invented the Internet" took strong hold in the court of public opinion. One
recent research paper analyzing this "political equivalent of an urban
legend" 389 concludes that "truth does not always win out in the marketplace
of ideas, even when the marketplace is highly competitive, 390 as would be
expected in a high-stakes, widely-covered political campaign. 391
These apparent flaws in the marketplace-of-ideas metaphor strongly
suggest the desirability for some tailored policy involvement in the market
to yield More Good Ideas. We should be quite cautious, however, not to
take things too far. Freedom of expression does not necessarily mean
truthful expression. Different marketplaces of ideas exist, including those
for commercial, political, and personal speech. People have numerous
reasons to communicate (or, by extension, engage in transactions) with
each other, such as exchanging opinions, arguments, and entertainment.
index.html) (presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association in
Albuquerque, N.M., Mar. 17, 2006). Even when accepted, facts alone may not be enough to
dislodge false beliefs, with the most confident citizens often being those who hold the most
inaccurate beliefs. See id. at 33-35. In some cases, such as the false notion that the Iraqi
government possessed weapons of mass destruction in 2002, corrections actually increase
misperceptions. See Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The
Persistence of Political Misperceptions 1, 11-16 (Feb. 2, 2008) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://www.duke.edu/-bjn3/nyhan-reifler.pdf).
388. Late Edition: Interview of Vice President Al Gore by Wolf Blitzer (CNN television
broadcast Mar. 11, 1999) (transcript available at http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/
stories/l 999/03/09/president.2000/transcript.gore/).
389. Chip Heath & Jonathan Bendor, When Truth Doesn't Win the Marketplace of
Ideas: Entrapping Schemas, Gore, and the Internet 14 (Mar. 10, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
390. Id.at 4. Among other points, the Article reveals that about twice as many news
articles attributed the false phrase to Gore as attributed the true one. Id. at 13. Further, the
incorrect attribution triggered a perception that Gore was a liar, which "snowballed over
time by adding additional false ideas that reinforced this entrapping schema." Id. at 14.
391. See also Piety, supra note 265, at 209-10 (it is "demonstrably false" that the market
eventually corrects for falsehood).
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The notion is not necessarily that truth will always win out, but that people
are free to express and receive what they see as most important to them.
Once the government begins judging what constitutes a good idea and what
does not, the First Amendment is in grave jeopardy.392
Further, the availability of a ubiquitous communications/information
platform in the Internet should help us achieve a more equitable and
competitive-if not always truthful-level. The Internet can enable users to
promulgate a vast array of ideas, and at times, even sift out the bad ones.
Of course, for the Internet to carry out this function of promulgating,
sifting, and disseminating, all in the service of More Good Ideas, we may
need some public policy objectives to support that goal.
B. An Objective: HarnessingCommunications Networks as Online
Platforms
So, in understanding the challenge of fostering a more robust
marketplace for ideas-and by extension PTs, STs, and BPs-we should
ask: what are the intermediate policy steps that will bring us More Good
Ideas? The suggested approach is to define our policy objectives in a more
granular way, while still retaining the holistic view of how the different
components interrelate.
In Emergence Economics, we explained the importance of human
communications to the very fabric of our civilization.3 93 Communications is
all about broadly accessible connectivity, and the telecommunications
sector "provides increasingly ubiquitous infrastructure for the New
Ecosystem" of the market. 394 "Innovation in communications and the
organization of information fosters educational, political, and social
development,, 395 and reduces the transaction costs for conveying and
exchanging ideas.
A deep understanding of the telecommunications market should lead
policymakers to see that its underlying infrastructure is a "general purpose

392. TErLOCK, supra note 74, at 233-34. Along those lines, Tetlock suggests that rather
than utilizing government filtering mechanisms, we need self-correcting epistemic
communities, such as academic journals. Id. Blocher similarly suggests that courts should
defer to the speech roles of institutions that enhance the marketplace of ideas, such as
schools and universities, for the same reasons that economists tend to defer to the private
norms of market-enhancing institutions. Blocher, supra note 152, at 877, 882-83, 889.
393. Whitt & Schultze, supra note 1, at 290-91.
394. FRANSMAN, supra note 58, at 14; see also SPAR, supra note 44, at 9
("[C]ommunications technologies have a certain force to them, and a particular import. For
communication is the sinew of both commerce and politics, the channel through which
information-and thus power-flows.").
395. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 40, at 108.
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technology" that "drives innovation and productivity., 396 In particular, the
Internet has become the cornerstone of communications policy, given the
enormous economic and social benefits that it provides. 397 "As the digital
economy has emerged, telecommunications policy has become not just
more complex, but more important. 398
In Emergence Economics, we tentatively suggested three interrelated
objectives related to the optimal deployment and use of broadband
networks that enable robust access to the Internet: (1) open platforms, (2)
more platforms, and (3) bigger platforms. 3 9 Others have articulated a
similar view, 400 and I will explore another version of this concept in greater
depth in an upcoming paper on U.S. broadband policy.40 ' For now, it is
worth noting that we need the right institutions and organizations in
place-from laws to norms, Congress to SROs-to create the right
incentives for optimal Internet broadband deployment and use.
One implication is that governments should seek to eliminate harmful
barriers to the use and development of the Internet, including unnecessary
obstacles to Internet transmissions. Frischmann and van Schewick explain:
[T]he rate with which the Internet can contribute to economic growth is
...limited by the rate of application-level innovation. Measures that
reduce application-level innovation have the potential to significantly
limit economic growth. Measures that increase application-level
innovation
40 2 have the potential to significantly increase economic
growth.

Relatedly, former Nobel Laureate Edward Prescott advocates for open
borders for trade because he believes "[i]t is openness that gives people the
opportunity to use their entrepreneurial talents to create social surplus,
rather than using those talents to protect what they already have. Social

396. See ATKiNSON & AUDRETSCH, supra note 4, at 26. Importantly, all general purpose
technology-including communications networks---create significant spillover effects.
LiPsEY, CARLAW & BEKAR, supra note 92, at 98-100. This means that the platform owners
inherently do not capture the full economic benefits that flow from use of their platforms.
397. See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REv. 917, 1016-17 (2005).
398. ATKINSON & AUDRETSCH, supranote 4, at 25.
399. Whitt & Schultze, supra note 1, at 299-303.
400. See ATKrNSON & AUDRETSCH, supra note 4, at 26 (arguing explicit national policies
should spur the development of better broadband networks, including giving incentives to
private providers to invest in such networks, and in providing broadband to more areas and
more people).
401. Richard S. Whitt, Evolving BroadbandPolicy: Taking Adaptive Stances to Foster
Optimal Internet Platforms, 17 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUs 417 (2009) (final version on file

with author).
402. Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the
Economics of an Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JuRIMETRIcS J.
383, 424 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
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surplus begets growth, which begets social surplus, and so on." 4 3 Others
have pointed out that "where information and knowledge cross frontiers,
armies will not." 4°4 Regardless, the key point is that using public policy to
help harness the power and potential of communications networks can
enable More Good Ideas.

C. Focus on the FCC: The OrganizationalandInstitutional
Challenges
1.

The Traditional Role

Scholars have argued that "[l]ike the economy as a whole, the
telecommunications sector constitutes a complex evolving system ''4 °5 and
that "telecommunications policy is embedded in multiple layers of social
arrangements, such as constitutional provisions, statutory provisions, and
specific regulatory institutions." 406 First, the powers-that-be must decide
that government regulation is warranted, and then determine a choice
among different organizations and institutions.0 7 Public policymaking
includes setting the agenda, specifying alternative policy choices, selecting
a policy, and implementing the decision; a successful policy outcome
depends on success in all these processes.40 8
The FCC is an independent regulatory agency, charged by Congress
with the task "to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the
United States ...a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and
radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges." 4°9 The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, is the FCC's
governing statute, incorporating, most recently, the Telecommunications
41
Act of 1996.410 In addition, the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) 1
403.

MICHAEL

SHERMER,

THE

MIND

OF

THE

MARKET:

COMPASSIONATE

APES,

COMPETITIVE HUMANS, AND OTHER TALES FROM EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS 38 (2008)
(quoting Edward C. Prescott, Opinion, Competitive Cooperation, WALL ST. J.,Feb. 15,

2007, at A19).
404. Id.at 258 (emphasis omitted). Shermer calls this the "Google theory of peace." Id.
One way of accomplishing this objective is to actively seek to eliminate trade barriers in the
online world. U.S. trade policy in particular can be used to minimize regulation of Internet
transmissions that impedes international trade, investment, and innovation. This includes
ensuring that any regulation of Internet transmissions is done in a nondiscriminatory
fashion, and carried out in a transparent and open manner.
405. Cherry & Bauer, supra note 53, at 19.
406. Bauer & Wildman, supra note 63, at 419.
407. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 40, at 132.
408. Barbara A. Cherry, Analyzing the Network Neutrality Debate Through Awareness of
Agenda Denial, 1 INT'L J. COMM. 580,581 (2007).
409. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
410. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 143 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C. (2000)). The 1934 Act arguably has had more staying power than the
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generally establishes the appropriate processes that the FCC can employ in
its various proceedings.
The FCC typically adopts, implements, and enforces rules and
regulations, pursuant to specific procedural requirements adopted over the
years pursuant to the 1934 Act. The FCC's substantive rulemaking
authority is comprised of hundreds of engineers, economists, and lawyers
who help and inform the rulemaking process and, ultimately, the decisions
that its five commissioners make.4 12 Rather than a single monolith, then,
the agency is the sum of its many moving parts, working together (or in
opposition) to varying degrees of effectiveness.
The APA requires that federal agencies, such as the FCC, undertake
rulemaking proceedings based on a notice-and-comment process.4 13 Section
553 stipulates that the FCC must publish notices in the Federal Register,
and then give interested parties an opportunity to participate in the
44
rulemaking "through submission of written data, views, or arguments. 1
The APA takes a fairly broad view of a rule, defined as "an agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy."'4 5 The FCC's
enforcement authority also derives from the 1934 Act.
2.

The Evolving Challenges

Of course, a mere recitation of the basics of classroom administrative
law, as applied to the FCC, sheds little light on the FCC's actual operation.
We need further perspective on the challenges that the FCC faces,
particularly given its role as an arbiter between various enormous and
powerful political factions in a rapidly evolving marketplace. The objective
here is not to criticize the FCC for what it is, but instead to offer
constructive suggestions on ways for it to become more adaptive, flexible,
and tailored in its inevitable market role.
1996 Act, perhaps because it is written in a more general way with more leeway given to the
FCC for interpretation. The 1996 Act also rested on an unsustainable policy model, and was
the victim of major technological and economic transformations within the industry. See
Bauer & Wildman, supra note 63, at 422-23.
411. 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 551-559 (2000)).
412. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 40, at 147; see also FCC, About the FCC,
http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
413. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
414. § 553(c). There is a longstanding debate among commentators about the benefits
and costs of the public comment process. For a thorough review, see Benjamin & Rai, supra
note 40, at 168-74, concluding that an APA-style comment process "is not essential, or even
particularly helpful, for purposes of improving innovation regulation."
415. § 551(4). Notably, while § 553 applies to legislative rules, it does not apply to two
other categories of agency actions: statements of policy (which are guidelines with no force
of law), and interpretive rules (with force of law).
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The FCC faces two major challenges: accessibility as an organization
and flexibility in its institutions. We have already discussed the concept of
regulatory capture under public choice theory. Former FCC Chairman
William Kennard puts it succinctly: "[r]egulatory capitalism is when
companies invest in lawyers, lobbyists and politicians, instead of plant,
people and customer service."' 416 The logic of collective action assumes that
a group of small powerful firms with concentrated interests will have an
easier time influencing decisionmakers than large, diffuse groups.417 Even
where it is assumed that policymakers like the FCC pursue "publicregarding objectives," the concept of "informational capture" means that
those same narrow interests have the resources to be the most vigorous
suppliers of relevant information.4 18 In a similar vein, where policymakers
rely on concepts from Old School Economics, one could say they are
subject as well to what I consider to be a form of "theory capture."
Cherry and Bauer argue that sources of the unsustainability of
telecommunications policy include "initial improper general design,"
"changes internal or external to the policymaking system," and "a failure to
adapt.""' 9 By contrast, sustainable telecommunications policies are
politically adoptable and the desired goals of such policies are reasonably
likely to be achievable. They also point out that there should be more of a
focus on process rather than outcomes.420 Communications policymakers
should "shift from a traditional paradigm emphasizing static optimization
to an evolutionary paradigm focused on adaptability... [using] a mental
model of the coevolution of policy" and the telecommunications market.42'
In addition, policymakers should not overmanage to achieve specific
outcomes, but rather should "seek to enable emerging properties of the []
sector" 4-what I refer to as "tinkering without tampering." Further,
policymakers should understand that their goals and the means of achieving
them will evolve. They will accept that it is necessary to experiment-and
inevitably fail-in
an environment of uncertainty, and will then utilize new
42 3
research tools.
Nonetheless, there is no clear evidence that the primary
decisionmakers at the FCC fully understand and appreciate these concepts.
416. William E. Kennard, Chairman, FCC, Internet Telephony: America Is Waiting,
Remarks Before Voice over the Net Conference (Sept. 12, 2000) (transcript available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/2000/spwek019.html).
417. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 40, at 135.
418. Id. at 136.
419. Cherry & Bauer, supra note 53, at 23-25.
420. Id. at 3.
421. Id. at26.
422. Id. at 27.
423. Id. at 27.
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In fact, the FCC has had an historic tendency to align itself with the
interests of the incumbents that it regulates, which in turn has a dampening
effect on technological innovation. As Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai put it,
"the two most noticeable themes in FCC history have been its catering to
powerful interests and, quite relatedly, its thwarting of the deployment of
new technologies. ' ' 2 4 The FCC's responsiveness to incumbents has
entailed hostility toward disruptive innovations and innovators.
Perhaps the single best historic example is TV broadcasters. The
stories have been told often and well,425 but a quick outline is worth
repeating. The classic case of regulatory capture arises when the major
incumbents from a regulated industry band together and exert significant
influence over the administrative agency. Since the TV broadcasters first
received their spectrum many decades ago, their lobbyists have succeeded
in using various regulatory restrictions to delay and hamper the progress of
cable TV, cellular telephony, satellite TV, low-power TV, and even
TiVo.426 A more recent example is the broadcasters' staunch political
opposition to an FCC proposal to allow unlicensed use of the white spaces
located between licensed digital TV channels.427 The broadcasters also
pressed the FCC to adopt the so-called "broadcast flag" to protect TV
producers' copyrights.428 In all these instances, the issue is not whether
these companies have the right to petition the government to protect their
business interests-under our current system of government, they plainly
do-but rather, what reception they receive from policymakers. All too
often that reception has been a welcoming one.
As discussed in some depth in Emergence Economics, the FCC's
Wireline Broadband Order is a recent notable example of poor adaptive
policy. 429 In that decision, the FCC redefined wireline broadband service
provided by incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) as an unitary
information service, and removed the obligation that the ILECs allow
nondiscriminatory access to unaffiliated Internet service providers

424. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 40, at 147.
425. See, e.g., Thomas Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the
Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "Big Joke ": An Essay on
Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335, 405-51 (2001).
426. Benjamin Lennett, The Lobby That Cried Wof."NAB CampaignAgainst Using TV
White Space Follows a FamiliarScript, IssuE BRIEF (New Am. Found. Wireless Future
Program, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2008, at 1-9; see also Benjamin & Rai, supra note 40, at
147-51.
427. Lennett, supra note 426, at 10-11. This example also demonstrates how the FCC
can be exceedingly slow to open spectrum resources to more productive uses. See generally
Hazlett, supranote 425.
428. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 40, at 123.
429. Whitt and Schultze, supra note 1, at 293-96.
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(ISPs). 43 0 That decision betrayed some notably nonadaptive thinking in
terms of the ends and the means. The betrayal included (1) a failure to
grasp the "big picture"--by slighting concerns about ISPs retaining access
to the Internet, (2) an inflexible and irreversible approach-by relying on a
statutory interpretation over more flexible alternatives, (3) lack of a
nuanced approach-regulation/deregulation is all or nothing, and (4) a
profound lack of accountability-by not including a future mechanism to
reassess the market response. Perhaps most damningly, the FCC did not ask
itself a simple question (either in its decision here, or elsewhere): "whether,
on balance, the proposed regulatory action maximized the sum of
' 31
innovation incentives for all innovators, both current and future.A
Often the FCC cannot seem to help but regulate new technologies as
if they fit old legal paradigms. In the decision granting the AOL/Time
Warner merger, for example, the FCC imposed a mandatory condition that
AOL must allow other Internet portals to interconnect with its AIM
service.432 In addition to likely exceeding its legal authority over Internetbased software applications, that decision failed to foresee that the rapidly433
moving Web market eventually would render the condition unnecessary.
Similarly, in its recent decisions concerning Voice-over-Internet Protocol
(VoIP) technology, the FCC has steadily imposed a series of social and
economic obligations on VoIP service, under its "ancillary" Title I
authority.434 These decisions show seemingly little regard for the unique
nature of VolP technology, as well as the variety of less dictating
institutional implements, such as performance standards, 435 available to
prod the market in the right policy direction. Instead, the FCC's various

430. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline
Facilities, Report and Order andNotice of ProposedRulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853 (2005)
[hereinafter Wireline BroadbandOrder].
431. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 40, at 166.
432. Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and America Online, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547 (2001).
433. Within 30 months the FCC reversed course and removed the condition.
Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time
Warner Inc., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 16835 (2003).
434. See e.g., Rob Frieden, What Do Pizza Delivery and Information Services Have In
Common? Lessons from Recent Judicial and Regulatory Struggles with Convergence, 32
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 247, 280-88 (2007).
435. See, e.g., Coglianese & Kagan, supra note 188, at xxiv ("By specifying an end state
to achieve, performance standards give regulated firms the ability to choose both the most
effective and least costly means of reducing harm. Performance standards also provide firms
with an opportunity to innovate, seeking out better or lower-cost strategies to meet the
performance target.").
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VolP-related dockets
have slowly subjected the technology to death by a
43 6
cuts.
thousand
FCC procedures also can be utilized to support political outcomes.
Paul Kouroupas has identified several additional examples of what he calls
"process as a weapon," including the FCC's ISP reciprocal compensation
regime, where the FCC bailed out the ILECs from cost impacts from
poorly-conceived interconnection contracts with competitive local
exchange carriers (CLECs). 41 7 The FCC's line-sharing decision serves as
yet another salutary example, one of the triumphs of politics over
substance. The concept of unbundling network elements (UNEs) of the
local phone companies' last-mile networks was seen through a "new
conceptual lens," namely that unbundling has overall negative effects on
new facilities deployment by reducing carriers' incentives to invest.438
While four of the five FCC Commissioners actually supported allowing
data CLECs to continue utilizing the data portion of DSL-equipped local
loops, they accepted the trade-off of terminating the UNE platform-essentially favoring more immediate incumbent investment over more
facilities-based competition. The result consigned facilities-based data
CLECs43 9to a world without guaranteed access to the data portion of copper
loops.

There is also ample evidence that the FCC's processes themselves are
flawed, so that "its current lack of data-driven decision-making and its
emphasis on political dealing hinders the thoughtfulness of its analysis,
limits its ability to address issues effectively, and invites a cynical attitude
toward government." 440 Those salient issues are beyond the scope of this
Article. The larger point here is that the FCC's decisions often do not
436. See IP-Enabled Services, Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 11275 (2007);
Implementation of the Telecomm. Act of 1996: Telecomm. Carriers' Use of Customer
Proprietary Network Info. and Other Customer Info., Report and Order and FurtherNotice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R. 6927 (2007); Universal Serv. Contribution
Methodology, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 21 F.C.C.R. 7518
(2006), aff'd in relevant part, Vonage Holdings Corp. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cit.
2007); Comm. Assistance for Law Enforcement Act & Broadband Access & Serv., First
Report and Order and FurtherNotice of ProposedRulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14989 (2005),
aff'd, Am. Council on Educ. v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226 (D.C. Cir. 2006); IP-Enabled Services,
First Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 10245 (2005),
aff'd, Nuvio Corp. v. FCC, 473 F.3d 302 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
437. Kouroupas, supra note 70, at 7-10.
438. Bauer & Wildman, supranote 63, at 425-26.
439. Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers, Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 16978 (2003), vacated in part U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359
F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
440. Philip J. Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden Side of the
Administrative State 5 (Colorado Law Legal Studies Working Paper No. 09-01, 2009),
availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1336820.
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match up well with the dynamic ecosystem with which it is coevolving. Its
greatest challenge may be to remedy its current lack of a principled and
well-thought-out framework for identifying and addressing ways to
effectively discipline market behavior, where necessary, with a quick and
tailored touch. As suggested above, a good starting point would be to begin
investing in policies that are more cautious, macroscopic, incremental,
experimental, contextual, flexible, provisional, accountable, and
sustainable.
Finally, although this Article will not address various proposals for
wholesale legal changes to the FCC's governing structure, 44 1 or calls for the
FCC to hand some of its authority to other agencies, such as the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), 44 2 some suggested intra-agency organizational
changes are worth noting. For example, Phil Weiser recommends that the
FCC re-adopt a Chief Technology Officer (CTO) and re-empower a Chief
Economist to improve the technical and economic advice being given to the
Commissioners." 3 Others suggest that the FCC should adopt an internal
separation-of-powers approach. 4 "
Two other structural fixes could add useful voices from within the
FCC. As has been noted, government actors tend to systematically ignore
or misunderstand innovation absent measures designed to foster more
careful thinking." 5 Including a new Office of Innovation Advocate can
ensure that the FCC's regulatory process includes explicit attention to the
effects of any decision on the course of technological innovation. In a
similar vein, an Office of Ombudsman (perhaps best thought of as an
"Office of Devil's Advocate") would be charged with challenging
fundamental empirical and analytical assumptions underlying draft
decisions, and/or proposed institutional approaches. This would, among
other things, make the process more transparent for the public, and add
another organizational view to counter the natural organizational bias

441. See, e.g., id. at 12-32 (the FCC should significantly overhaul its institutional tools
and processes, or else consider outright abolition).
442. See, e.g., Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: An
Institutional Perspectiveon the Net Neutrality Debate (Reg-Market Center, AEI Center for
Regulatory & Market Studies,Working Paper No. 08-07, 2008), available at http:/aeibrookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/redirect-safely.php?ffiame=../pdffiles/phpGw.pdf
(arguing
that FTC should assume jurisdiction over network neutrality issues).
443. Weiser, supra note 440, at 26; see also Adam Bender & Jonathan Makes,
Pittsburgh Panelists Debate US. Broadband Ranking, COMM. DAILY, July 23, 2008,
available at 2008 WLNR 13920654 (Westlaw) (Former FCC Chief Technologist Dave
Farber believes the FCC should revive the CTO position to avoid the temptation of adopting
controls that will stunt technological growth).
444. See, e.g., HAROLD W. FuRCHTGOTT-ROTH, A TOUGH ACT TO FOLLOW?: THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AcT OF 1996 AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2006).
445. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 40, at 112.
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regulation

D. Additional Implements of an Adaptive Toolkit for
CommunicationsPolicy
1.

The Conceptual Metaphors

As pointed out above, the basic concept of metaphors is that we
project more bodily-based perceptual patterns to understand more abstract
domains." 6 Even the airiest of our ideas are expressed in "thumpingly
concrete metaphors."" 7 Humans are embodied beings with embodied
minds, constituted and constrained by the body and brain. We cannot help
but conceive of the world in physical terms, such as "Love Is a Journey." 448
In so doing, we integrate our metaphors in conceptual "blends," or
networks of mental spaces. 449
Metaphors and analogies are both limiting and limited "transitional
objects."' 4 They can illuminate, but also blind. The "free market" and the
"state of nature," are examples of metaphors that can mislead, rather than
inform.451 And we have already seen how the well-employed concept of the
traditional "marketplace of ideas" can be challenged on many fronts.
"Law is supposed to be a process in which specific issues are
correctly placed within the established legal framework. '' 452 Issue framing
is common in the law, where adversaries contend as to which is the correct
frame to fit a certain situation.453 The use of metaphor in legal discourse
has been especially ubiquitous, with enormous power over the thought and
behavior of policymakers and market agents alike. 454 "We speak of analytic
446. See, e.g., LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 325, at 45 ("Metaphor allows
conventional mental imagery from sensorimotor domains to be used for domains of
subjective experience.").
447. STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF THOUGHT: LANGUAGE AS A WINDOW INTO HUMAN
NATuRE 237 (2007). Pinker disputes the notion, promoted by George Lakoff and Mark
Johnson, that the human mind can directly think only about concrete experiences, and
metaphorical allusions to those experiences-what he calls "the metaphor metaphor." Id. at
238. Even if one agrees with Pinker-and his evidence is provisional-there is little doubt
that metaphors play a much greater role in our mental life than typically is assumed.
448. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 325, at 64-69.
449. FAUCONNIER & TURNER, supra note 323, at 40-50.
450. Mitleton-Kelly, supra note 256, at 26.
451. Rubin, supra note 26, at 50.
452. McFARLAND, supra note 124, at 141.
453. Id. at 141-43.
454. Jonathan H. Blavin & I. Glenn Cohen, Gore, Gibson, and Goldsmith: The Evolution
of Internet Metaphors in Law and Commentary, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 265 (2002). The
authors present the metaphor of law as a lever, with human behavior as the sphere and the
behavioral model as the fulcrum. Jones, Proprioception,supra note 189, at 840-42.
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tools, slippery slopes, balancing tests, swinging pendulums, narrow ends of
wedges, leaps of logic, seamless webs of logic, and logic stretched to the
breaking point." 4 55 After all, paradigm-changing Supreme Court decisions
can hinge on the efficacy of a single metaphor: is Internet access over
broadband more like a fully separate offering (pets and leashes), or a fullyintegrated offering (cars and windshield wipers)?4 56 It is not uncommon for
judges facing new technologies to analogize to better-known technologies.
But whether one is employing metaphors correctly is a tricky business. 5 7
For now, it may be illustrative to examine how metaphors can release
or constrain our thinking about the Internet. Is it appropriate to think that
the Internet is a highway (or even a series of tubes)? After all, in its early
years, the Internet was seen as the information superhighway. Is the
Internet instead a geographic place, like cyberspace? Or is it real property,
as some view it these days? Perhaps we should look instead to the organic
world for our metaphors-a nervous system, a cell, a rainforest, a coral
reef, a flock of birds? 458 Or is the Internet less a thing than a process,
unfolding constantly in space and time, like the formation of thoughts or
emotions?
In particular, the physical metaphor of cyberspace as place has one
unacknowledged influence on the legal framework for the Internet,
including the implication that there is property online that should be
privately owned and protected. Many metaphors for the Internet "assume
some sort of abstract physical space that may be navigated. ''459 This leads
directly to the "tragedy of the anticommons," a digital zone of interest
cyberspace assets
where no one is allowed to access someone else's
460
mechanisms.
permission
other
or
without licensing
As I have argued elsewhere:
Depending on your viewpoint, the Internet at any one moment is a
technical architecture (physical assets, logical protocols, and software),
455. Jones, Proprioception,supra note 189 at 840-41.
456. Compare Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967
(2005), with id. at 1005 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Frieden, supra note 434, at 253-57
(critiquing the Court's reliance on competing metaphors to understand broadband
technologies).
457. "When courts encounter new technologies not yet anticipated by the law, their
reliance on analogical reasoning plays a profoundly important role in the application of
proper legal rules. Courts, however, have demonstrated a bad track record in adopting the
appropriate analogies or metaphors for these new technologies." Blavin & Cohen, supra
note 454, at 267.
458. Why the Web is Like a Rainforest, http://www.stevenberlinjohnson.com/2005/10/
why_ the web is .html (Oct. 3, 2005).
459. Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91
CAL. L. REv. 439, 515-16 (2003).
460. Id.at 441; see also MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: How Too MUCH
OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVEs (2008).
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or a complex of providers (who owns, operates, and manages the
technical components), or a complex of users and their applications
and content, or a substrate for economic and non-economic activity, or
a process of human interactions. No single conceptual metaphor can
hope to capture all of these elements at once.
How about yet another metaphor that may better serve the needs of
policymakers? Some have suggested viewing the Internet as something
decidedly less noble-a slime mold." 2 The rationale is simple: slime molds
act as a single organism when food is abundant, and operate as a clustered
group of organisms when food is scarce. 463 "The slime mold [thus]
oscillates between being a single creature and a swarm." ' 4 This emergent
behavior seems to parallel the differentiated aspects of the Internet as both
an organism and a process-much like the individual and collective
behavior of all of us.
2.

The Fitness Landscape
A particularly powerful way for policymakers to conceptualize social
networks, such as business communities, is to compare them to biological
ecosystems. 46 One compelling conceptual tool (and a metaphor in its own
right) is the fitness landscape. By way of contrast, neoclassical economists
seek a single optimal balance for a particular market, and see growth as a
smooth trajectory of improved efficiency and increased output. 466 Our more
complex view of the process acknowledges to the contrary that there are
several possible "peaks" of high productivity that operate in different ways,
and that it is possible to arrive at those peaks via different "fitness
functions." Indeed, just when one peak has reached its maximum utility
(say, bamboo-based light bulb filament), an entirely different approach
might offer a far better fit (such as tungsten-based light bulb filament).

461. Whitt& Schultze, supra note 1,at 251 n.158.

462. See, e.g., Steven Alan Edwards, It's Alive, WIRED.COM, Apr. 1997,
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/5.04/ideesfortes.html (stating the Web is alive "like a
gigantic, spouting slime mould," and expands to fit the dimensions of its environment).
463. Hannah Clark, Finding Financial Wisdom, FoRBEs.CoM, July 20, 2006,
http://www.forbes.com/2006/07/19/leadership-required-reading-cx hc 0720reading.html.
464. SEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED LivEs OF ANTS, BRAINs, CITIES,
AND SoFTWARE 13 (2001). Johnson finds this a perfect representation of emergent behavior
of a system in which a bottom-up system with no apparent pacemakers somehow comes
together to form a system in which the overall result is greater than the sum of all the
individual parts. Id.at 12.
465. MARCO IANSITI & Roy LEViEN, THE KEYSTONE ADVANTAGE: WHAT THE NEW
DYNAMICS

OF

BusiNEss

ECOSYSTEMS

MEAN

FOR

STRATEGY,

INNOVATION,

AND

SUSTAINABILrrY 38-39 (2004). Of course there are some important differences between
business and biological ecosystems; in the former, innovation, competition for members,
and intelligent actors are more important for success. Id.
466. See Whitt and Schultze, supranote 1, at 224-26.
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The idea of the fitness landscape was introduced by Sewall Wright in
1932, and advanced by Manfred Eigen some sixty years later.467 The
concept "developed in evolutionary biology [] consists of varying fitness
level potentials for an organism in a given environment, with peaks, valleys
and plains of the landscape representing the fitness potential of different
combinations of behavioral schemata and organism structures." 8 Stuart
Kauffman explains it succinctly as viewing the adaptive process as
individuals "climbing a hill" in a virtual landscape of mountains and
valleys, feeling their way through minor variations toward "peaks" of high
fitness. 4 69 These landscapes represent, metaphorically, the contingent range
of possible relationships between a complex adaptive system and its
environment, demonstrating that such systems can improve their fitness in
a number of ways.4 70
An entity's fitness depends on its adaptive traits in the landscape: its
ability to move up the right peaks. 47 1 Agents move around their fitness
landscapes through mechanisms such as adaptive walks, patching, and
jumps. 472 Natural selection can be seen as enabling organisms to search
through vast spaces of possibility toward such peaks.473 Daniel Dennett
views the process as one that involves a tight interaction between the
organism and the environment, where "the landscape is constantly shifting
under your feet. ' '474 Things capable of evolution, like economic systems
and individual agents in that system, all live and evolve on landscapes that
467. See, e.g., DANIEL C. DENNETr, DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE
MEANINGS OF LIFE 190-91 (1999).
468. Cherry & Bauer, supra note 53, at 16.
469. STUART A. KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE: THE SEARCH FOR LAWS OF SELFORGANIZATION AND COMPLEXITY 154 (1995).
470. HOMER-DIXON, supra note 64, at 304-05.
471. Daniel Dennett calls it the Local Rule: "Never step down; step up whenever
possible." DENNETr, supra note 467, at 190.
472. Volker Schneider & Johannes M. Bauer, Governance: Prospects of Complexity
Theory in Revisiting System Theory 27-28 (April 14, 2007) (research paper presented at the
annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, copy available at
http://www.allacademic.corn//meta/pmaapa-research-citation/1/9/8/2/9/pagesl98298/pl
98298-1.php). Some lessons the authors derive from recent work with fitness landscapes
include:
(1) "Normal topographies" with multiple peaks imply there is not only one single
successful strategy of adaptation. Often there is a whole series of local optima. (2)
Specific topographies [path dependency] may imply a kind of "dead end" in the
evolution process... [because] there is no uphill path from a medium peak to an
adjacent higher peak. (3) Depending on the shape of the landscape (rugged vs.
smooth), variation also can lead to stagnating or even declining fitness....
Id. at27.
473. KAUFFMAN, supra note 469, at 154, 157, 166. Interestingly this fitness landscape
metaphor in turn employs the "More Is Up" and less is down bodily metaphoric system.
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 325, at 47-48, 49-54.
474. DENNETr, supra note 467, at 193.
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themselves have a special property: they allow evolution to "work." 475 The
systems most able to move from one fitness peak to another are those
poised "on the cusp between order and chaos," adventurous enough to look
for improved conditions but cautious enough to take advantage of
improvements they find.476
Coyle offers that "[i]t would be hard to deny, for even the most diedin-the-wool orthodox neoclassical economist, that the framework of
evolutionary competition offers a much richer and realistic account of
innovation.,, 477 Purposeful, self-reflective agents explore the fitness
landscape seeking opportunities for innovation and competing against each
other. Technological evolution is coevolution within an economic web,
where new technologies enter (like the automobile), drive others extinct
(like the horse), and create niches that enable other technologies (like
478
traffic lights).
Markets provide the fitness function for the selection process, perhaps
seen (again, metaphorically) as a giant search engine. The notion of fitness
implies that combined PTs and STs are used by agents to navigate a market
landscape of possible growth trajectories-like a map of mountains. Agents
use various strategies to combine PTs and STs into a BP. As one approach
reaches its peak limit, one might say that an equilibrium of sorts has been
reached-but only until it is upset by a different approach making use of a
different combination. Under one variation, this leads to a punctuated
equilibrium that is disrupted by "keystone" technologies.4 79

differentiation
selection(*
amplification

T

475. KAUFFMAN, supra note 469, at 169. These landscapes are said to be "correlated,"
not random, because they allow minor mutations to cause both small and large variations,
and the terrain itself offers the best clues about the best direction in which to proceed. Id.
476. HOMER-DIXON, supra note 340, at 305. He believes that Western institutions and
culture have developed a self-reinforcing combination that maintains societies at the
"fecund boundary between order and chaos." Id. at 306.
477. COYLE, supranote 156, at 191.
478. KAUFFMAN, supra note 469, at 280-81. Rubin observes that many moral and
religious rules demonstrate inherent conflicts between "the biological goal of fitness
maximization and the economists' hypothesized goal of utility maximization." Rubin, supra
note 26, at 76.
479. IANsrn & LEviEN, supranote 465, at 69-72.
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Ultimately, no one company can hope to out-innovate the market. An
ecosystem tends to beat a product (perhaps even something as innovative as
the iPod) because its collective of competitors can explore and innovate
and invest in many more ideas than any single company can do alone. 8
Beinhocker observes that "[i]n evolutionary systems, sustainable
competitive advantage does not exist; there is only a never-ending race to
create new sources of temporary advantage. ' 48 The bottom line is that
"evolution is cleverer than you are. 482
3.

The Modular Model

Another overarching conceptual tool for policymakers (and itself a
metaphoric construct) is the so-called "layered" approach to
communications policy. In a prior paper, I urged adoption of this approach
to guide decision making in the communications and information policy
space.483 Such a modular model would replace the existing "silos" approach
under the Communications Act of 1934, which treats regulated entities and
their service offerings in the context of legacy industries.484 In other words,
the institutions of the Communications Act and FCC regulations, as well as
the organizational structure of the FCC itself, no longer fit the realities of
the market and the technology.
The layered framework mirrors the actual functional architecture of
the Internet. While there are several different ways to think about the
modular components of the Internet, the model that appears best to
combine simplicity and precision is a four-layered approach: physical,
logical, applications, and content. 485 The top two layers of the modelapplications and content-are under the end-user's control and visible,
while the lower two layers-physical and logical-are under the network's
control and invisible to all but the network. 486 The four-layered model can
480. John J. Sviokla, In Praise of Ecosystems, FAST COMPANY, Aug. 1, 2005, at 21,
availableat http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/97/openessay.html.
481. BEINHOCKER, supra note 10, at 332.
482. DENNETT, supra note 467, at 464 (quoting British biologist Francis Crick's famous
Orgel's Second Rule).
483. See generally Richard S. Whitt, A HorizontalLeap Forward: Formulatinga New
Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 FED.
COMM. L.J. 587 (2004).
484. Interestingly, Beinhocker discusses individual "modules" as the components of
Business Plans that are subject to differential selection in the market, and in turn match up
to evolutionary schemata's "building-block, combinatorial character." BEINHOCKER, supra
note 10, at 283-85.
485. See Whitt, supra note 483, at 621-24.
486. Susan Crawford rightly derides the persistent use of "content" as a placeholder for
all the myriad activities of the Internet. Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Projectof
Communications Law, 55 UCLA L. REv. 359, 390-91 (2007). We must remind ourselves
that software applications are merely the tools (the means), while "content" is but one type
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be modified to highlight the ways that different players and activities can
affect the other modular components of the network.487 For example,
Timothy W. Wu has recommended that the model be reduced to two layers
in order to facilitate understanding by decision makers.488 Kevin Werbach,
in a compelling paper, has expanded the model to include the interfaces
between the layers.489 More fundamentally, the first principle of layers is
that there is network, and there is "stuff' (mainly software-enabled
interactivity) that rides on top of the network.4 9 °

of end "product." Nor are we mere consumers of content-or in Jerry Michalski's words, "a
gullet whose only purpose in life is to gulp products and crap cash." The Onda,
http://www.theonda.org (follow the browse posts by year "2007" hyperlink) (July 26, 2007)
(posting entitled First We Trashed "Consumers," Now We've Effed up "Users"). Instead we
are creators of value--commercial, social, and personal. Moreover, in important ways
Crawford's "social layer" of "content" encompasses all layers of the Net. Frischmann, supra
note 397, at 1012-14, 1018 (Innovation is too narrow conceptually to capture the overall
social welfare afforded by the Internet; after all, "a significant portion of the content
traveling on the Internet is noncommercial, speech-oriented information.").
487. Networks generally consist of three main elements: links, nodes, and routing
information. Each of the horizontal network layers can be divided further into these three
elements, as well as subdivided into geographic components. Hendrick Rood, A Primer on
Empirically Assessing Strategic Moves in ECS 1-3 (Sept. 2008) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
488. Timothy Wu, Why Have a TelecommunicationsLaw? Anti-DiscriminationNorms in
Communications, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15,22 (2006).
489. Kevin Werbach, Breaking the Ice: Rethinking Telecommunications Law for the
DigitalAge,4 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 59, 89-92 (2005).
490. Moreover, Romer's version of new growth theory generally buttresses the concept
of the layered approach. See generally Romer, supra note 42. As I see it, the different
economics of things and ideas (or atoms and bits) matches up well against the division
between networks and the myriad interactions enabled by them.
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A MODULAR FRAMEWORK
The chief idea behind the layers approach is to allow for "a more
concrete analysis of the issues by placing [each] function at a proper layer
[of the network] and providing a correct focus on the relevant operation of
the Internet. '4 91 The layers metaphor is intended to provide a flexible
conceptual framework-a visual map-to guide decision making. Just as
importantly, the layers framework was intended to inject considerable
caution into the policy-making process. My original layers paper urged
policy restraint (no dictating), unless there was a compelling regulatory
justification and a carefully tailored remedy (enabling).4 92 As noted there,
policymakers should not adopt legal regulations that violate the integrity of
the layered nature of the Internet, absent a significant regulatory interest
and careful consideration of layers-respecting alternatives.493 As I have
491. Whitt, supra note 483, at 627.
492. See generally id. Werbach echoes that point, stating that one lesson of the layered
regulatory model is that "regulators should be increasingly hesitant to impose obligations at
higher levels of the protocol stack." Kevin Werbach, Only Connect 48 (Feb. 20, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http:papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract
id=964991); see also Frieden, supra note 434, at 256 (layered approach provides flexibility
and restraint in deciding whether ex ante regulation is necessary).
493. Whitt, supra note 483, at 625. As a supreme irony, the FCC recently has
promulgated a regulatory regime premised on what can only be described as a "contralayers" approach: regulate the competitive top layers (VolP software applications), and
deregulate the more concentrated bottom layers (broadband network connectivity).
Unfortunately, as discussed previously, the FCC gets this latter element hopelessly muddled
in its Wireline Broadband Order, supra note 430. There the agency declines to regulate
broadband networks merely because the end user perceives that they typically are used in
conjunction with a particular non-regulated consumer service (Internet access). A little
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argued elsewhere, "[g]enerally speaking, the more narrowly the regulation
focuses on the layer it is attempting to control, the lesser it will impair other
layers, reduce transparency, or cause substantial 'innocent use'
problems. 4 94 By seeking to preserve the integrity of the Internet, the layers
principle also preserves the emergence of innovation, economic growth,
and other salient Internet effects.
Moreover, the foundation of the layers framework is the reality of the
market we have today, rather than some artificial construct found on a
chalkboard. Modularity comports with the technology-based ecosystem at
the heart of the communications sector. Marty Fransman states that "[t]he
interactions of the players are influenced by the architectural structure
within which they exist'4 9 --in this case, a layered model. The layers
model "emphasizes the interdependence - in both a technical and economic
sense - of the different layers. ' 4 96 Most firms in the New Economy are
organizing their work around the reality of the Internet.49 7 Further, Japan's
and Information employs a layers model as a
Ministry of Communications
498
conceptual tool.

The static topographical model of a layered platform cannot hope to
capture all the complexity and dynamism of the actual Internet, but as
discussed earlier, nothing truly can.499 Nor is the framework intended to
impose a normative value onto the market. The success of "dismodular"
companies like Apple is a salient reminder that there are many beneficial
market pathways other than modular ones. However, a layered framework
can help us understand the various components that collectively lead to that
layered thinking could have gone a long way toward avoiding the tangled mess of the
Communications Act that has resulted.
494. Whitt, supranote 483, at 637.

495.

FRANSMAN,

supranote 58, at 7.

496. Id. at 10. Fransman himself developed what he calls the New ICT Ecosystem Layer
Model, or ELM, both as an engineering-architectural and an economic-institutional model,
which conceptualizes the ecosystem as a set of functionalities. Id. at 22; see also Martin
Fransman, Evolution of the Telecommunications Industry into the Internet Age 37 (2000),
reprinted in 3 THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS:
WORLD TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETS 15 (Gary Madden, ed. 2003); available at
http://www.telecomvisions.com/articles/pdf/FransmanTelecomsHistory.pdf (discussing six
layered model of the "info-communications industry").
497. ATKINSON, supra note 49, at 95.
498. FRANSMAN, supranote 58, at 9.
499. See id. at 37-54. Pierre de Vries argues that the layered model does not adequately
represent the dynamics and unpredictability of the Internet. de Vries, supra note 85, at 11.
While there is no doubt it does not fully capture all market realities, the layers model does
represent a relatively stable industry structure, and is relatively easy for policymakers to
grasp and utilize in constructive ways. By contrast, de Vries' metaphor of the intemet/web
as a forest, id. at 13-14, while perhaps a more accurate mental picture, does not appear to
help communications policymakers appropriately analyze salient features of Internet-related
market phenomena, like VoIP applications or broadband networks.
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market success. While not perfect, and perhaps only provisional, layering
as a conceptual tool remains clearly superior to today's strangely enduring
legal silos, and should be a satisfactory surrogate until the Internet changes
into something else or until someone discovers a better conceptual ordering
mechanism. 50 0 Understood correctly as a conceptual framework, and an
analytical tool, the layers model fits nicely in the (metaphorical) toolkit of
adaptive policymaking. 50 1
V. ENABLING VERSUS DICTATING: FURTHER EXPLORING A
FITNESS FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS
Noted physicist Stuart Kauffman has explained the challenge of
creating novel conceptual models for understanding complex systems:
We are seeking a new conceptual framework that does not yet exist.
Nowhere in science have we an adequate way to state and study the
interleaving of self-organization, selection, chance, and design. We
have no adequate framework for the place of law
50 2 in a historical
science, and the place of history in a lawful science.
He adds
that we are just beginning to pick out "strands in the tapestry" of
50 3
life.
Despite these daunting challenges, I believe Emergence Economics
suggests at least one conceptual framework for policymakers to utilize as
they examine public policy issues. No framework is entirely accurate, or
even the thing it purports to represent. Indeed, we should resist the urge to
boil reality down to a single framing device °4 Yet, in the face of a world
500. See, e.g., Bauer & Wildman, supra note 63, at 436 (citing the advantages of a
horizontal layered model over the silo approach in U.S. policy, but suggesting that
"establishing a horizontal framework may not be a long-term sustainable strategy either").
501. A related suggested change to the FCC's current legal structure would replace the
current silos of the "wireless" and "wireline" and "media" bureaus with a layered approach
divided between conduit and (on a much smaller scale) content. See, e.g., HAL ABELSON,
KEN LEDEEN, & HARRY LEwis, BLOwN TO BITS: YouR LIFE, LIBERTY, AND HAPPINESS AFTER
THE DIGITAL ExPLoSION 291 (2008).
The silo organization of the legal structures inhibits innovation in today's layered
technologies. Regulation of the content layer should not be driven by an outdated
understanding of the engineering limits of the physical layer. Investments made in
developing the physical layer should not enable the same companies to control the
content layer .... Laws and regulations should respect layers, not the increasingly
meaningless silos ....
Id. at 291, 313.
502. KAUFFMAN, supra note 469, at 185.
503. Id.; see also de Vries, supra note 85, at 18 ("It is not possible to set up analytical
models for complex systems. Any model that purports to capture the behavior of a system
necessarily under-represents it. No model less complex than the system itself can exactly,
and in detail, forecast its behavior.") (internal citations omitted).
504. Further, because "simplifications [of reality] are necessary, competing
simplifications are essential." ALLISON & ZELIKOW, supra note 271, at 8 (emphasis omitted).
Having one or more competing conceptual frameworks help remind us of the distortions and
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of dynamism and complexity, and even contradiction, we should try to sort
through the evidence around us, as best we can.
My proposed conceptual framework stipulates that, where markets are
contestable, policymakers should endeavor, at most, to foster the market's
processes, rather than interfere with or attempt to replace those processes.
This proposed dichotomy would still allow certain "tinkering" with the
fitness environment-providing useful inputs, incentives, feedback, and
connectivity. However, "the basic workings of the evolutionary algorithm agents differentiating, selecting, and amplifying various technologies and
business plans - should be left to the effectiveness, merits, and complexity
of the open market." 505 The following diagram lays out this dichotomy
between acceptable enabling (or "tinkering") and unacceptable dictating (or
"tampering"):
diversification

connectivity
Q. .9
."1",.

landscaping

feedback

some role for policy
only market forces
differentiation

selection
amplification

'-1.

(*PT
S

The notion of tinkering versus tampering has been recognized
elsewhere in somewhat different contexts. For example, Thomas HomerDixon believes "[a] decentralized, network-based approach" is best in most
market situations (no tampering), but "[s]ometimes a centralized,
hierarchical, command-driven approach is essential, even if only as a
catalyst or complement [tinkering] to a network-based approach. 50 6 Geerat
Vermeij similarly points out that diffuse control (no dictating) must be
tempered and regulated to some degree by top-down, centralized
intervention (enabling), which accomplishes ends that the free market by
507
ofcr
itself cannot.
And, of course, Eric Beinhocker distinguishes between
economic evolution and policies that help shape
policies that interfere with
the fitness environment.50 8

limitations of whatever framework one employs; "[tjhey open minds a little wider and keep
them open a little longer." Id.
505. Whitt & Schultze, supra note 1, at 304.
506. HOMER-DiXON, supra note 64, at 307.
507. See generally VERMEU, supra note 362.
508. See BEINHOCKER, supra note 10, at 426-27.
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To be clear, the tinkering inputs are not absolute goods in themselves.
They are not optimal for all times and places, or in maximum amounts, but
instead are relative to the condition of the market. Indeed, too much choice
can be confusing, too much connectivity can be destabilizing, and too much
information can be paralyzing. The point is that these four categories of
policy inputs seem to match up well to those common market situations
where one or more of the corresponding positive economic attributes are
lacking to some degree. The context between market realities and policy
implements is crucial. 0 9
Moreover, where one chooses to draw the line between tinkering and
tampering likely will vary from market to market and over time. They
occupy a range of options along a continuum, rather than black-or-white
decisions. Markets with little to no real competition, and a lack of
contestability, may require some form of dictating by government. Further,
where there are major structural problems with the institutions or the
organizations of a particular market sector, direct intervention that amounts
to dictating particular business practices or outcomes may be necessary.
However, the general rule should be to tamper only where other, lessintrusive options are unlikely to have the intended effect.
Even so, there are obvious "challenges of tinkering with complex
adaptive systems to produce specific intended outcomes,,, 510 in part because
the coevolution of fitness landscapes "[has] confound[ed] efforts to design
change in complex adaptive systems with specific intended results. '5 1 One
lesson is to avoid outcome-oriented policies and focus instead on
process. 512 In the following section, I will expand on the notion of dictating
versus enabling, and raise some anticipated questions about the suggested
framework for ordering the selection landscape.
A.

Do Not Dictate Outputs and Outcomes

The general policy principle articulated in Emergence Economics is
that markets should be the primary mechanism for selecting and amplifying
technological change, so that policymakers do not interfere in the processes
of economic evolution. 51 3 Richard Lipsey and his co-authors agree, noting
that markets and the market expertise of private sector agents should be

509. "As public policy and private ordering have their respective costs, the appropriate
normative question is to find the mix of (imperfect) collective policy arrangements and
(imperfect) private ordering that yield the highest aggregate welfare, given the overall vision
for the sector." Bauer & Wildman, supra note 63, at 434.
510. Ruhl, supra note 65, at 902.
511. Id. at903.
512. Bauer & Wildman, supra note 63, at 434-35; see also Kouroupas, supra note 70.
513. See generally, Whitt & Schultze, supra note 1, at 304-08.
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utilized whenever possible.5 1 4 Allowing government agents to dictate
business decisions would amount to suppressing or ignoring market
signals.
Trusting the evolutionary process of the market-allowing agents
collectively to differentiate, select, and amplify certain modes of
service/production-amounts to trusting in the efficacy of the outcome.
While the results may not be optimal or efficient for all, the market comes
closest to the effective meritocracy we should want. The innovation process
involves weeding out the good from the not-as-good. First, policymakers
should not be in the habit of creating, proposing, or emphasizing particular
market alternatives. This is not to say that there should be no governmental
role in encouraging the differentiation process; depending on the market
circumstances, some such limited encouragement may have a beneficial
impact. Second, policymakers should not have a direct role in business plan
selection. Where the appropriate institutions and organizations are
functioning at least adequately, market actors should be free to select the
physical and social technologies that make up their business plans, and to
innovate toward what they think will be the "most fit" for the economic
landscape. Selection is the heart of evolution, and the heart of markets.
Third, policymakers should not amplify the "most fit" business plans.
Amplifying either legacy or new approaches threatens the ability of the
market to sort itself out according to the wishes and actions of disparate
market players. Instead, amplification should happen at the level of
individual agents as they navigate the fitness landscape.
As just one example of this concept, William Easterly points out that
the West has spent $2.3 trillion in foreign aid over the last five decades,
and still has not brought concrete results for needy people around the
world.5 5 Easterly calls those policymakers who mistakenly tend to use topdown, supply-driven interventions to deal with poverty the "Planners. '1 6
Easterly claims instead that "[t]he right plan is to have no plan,"'5 17 with the
"Searchers" employing local, demand-drive, bottom-up, accountable, and
incentivized approaches, based on trial-and-error experimentation. In his
view, only homegrown development, based on the dynamism of individuals
and firms in free markets, can achieve the end of poverty. 518 "Big Plans will
always fail to reach the beautiful goal."5'1 9

514. LIPSEY, CARLAW & BEKAR, supra note 92, at 46-49.
515. WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST'S EFFORTS TO AID
THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL AND So LITTLE GOOD 4 (2006).

516. Id.at5.
517. Id.

518. Id.at 100-01.
519. Id.at 11.
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Of course, as discussed earlier, this approach assumes that the
appropriate institutions and organizations are in place and working properly
to sustain a viable market in the first place. Markets are artificial
constructs, built to accommodate evolutionary forces driving each of us,
individually and collectively. In competition law, the relevant concept is
whether the market is "contestable" enough (an entity has a realistic
opportunity to compete effectively) to warrant no governmental intrusion.
Where the market is not functioning as it should, it raises important
questions about whether and how government should intervene directly in
the heart of market forces. After all, "the material wealth of capitalism
arises from human ingenuity, industry, and 52
effort,
not magically from a
0
virtuous adherence to the laws of the market.,
Some may argue that we should not in general defer to the workings
of the market because it does not produce optimal results. Why should we
trust the markets and evolutionary processes to yield optimal outcomes of
BPs, PTs, and STs? After all, our own bodies display the flaws of
biological evolution from a strictly functional design perspective-the
useless appendix, the choking-inducing esophagus, the blind spots in our
retinas.52' Should VHS have beaten Beta? Should Explorer have defeated
Netscape? Should Google have outlasted Alta Vista? How can we be sure
that what happens in the "free" market is in fact optimal? And for whom?
Lipsey and his co-authors put it bluntly:
in a dynamic world of uncertainty there is nothing in the market
selection process to guarantee that only the fittest will survive, that all
the fittest will survive, and that all others will be eliminated-as long
as 'fittest' is defined independently of survival and not tautologically
as 'those who survive'. 522
They also point out that before a new technology is even accepted by
end users 52in3 the marketplace, its diffusion is "slow, costly, and often
uncertain.
However, an important initial point is that optimal outcomes should
be evaluated in terms of effectiveness, rather than efficiency. Markets can
be very wasteful in terms of the excess (failed) BPs that are generated and
520. FOLEY, supra note 50, at 228.
521. See, e.g., S. Jay Olshansky, Bruce A. Cames, & Robert N. Butler, If Humans Were
Built to Last, SctENTIFic AM., March 1, 2001, at 50 (citing, among other body design flaws,
backward-facing light detection cells between the optic nerve and retina, a common
passageway for food and air, and fragile hair cells in our ears); see also MELVIN KONNER,
THE TANGLED WING: BIOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE HUMAN SPIRIT (2003). Neil Tyson

amusingly has referred to human genitalia as "an entertainment complex in the middle of a
sewage system." Trevor Bekolay, Unintelligent Design, THE MANITOBAN ONLINE, June 18,
2008, www.themanitoban.com/science-technology/unintelligent-design.html.
522. LIPSEY, CARLAW & BEKAR, supra note 92, at 47.
523. Id. at 87.
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discarded. That lack of efficiency, however, should not be confused with
the ability of markets eventually to reach fit decisions by churning
effectively through the available options. The key is that markets play a
critical role in collecting and processing information, as well as keeping
power hierarchies in check by providing a fitness function for the selection
of BPs. While markets are24necessary, useful, and effective, they do not tend
to be optimally efficient.1
Thus, decentralized decision making by individual agents in a market
wins out over command and control, not because of the market's automatic
efficiency at resource allocation in equilibrium, but because of its potential
effectiveness at innovation in disequilibrium. 525 "[T]here is not a single
economic theory that can show that a totally free market sets the most
socially beneficial price for goods, or leads to their optimal distribution. 52 6
Instead, we should take a pragmatic approach to the market, says
McMillan, "against the quasi-religious view that it is always right or
fundamentally evil.... Markets are not magic, nor are they immoral. 527 If
calibrated properly, markets can avoid the worst tendencies of state
hierarchies, while at the same time discipline the worst tendencies of
company hierarchies. Neither form of monopoly alone can be trusted.
Again, evolution does not necessarily make optimal solutions. Nor is
there a guarantee that change is progress, and near-optimal solutions cannot
be predicted. 528 "In th[e] dynamic market, the best design does not always
win. 52 9 And "no adaptation, and no adapted system, is perfect. 53 °
Nonetheless, "[t]he self-organized critical state with all its fluctuations is
not the best possible state, but it is the best state that is dynamically
achievable., 53' The superior recipe for confronting novel change is the
maintenance of institutions that permit trial and error experiments to
occur.532 The point is that the market, like biological evolution, is optimal
in context, and thus the best we can hope to have. If the market itself is
524. BEINHOCKER, supra note 10, at 399-403.
525. Id. at 402-03.
526. PHILIP BALL, CRITICAL MASS: How ONE THING LEADS TO ANOTHER 457 (2004).
527. McMILLAN, supra note 274, at 226. This sentiment echoes that of Mises: "There is
nothing inhuman or mystical with regard to the market. The market process is entirely a
resultant of human actions." LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON
EcoNoMIcs 258 (4th ed. 2008).
528. Cherry & Bauer, supra note 53, at 19.
529. DAVID E. NYE, TECHNOLOGY MATrFERS: QUESTIONS TO LIvE WITH 43 (2006).

Examples he cites include Sony's Betamax and Apple's Macintosh computer, and RCA's
ability to resist the adoption of FM radio in the 1930s and 1940s. Id.
530. VERMEU, supra note 362, at 303.
531. PER BAK, How NATURE WORKs: THE SCIENCE OF SELF-ORGANIZED CRITICALITY 198

(1996).
532.

NORTH,

supranote 151, at 163.
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robust and diverse enough, the decision-making process should effectively
reflect the interests of the agents. 33
Ideally, the market is a democratic process. Realistically, as we have
seen, there are infirmities large and small in the marketplace, depending on
factors like the national culture, the industry sector, and the institutional
and organizational backdrop. However, where at least the overall structure
of the market itself is sound, tampering can be foreclosed, and at most the
tinkering process can come into play.
Further, VHS defeating Beta in the VCR standards wars was not
necessarily a "market failure," but an example of a form of complexity
effects, a virtuous circle of self-reinforcing growth. The increasing returns
on early gains eventually tilted the competition toward VHS, which
eventually captured nearly the entire market.534 Eve Mitleton-Kelly notes,
as a path dependency, this increasing pull of a new technology in attracting
or enabling further development.5 35 However, this is not a simple or
straightforward process; numerous variables are engaged in positive and
negative feedback loops. The larger point is that government involvement
inevitably would skew the end results of this evolutionary process. Indeed,
Brian Arthur argues that history shows that irrational exuberance for
competing technology in a relatively unregulated environment leads to
speculation, and then crashes, but ultimately to a mature, productive period
of confidence and prosperity built on that technology. 536 Railroads and
canals are two recent examples of such technologies; the Internet is a third.
Plus, the Internet now provides a new and possibly unique platform to
better optimize the performance of the market. This is accomplished by
putting sellers and buyers in more direct contact, by enabling the Long
Tail 537 of minority interests not previously served, by removing earlier
gatekeepers and other unwanted intermediaries, and by disciplining the
533. An analog is the voting process in a democracy. The whether and how of an
individual's decision making in the voting booth should be left to the agent-citizen, so as to
best express the will of the people. Just as we should want to refrain from substituting our
judgment for that of an agent-citizen, so should we do for an agent-consumer.
534. Eve Mitleton-Kelly, Introduction, in COMPLEX SYSTEMS AND EVOLUTIONARY
PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANISMS, supra note 256, at 18. Nye further observes that Sony made
the fatal decision not to share its Betamax system with others, in hopes of reaping all the
rewards, while rival JVC aligned itself with other manufacturers and licensed them to coproduce its VHS system. NYE, supra note 529, at 43.
535. Mitleton-Kelly, supra note 256, at 38-39.
536. W. Brian Arthur, Is the Information Revolution Dead? If History Is a Guide, It Is
Not 1-6 (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
537. For an early explanation of the Long Tail, see Chris Anderson, The Long Tail:
Forget Squeezing Millions from a Few Megahits at the Top of the Charts. The Future of
Entertainment is in the Millions of Niche Markets at the Shallow End of the Bitstream,
=
WIRED.COM, Oct. 2004, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.10/tail.html?pg=2&topic
=
tail&topic-set .
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behavior of market incumbents and those with market power with the threat
of quicker, more robust, and more disruptive competitive responses. While
the equation may be different in other sectors, these factors change the
nature
of the government's role regarding the intertwined
communications/Internet markets.
A related argument is that the market only responds to the majority
interest; minority preferences tend not to get taken up. In The Tyranny of
the Market, Joel Waldfogel claims that markets are not optimally efficient
in bringing forth products that consumers want. 538 Even though
government can be stupid or "evil" as it intervenes in the market,
Waldfogel marvels how "[w]e live in an era of almost limitless faith in
markets and almost limitless scorn for government., 539 Some of this is
undoubtedly true. The tyranny of the majority existing in many markets
says that what I get depends on how many others also want it. However, as
noted, the Internet enlarges markets by making information, as well as
retail goods, available to consumers around the world. The Internet also
reduces fixed costs.i ° As a result, Waldfogel admits that "preference
minorities turn to the Internet for liberation from unappealing product
options available locally.", 541 The Internet helps us find and explore the
Long Tail.
B.

Do Enable Inputs

Where important policy goals and objectives are at stake, a potentially
appropriate role for government is to experiment with different changeable
elements of the fitness environment within which the evolutionary
algorithm operates. The fundamental point is to improve the market's
ability to formulate and present different options (the quantity function),
while leaving the selection processes themselves undisturbed (the quality
function). Put another way, policymakers should endeavor to coordinate,
and not control.
There is room for public policy to define various elements of the
selection environment in which agents operate.542 In some sense, the basis
for the market failure is the inability of agents to fully explore their fitness
landscape; this can stem from actions by a market player, or a government
player, as well as flawed or failed institutions and organizations. Further,
human beings may not be able to overcome their cognitive constraints
538.

JOEL WALDFOGEL, THE TYRANNY OF THE MARKET: WHY YOU CAN'T ALWAYS GET

WHAT YOU WANT 168 (2007).

539.
540.
541.
542.

Id. at 169.
Id. at 120-27.
Id. at 96; see also id. 96-99.
Cherry & Bauer, supra note 53, at 20.
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when dealing with marketplace ambiguity or uncertainty, leading to what
John Maynard Keynes called the proliferation of spontaneous "animal
spirits" in the economy.5 43 In dealing with these realities, as a general rule,
bottom-up processes are better than top-down processes, but only if the
right conditions are in place-in particular, choice, transparency,
connectivity, and feedback. 544 "At best, a policy rule can be expected to
affect the fitness landscape of the economic system ... but it can not [sic]
guarantee the specific points in the fitness landscape that the economy will
outcomes but
traverse., 545 Policies "should seek not to manage ' specific
46
enable emerging properties of the economic sector.
Benjamin Friedman, for one, maintains that while it is a commonly
held view that "government policy should try, insofar as it can, to avoid
interfering with private economic initiative," this familiar view is seriously
incomplete. 547 He argues that market forces alone will systematically
provide too little growth because "the right rate of economic growth is
greater than the purely market-determined rate, and the role of government
'54s However, that perspective is not at all inconsistent
policy is to foster it."
with the concept of enabling without dictating, where market forces are
employed in service of the larger goals of generating additional innovation,
economic growth, and other emergent-and "unpriced"-benefits.
The rough formula for emergence offers us some guidance in the
context of communications policy. For example, the existence of
constrained yet adaptable agents suggests the need for user education and
greater market transparency. Interconnected and dynamic networks suggest
a preference for optimal interconnection between different networks, and a
balance between network aggregation and disaggregation. Synergistic,
fitness-maximizing evolution suggests an important role for open
543. See GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: How HUMAN
PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 3-4
(2009). The authors explain that the five animal spirits of confidence, fairness, corruption,
money illusion, and stories are ubiquitous motivators of people, and in the context of U.S.
financial institutions require various governmental reforms and regulations. Id. at 174-76.
544. Using yet another conceptual metaphor, the profit motive can be seen as "an everflowing stream, and, if unattended, it can erode the social fabric... and the environment.
But, good ground rules can channel competition to serve the public purposes." FRIEDMAN,
supra note 208, at 181.
545. Cherry & Bauer, supra note 53, at 23. Put another way, some evolutionary
economists believe that the invisible hand of the market needs significant amounts of policy
assistance, although "'assistance that distorts' is a concept that is related to optimality
conditions that are unobtainable and hence irrelevant to a growing economy operating under
uncertainty." LIPSEY, CARLAW & BEKAR, supra note 92, at 49.
546. Cherry & Bauer, supra note 53, at 27.
547. BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 14
(2005).
548. Id.at 15.
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platforms, so that neither public nor private authorities can unfairly
constrain the ability of economic actors to differentiate, select, and amplify
ideas. Finally, beneficial but unpredictable emergence behavior suggests
the need for regulatory humility and skepticism, while also protecting and
promoting emergent sources and uses of innovation, generativity, economic
growth, and spillovers. These in turn should lead to policies supporting
informed and empowered agents, connected networks, unfettered
evolution, and full-blown emergence of new ideas.
Thus, consistent with those considerations, and for purposes of this
discussion of communications policy, I believe that environmental
"tinkering" can be accomplished in at least four different ways: (1) feeding
the evolutionary algorithm through diversifying inputs, such as BPs and
their accompanying PTs and STs; (2) fostering connectivity between
agents, so that physical and virtual communication links are optimized; (3)
shaping the fitness landscape in order to create economic incentives and
increased market trust for certain activities; and (4) enhancing market
feedback mechanisms, to facilitate better decisions through generating
greater flows of timely and accurate information. 49 Again, to suggest these
potential steps of supplying inputs, connectivity, incentives, and feedback
is not to endorse their use in any or all situations. Only where an
overarching policy decision requires some form of market implementation
should one or more of these steps even be considered, and perhaps adopted.
But if done correctly, these relatively modest measures can provide
substantial emergent benefits.
In all respects, policy decisions in these contexts should be seen as a
series of experiments that compete to evolve over time. Using the right
policy tools, we can prod the market into self-correcting, "steer[ing] itself
toward order without over-determining the exact contours of what that
order should look like." 550
1.

4

Feeding the Algorithm (Innovation and Choice)
The policymaker first can feed the algorithm of
evolution by adding additional inputs to the process.
These inputs include BPs, PTs, and STs. In some ways,

549. A useful metaphor here, proposed by Professor Lon Fuller, is the tree pruner, where
"the law can act as a gardener who prunes an imperfectly growing tree in order to help the
tree realize its own capacity for perfection." David G. Post & David R. Johnson, "Chaos
Prevailingon Every Continent": Towards A New Theory of DecentralizedDecision-Making
in Complex Systems, 73 CI.-KENT L. REV. 1055, 1092 (1998) (quoting Lon L. Fuller,
Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 54 PRoc. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 1, 3 (1960)).
550. Matwyshyn, supra note 209, at xvii. The author employs an interesting choice of
verbs to describe the government's preferred role, such as "gently nudge," id.at xvi,
"nurture," id.at xvii, and "guide," id.
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this puts the government metaphorically in the role of a lab technician,
providing different plans and technologies for agents to experiment with in
the market through selection.
By allowing, and even nudging, additional inputs to feed the
algorithm, more optimal amounts of novelty, knowledge, and growth are
generated. A diversity of inputs-BPs, PTs, and STs-serves as the raw
material for differentiation. Ideas are the key input because they can
become innovative business plans (when combined with implementation),
physical technologies (when combined with things), and social
technologies (when combined with processes). By the same token,
supplementing market forces from within via inputs to the emergence
algorithm can strengthen the evolutionary process, and yield a richer
outcome. Geerat Vermeij notes that "the breadth of inclusion is critical to
the discussion of whether and how economic systems operate for the
benefit of participants."55 ' The key is to influence the quantity of inputs,
without disturbing the quality of decisions derived ultimately from the
algorithm itself. As Beinhocker cautions, "[w]e should be realistic about
our ability to predict the effects of government shaping of the fitness
function and the likelihood of unintended consequences. 5 52
One reasonably may ask why there is a need for government to
generate variety by providing inputs at all. Should not the market naturally
evolve every conceivable business plan, and in turn churn through and
select the most adaptable (the most responsive to user demand)? In someperhaps many-circumstances, the answer would be yes, but someperhaps many-markets are not optimally competitive to yield these BPs.
As it turns out, left solely to their own devices, markets tend not to produce
optimal amounts of innovative plans and technologies.553
An inescapable conclusion of Paul Romer's work is the need to find
ways to increase economic growth. 554 He points out that the possibility of
creating a permanent increase in the trend rate of growth of income per
capita in the United States-from the historic value of 1.8% up to 2 .3 0/-551. VERMEIJ, supra note 362, at 304.
552. BEINHOCKER, supra note 10, at 427.
553. Jonathan Sallet points to one recent example: the FCC's establishment of
"openness" requirements for the C Block licensee in the 700 MHz spectrum auction of
2008. JONATHAN SALLET, "NEw PRODUCTS AT EVERY STAGE" - THE APPLICATION OF
COMMON-LAW REASONING IN AN AGE OF INNOVATION 9-10 (2009), available at http://fcc-

reform.org/sites/fcc-reform.org/files/sallet-20090105.pdf. Sallet adroitly observes that the
FCC's action can be viewed as a narrowly-tailored "experiment" that allowed the agency to
set up subsequent market-based "bargaining" between at least two different business
models: open and closed wireless networks. Id.
554. Paul M. Romer, Should the Government Subsidize Supply or Demand in the Market
for Scientists and Engineers? 47 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
7723, June 2000), availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/w7723.
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"could resolve all of the budget difficulties associated with the aging of the
Baby Boom generation, and still leave ample resources for dealing with
any number of other pressing social problems."" 5 Others have made
similar points about the salient effects of growth and a possible state role to
stimulate technological innovation. Benjamin Friedman further observes
that because economic growth positively affects the character of the society
as a whole, "there is a consequent role for policy measures
to seek growth
556
own."
its
on
provide
would
market
the
beyond what
Another implication that stems from new growth theory is that free
markets tend to produce too little technological innovation relative to what
is optimal. The United States, for example, by most accounts, under-invests
in basic research. 57 In the presence of increasing returns from new ideas,
Professor Jones argues that Adam Smith's invisible hand may fail to get
things right. In particular, the non-rivalry of ideas means that per capita
income depends to a large extent on the total stock of ideas.5 58 For now, the
key observation is that, without introducing an additional force to help
bridge the gap, the United States may face an ideas deficit in the future.
The reason for such under-investment is no mystery. By all accounts,
the market by itself is not sufficient to provide every useful research-related
input to the rough formula for emergence. 559 Given that the welfare benefits
of innovative research may be too uncertain, long-term, and diffuse to
monetize, let alone control, markets will not allow innovators to capture a
sufficient percentage of the welfare benefits they produce. 560 One key
reason that the marketplace alone does not generate sufficient levels of
investment in research, Atkinson shows, is a misalignment of economic
incentives between the public good and the private good. 56' Thus, the social
555. Id. at 11-12.
556. FRIEDMAN, supra note 547, at 400.
557. See, e.g., Charles I. Jones, Sources of US. Economic Growth in a World of Ideas,
92 AM. ECON. REv. 220, 233 (2002).
558. Jones, supra note 356, at 1072. Jones notes that U.S. economic growth between
1950 and 1993 can be attributed to two factors: rising levels of educational attainment, and
increased research intensity. Together these two factors account for some 80-90% of the
growth in output per worker (with the rest due to the rise in employment population). Jones,
supra note 557, at 235.
559. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resourcesfor
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACrIvrrY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FACTORS 609, 619 (1962) ("[W]e expect a free enterprise economy to underinvest in
invention and research (as compared with an ideal) because it is risky, because the product
can be appropriated only to a limited extent, and because of increasing returns in use.").
560. Benjamin & Rai, supranote 40, at 12.
561. "[T]he rates of return to society from corporate R&D are at least twice the estimated
returns that the company itself receives. Firms' inability to capture all the benefits of their
own innovative activity means that firms, left on their own, will produce less innovation
than society needs." ROBERT ATKINSON & HowARD WLAL, BOOSTING PRODUCTIVITY,
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returns (in this case, of private research and development) exceed the
private returns by a substantial margin, 162 creating what we can think of as
a "spillover gap." These spillovers are good for society because they drive
innovations-industries with significant spillovers generally experience
more and faster innovation than industries with fewer spillovers-and
research and development (R&D) investments by both sides of the market.
Government policies can kill growth or can create incentives for
growth. 563 One way to feed the evolutionary algorithm is to use the
government's spending authority to channel resources. Many experts have
discussed the urgent need for technology policy to support R&D because it
is the key fuel of the engine for new economic growth.564 Investment in
R&D explains a substantial part of the variation in different economic
growth rates in different countries.565 In short, we need to create further
market incentives for both private and public R&D.566
Romer believes that the classic R&D model for both governments and
firms must be addressed so that command-and-control mechanisms as well
as tax-and-subsidy mechanisms are joined with market-like mechanisms
that impose market-based tests for success. 567 He talks about increasing
both demand subsidies (government spending on R&D) and supply

INNOVATION, AND GROWTH THROUGH A NATIONAL INNOVATION FOUNDATION

11 (2008),

availableat http://www.itif.org/files/NIF.pdf.
562. Frischmann, supra note 361, at 305-06.
563. WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH: ECONOMISTS' ADVENTURES
AND MISADVENTURES IN THE TROPICS 217-39 (2001).

564. As one example, the National Academies of Science issued a paper stating they are
"deeply concerned that the scientific and technological building blocks critical to our
economic leadership are eroding at a time when many other nations are gathering strength."
NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM: ENERGIZING AND EMPLOYING
AMERICA FOR A BRIGHTER ECONOMIC FUTURE 3 (2007). The paper calls for enhancing "the

human, financial, and knowledge capital necessary for US prosperity," in part by increasing
federal support for various R&D-related tax credits and providing additional funding for
scholarships and fellowships in science, math, and engineering. Id. at 4.
565. See ELHANAN HELPMAN, THE MYSTERY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 34-85 (2004).
566. Unfortunately, spending on R&D has slipped considerably in recent years, so that
today "federal R&D as a ratio to GDP today is only 0.8 percent, compared to 1.5 percent in
the 1960s." EASTERLY, supra note 563, at 192. At the same time, business-funded R&D has
almost doubled from 1.19% of GDP in 1980, to 2.02% in 2002, and is now twice as much as
government-funded R&D. ATKINSON, supra note 49, at 101. Yet in 2004, the United States
ranked seventeenth among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) nations in favorable tax treatment of R&D. See Robert D. Atkinson, Deep
Competitiveness, ISSUES IN SCIENCE & TECH., Winter 2007, at 71, available at
http://www.itif.org/files/Deep-Competitiveness.pdf. In Romer's words, "in the last several
decades, the efforts that our nation has undertaken to encourage faster growth have been
timid and poorly conceived." Romer, supra note 554, at 47.
567. Kevin Kelly, Paul Romer: The Economics of Ideas, WIRED, June 1996, availableat
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.06/romerjpr.html.
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subsidies (employment inputs).568 While approving of demand subsidies
such as R&D tax credits, government support for public/private R&D
programs, and direct research grants, Romer also highlights an overlooked
component: supply subsidies that increase the number of trained scientists
and engineers.569 Others concur that government should encourage the pace
of technological advance through tax credits and investment in R&D, but
leave the development of new knowledge to the larger environment.57 ° As
the Internet's own origins plainly show, government-sponsored
investments in potential future payoffs can help create generative
platforms, big and small, for economic growth.57 ' There is also a separate
demand-side perspective to innovation policy, based on extensive research
showing that venturesome consumers adopting and using technology are
crucial to maintaining economic prosperity.572
A recent Information Technology and Innovation Foundation report
adds further fuel to the R&D debate, finding that "innovations stemming
from collaborations with spin-offs from universities and federal
laboratories make up a much larger [and growing] share" of all awardwinning innovations since 1970. 7 3 The federal government also plays a
supportive and important role in this increasingly collaborative U.S.
innovation system. The report recommends that the U.S. government
expand and secure funding for its technology initiatives and improve
coordination of different technology initiatives throughout government and
with firms, universities, federal laboratories, and states. 574 In other words,
568. See generally Romer, supra note 554.
569. See id. at 21-47.
570. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 547, at 402.
571. Easterly agrees that the non-appropriability and the obsolescence aspects of
innovation mean that the role of technological innovation will tend to be too slow in a
market economy. EASTERLY, supranote 563, at 178-79. The way out, he believes, is for the
state to create strong incentives for innovation, by subsidizing private R&D, promoting
government R&D, and encouraging direct investment. Id.
572. See generally BHIDt, supra note 41. Bhidd further argues that the alleged
undersupply in cutting-edge research and researchers is largely unproven. Id. at 411-27.
Bhidd claims that this lack of evidence should establish a high bar for those who wish to
argue for an expansion of public funding for scientific research on the grounds that it will
produce high economic returns or other material benefits. Id. at 419.
573. FRED BLOCK & MATTHEW R. KELLER, INFORMATION TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND.,
WHERE

Do

INNOVATIONS

COME

FROM?

TRANSFORMATION

IN

THE U.S.

NATIONAL

INNOvATION SYSTEM, 1970-2006 1 (2008), availableat http://www.itif.org/files/Where-do
innovationscomefrom.pdf.
574. Id. at 3; see also ROBERT D. ATKINSON, INFORMATION TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND.,
THE R&D TAX CREDIT TO DRivE INNOVATION, COMPETITIVENESS AND
PROSPERITY 1 (2007), available at http://www.itif.org/files/ExpandR&D.pdf (including
EXPANDING

making R&D tax credit permanent and doubling the credit's rate to 40%). There is an
important role as well for programs benefiting small businesses and entrepreneurs-which
of course are the source of many new ideas and innovations-and economic growth. While
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policymakers should find concrete ways to feed the market's evolutionary
algorithm.
2.

Fostering Connectivity (Institutions and Infrastructure)
and The policymaker also can foster connectivity
and networking between various agents in the
",.0:C
market. This can be done, for example, by
strengthening
or
adding
links
(lines
of
communication, whether actual or logical) between
nodes (agents).
New growth will not happen if the right infrastructure, or
institutions-of science and the markets, of conventions and rules-are not
in place.575 The projection of "influence through an ecosystem depends on
the degree of connectivity and interdependence. 576 We have seen the need
for social trust engendered by institutions. This trust can form and grow
where there is sufficient connectivity between agents. Of course, the
Internet is the single best example of a shared infrastructure, emerging
from a mix of first public, and then private actions. Thus, policymakers
should facilitate ways for agents to interact via the Internet.
One may reasonably ask why the government must take such a role.
As pointed out in Emergence Economics, the Internet's own history shows
that certain forms of user connectivity are not inevitable.5 77 In many
countries, broadband policy is dictated by the central government, often
with specific mandates on deployment.578 In the United States, we have
chosen a private ownership system of communications infrastructure. And
yet, there is a direct public benefit from new communications and
information technology in allowing for the useful interactions and
exchange of information among citizens.579
The notion that communications policy should serve the public
interest is at the heart of the 1934 Communications Act: indeed, nearly 100
statutory provisions direct or authorize the FCC to act in the public

C)

small business gets lip service politically, government programs often fail to match the
rhetoric.
575. Ronald Bailey, Post-Scarcity Prophet. Economist Paul Romer on Growth,
Technological Change, and an Unlimited Human Future, REASON, Dec. 2001, available at
http://www.reason.com/news/show/28243.html.
576. Mitleton-Kelly, supra note 256, at 28.
577. Whitt & Schultze, supra note 1, at 251-56.
578. Whitt, supra note 401, at 470-71 (Asian and European governments tend to
establish more pro-active broadband policies, including public investment and network
access mandates).
579. SCHEUERMAN, supra note 66, at 201.
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interest. 580 The "public interest, convenience, and necessity" language was
first adopted by Congress in the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887,58 ' and
then borrowed for the Radio Act of 1927.582 Subsequently, the Supreme
Court proclaimed that the public interest standard "is as concrete as the
complicated factors for judgment in such a field of delegated authority
permit. ' '583 Nevertheless, the statutory language is an easy target in some
quarters, as it can be hopelessly vague and foundationless. 584 Regardless of
the merits of some of these criticisms, the FCC ultimately is required to
explain many of its decisions with reference to that single phrase.
Perhaps one problem is that a unitary public interest standard is
insufficient for the multiplicity of uses to which it can be applied.
Historically, the language has been used to justify a variety of government
programs and regulations related to transportation and communications
infrastructure. If there is not one correct way to describe the standard,
perhaps we should go back to its roots, and recast it as a series of
interrelated public interests. More specifically, we can tie the standard to
one or more "tinkering" projects within the FCC's jurisdictional purview,
in an attempt to provide More Good Ideas via additional agent
connectivity. Such a vision of public interests invariably would appreciate
the collective economic and social benefits of openly interconnected
market agents.

3.

Shaping the Landscape (Incentives and Trust)

Encouraging greater increases in income over
a shorter period of time arguably is the "central
economic policy task of any nation. ' ' 585 And in that
586
quest, incentives for growth obviously matter.
The policymaker here can serve as a "fitness
function shaper," which amounts to acting so that "the evolutionary
processes of the market can be better shaped to serve society's needs. 587
580. Randolph J. May, The Public Interest Standard: Is It Too Indeterminate to Be
Constitutional?,53 FED. COMM. L.J. 427,457-67 (2001).
581. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (current version in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C. (2000)).
582. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1934),
and repealed 1936).
583. FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
584. See, e.g., Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The "PublicInterest" Standard:
The Search for the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605 (1998); see also May, supra note
580.
585. Crawford, supranote 486, at 29.
586. EASTERLEY, supra note 563, at 177.
587. BEINHOCKER, supranote 10, at 427.
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Because incentives provide useful signals to all agents in the market,
the best way to use the fitness landscape to achieve policy objectives is to
employ market-based incentives. "Policy can use incentives or
disincentives that are either generally applied or narrowly focused."' 8 8 This
can be achieved by, for example, setting broad policy goals and then
allowing agents operating under unfettered economic and non-economic
conditions to meet those goals. By shaping the metaphoric landscape in
which agents operate-providing incentives to scale particular mountains,
or supporting the discovery and sharing of path shortcuts-policymakers
can encourage policy objectives without interfering with the core activity
of evolution.
Dan Kahan notes that correctly understanding human behavior
extends beyond the conventional view (that incentives are a solution to
collective action problems) and embraces the strong reciprocity view that
agents can be motivated by honor and altruism to contribute to the public
good if they see others behaving cooperatively. 8 9 Conversely, incentives
sometimes can magnify collective actions problems by dissipating trust.
The simple existence of an incentive scheme can be seen as a clue that
other agents are not inclined to cooperate voluntarily; if they were,
incentives would be unnecessary.590 Maximum cooperation probably
requires that reciprocity dynamics be supplemented with appropriately
tailored incentives, most likely in the form of penalties aimed specifically
at persistent free riders.59'
Unfortunately, recent FCC activities constitute a negative
counterpoint. As mentioned above, over the past several years, the FCC
inexorably has imposed various carrier-style regulations on a swath of
VoIP applications and services. This trend threatens to stifle innovative
new applications, and reduce-not amplify-the range of More Good
Ideas. The means employed by the FCC-creating specific technology
mandates for programs like E-9 11 (enhanced emergency services), CALEA
(Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act), CPNI (Customer
Proprietary Network Information), TRS (Telecommunications Relay
Service), and USF (the federal universal service fund)-often go well
beyond tinkering via market incentives, and involve tampering with the
actual process of evolving solutions. 2 In particular, rather than
establishing broad guidelines or general mandates for VolP technology
588. LIPSEY, CARLAW & BEKAR, supra note 92, at 499.
589. Kahan, supranote 312, at 346.
590. Id.
591. Id.
592. The point is not necessarily that these programs should not apply to VolP
applications-which is subject to debate--but rather how and when they should apply.
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providers to meet within a prescribed period of time, the FCC instead tends
to impose specific, backward-looking mandates with legacy systems. The
concern is that by tampering with the evolutionary processes, the FCC
actually is hampering the growth and innovation of these technologies.
One reasonably may ask why we should rely on agents' pecuniary
incentives. The answer is that makers of technology respond to market
incentives, just like everything else. Because the firm does not benefit from
all of the knowledge it has created, its incentives to innovate are lowered
somewhat. However, Easterly points out that society ultimately gains in
this tradeoff because each
innovation permanently increases the
593
productivity of the economy.
Incentives need not be purely pecuniary, or even material. "[G]reater
financial incentives don't always elicit more effort... [or] produce better
results. 594 As we saw with emergent phenomena, many forms of net effects
take the form of either non-traditional economic activity (like peer
production), or non-economic activity. While Old School Economics tends
to slight these types of incentives, Emergence Economics recognizes that
they readily drive human behavior and thus should not be ignored.
"Effective policies are those that support socially valued outcomes not only
by harnessing selfish motives to socially valued ends, but also by evoking,
cultivating, and empowering public-spirited motives. 595 As one set of
researchers puts it:
The behavioral sciences have traditionally offered two contrasting
explanations of cooperation. One, favored by sociologists and
anthropologists, considers the willingness to subordinate self-interest
to the needs of the social group to be part of human nature. Another,
favored by economists and biologists, treats cooperation as the result of
the interaction of selfish agents maximizing their long-term individual
material interests. [We show that] a significant fraction of people fit
neither of these stereotypes. Rather, they are conditional cooperators
and altruistic punishers... which we call strong reciprocators.
More recent research of strong reciprocity in the social sciences
suggests another complementary approach: instilling trust. Individuals who
have faith in the willingness of others to contribute their fair share in a joint
enterprise will voluntarily respond in kind.597 In fact, manipulating material
593. EASTERLY, supra note 563, at 178. Easterly goes on to argue that in these situations,
"[m]arkets will often need an injection of government subsidies to start the knowledge ball
rolling." Id, at 155.
594. BuDm, supra note 41, at 419.
595. Herbert Gintis, et al., Introduction, in MORAL SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL

supranote 312, at 4 (emphasis omitted).
596. Herbert Gintis, et al., Preface, in MORAL SENTIMENTS

INTERESTS,

AND MATERIAL INTERESTS,

supra note 312, at xi (emphasis omitted). They further argue that "strong reciprocity is the
product of gene-culture coevolution" in human beings. Gintis, et al. supra note 596, at 23.
597. Kahan, supranote 312, at 342.
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incentives may be a self-defeating strategy, at least by itself, because it
signals that others would not be inclined to cooperate voluntarily and are
prone to cheat if possible. As Kahan notes, "[i]ncentives do more than
affect individuals' calculations of the costs and benefits of particular forms
of conduct; they also shape their impressions of the attitudes and intentions
of those around them., 598 Fitness landscape shaping can be accomplished
best through a mix of incentives and trust cues, where both competition and
cooperation naturally flow from the overall incentives system.
4.

Enhancing Feedback (Transparency and Accountability)

Justice Brandeis famously remarked that "[p]ublicity
is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial
diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policeman., 599 A final form
of tinkering involves creating or enhancing market
feedback mechanisms, essentially filling in various information or
transparency gaps in the market. This means providing agents with more
and better data, and perhaps enhanced decision-making tools, so they can
make informed decisions. Ultimately, more information also involves
holding agents (public and private alike) accountable for their actions.
Markets rely on information in order to function properly.
Conversely, "[s]imple market solutions are stymied by informational
problems.,,600 Agents as consumers or users typically lack complete
information and foresight to make informed choices among goods and
601
services and can be easy victims in a marketplace tilted against them.
Bounded rationality, asymmetric information flows, cognitive biases, linear
thinking, and more suggest that users often stand little chance when
negotiating with more powerful agents.60 2 The policymaker can help even
the odds, at least to some degree. Because consumers and users are
adaptable and able to learn and grow, policymakers should give them what
they need to take that leap: more information and a voice. With such tools,
these agents then can hold accountable for their actions those in both the
private and public sectors.
598. Id.at 346.
599. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914).
600. FRIEDMAN, supra note 208, at 180.
601. See ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM &DAvID WELL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS
AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 6 (2007).
602. Normally, we humans tend to act only when the situation is, in Professor Helen
Ingram's words, "soon, salient, and certain." Andrew C. Revkin, Meltdown: Yelling "Fire"
on a Hot Planet, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2006, at 41.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 61

Transparency is known to be a useful mechanism for managing the
volatility in complex systems. °3 The feedback process typically is seen in
terms of positive and negative feedback, but in human systems the degree
of connectivity (as discussed above) often determines the strength of
feedback. 60 4 True feedback means influence that changes the potential
actions and behavior of other agents, and thus can influence the state and
pace of coevolution. °5
Transparency systems increasingly are emerging as a mainstream
regulatory tool, 6°6 where the guiding idea is that public intervention can
"create economic and political incentives that advance specific policy
objectives."6 °7 By mobilizing individual choice and market forces, targeted
60 8
transparency can serve in the place of heavier-handed regulation.
Government-sponsored ratings of rollover risks for automobiles are but one
example, where knowledgeable consumers can shop accordingly and auto
manufacturers can respond with safer automobiles. 6°9 Transparency can
also facilitate greater public participation in the formal rulemaking
process.6 1 ° Of course, transparency is of little value without accountability.
Successful information access regimes require some form of bureaucratic
apparatus, watchdog groups, or other organizations/institutions to uphold
the requirement.611

603. de Vries, supra note 85, at 42.
604. Mitleton-Kelly, supranote 256, at 37-38.
605. Id.at 38.
606. Indeed, "transparency" was Webster's Dictionary's Word of the Year in 2003. See
Ann Florini, Introduction: The Battle Over Transparency, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW:
TRANSPARENCY FOR AN OPEN WORLD

2 (Ann Florini ed., 2007).

607. ARCHON FUNG, ET AL., ASH INST. FOR DEM. GOVERNANCE & INNOVATION, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSPARENCY: WHAT MAKES DISCLOSURE POLICIES EFFECTIVE? 1
(2004).
608. FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 602, at 5.
609. The U.S. National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHSTA)
recently concluded that publishing the static stability factors (SSFs) for sports utility
vehicles (SUVs) and other large automobiles has resulted in a marked improvement in the
overall safety of those cars. See MARIE C. WALTZ, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMIN., TRENDS IN THE STATIC STABILITY FACTOR OF PASSENGER CARS, LIGHT TRUCKS, AND

VANS (2005), available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/regrev/evaluate/809868/
images/SSFTrend%20final.pdf.
610. Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin & Evan Mendelson, Transparencyand Public
Participationin the Rulemaking Process: A NonpartisanPresidentialTransition Task Force
Report, (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research
Paper No. 08-41, 2008), reprintedin 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=-1292911. The task force recommends 26 different ways to
improve the transparency, public participation, and strategic management in federal agency
processes. Id. at app. 1, at 30-32.
611. See, e.g., Florini, supra note 607 at 337.
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Information disclosure also can be seen as part of an incentives
system, creating an impetus for entities to improve services or comply with
regulations. The effectiveness of a transparency regime-"[r]egulation by
[r]evelation" 612-stems from how "embedded" the information becomes
"in the everyday decision making routines of users and disclosers" alike.613
One suggested "role for public policy is to gather and provide as much
information as is possible for agents involved in adoption decisions before
particular trajectories become locked in., 614 Policymakers can assist in
improving information flows between users and producers, and in the
process "hold the door open" to allow producers "to evolve, agents to learn,
and possible mistakes to be avoided." 6 5
Of course, transparency is not a cost-free solution. Mandating more
public information is not always better, as it can impose significant
disclosure burdens on corporations and government alike. Transparency
also can confuse the user, be captured by narrow interests, grow outdated,
and waste resources.6 16 In fact, done badly, a transparency mandate can be
damaging to its own interests, yielding information that is "incomplete,
inaccurate, obsolete, confusing, or distorted., 617 The key is to balance these
potential downsides against the additional benefits of facilitating a
smoothly-operating market.61 8
One example of the need for feedback mechanisms comes from the
FCC's spectrum policy. Jim Snider calls spectrum the "invisible resource"
due to the public's scientific ignorance of spectrum's physical and
economic properties, the unprecedented nature of spectrum applications,
and various government decision-making processes.6 19 Snider offers up a
host of intriguing substantive and procedural changes to raise the visibility
612. Id.at 339.
613. FUNG, ET AL., supra note 608, at 4. By one account the ultimate level of
transparency is reached when "there is a successful attempt to integrate stakeholder
communication into the governance processes of the organization." ADRIAN HENRIQUS,
CORPORATE TRUTH, THE LIMITS TO TRANSPARENCY 165 (2007).

614. LIPSEY, CARLAw & BEKAR, supra note 92, at 80.

615. Id.
616. FUNG, ET AL., supra note 608, at 3.
617. FUNG, GRAHAM, & WEIL, supra note 602, at 7.

618. Obviously, the Internet can help create a new generation of more effective
transparency policies, with users able to compile data themselves and utilize more
interactive, customized, and scalable interfaces. Id.at 15, 152-53.
619. J. H. SNIDER, NEW AM. FOUND., THE ART OF SPECTRUM LOBBYING: AMERICA'S $480
BILLION SPECTRUM

GIVEAWAY, How IT HAPPENED, AND How TO PREVENT IT FROM

RECURRING 23 (Aug. 2007), available at http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/
artspectrum lobbying (quoting HARVEY J. LEVIN, THE INVISIBLE RESOURCE: USE AND
REGULATION OF THE RADIO SPECTRUM (1971)). He points out that the U.S. government has

raised some $40 billion since 1993 in spectrum auctions, id.
at 17, while the estimated value
of the spectrum usage rights approaches $480 billion, id.
at 1.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61

level of spectrum as a natural resource, including reducing database
complexity, improving tracking capabilities, rationalizing the license
modification process, and automating the build-out requirements. 620 Many
of these ideas mesh nicely with the tinkering approach recommended
earlier in this Article to boost user transparency and establish a sound
fitness environment to accommodate greater competition.
A salient question is where transparency ends and deliberate steering
begins. Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein have developed what they call
"libertarian paternalism," which seeks to preserve the ability of people to
choose freely in the market, while allowing institutions to make selfconscious efforts to steer people's choices in welfare-improving
directions.62 1 Where imperfect competition is unable to protect the interests
of irrational consumers, the authors propose enlisting default rules, framing
effects, and starting points to assist vulnerable third parties.622 Malcom
Gladwell also suggests
making information more "sticky" by tinkering with
623
its presentation.
While the Thaler and Sunstein philosophy sounds similar to the
proposed "enable, don't dictate" dichotomy, I am somewhat less sanguine
about granting policymakers too much leeway to "steer" people's choices
in any particular direction. Gregory Mitchell points out that paternalism is
not inevitable because individuals can improve their decision-making skills
by overcoming their irrational influences. 624 The approach sketched out
here celebrates a different freedom of choice: for example, by giving
625
people both a greater number of choices, and a more informed freedom.
Further, as research has shown, the human brain is extraordinarily
"plastic," an attribute that persists throughout our adult lives.626 That
plasticity is the product of ecological requirements during our prehistory.
"[W]e are good at learning the kinds of things it was adaptive for us to
620. Id. at 37-48.
621. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler,
LibertarianPaternalismis Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. Ci. L. REV. 1159, 1162-63 (2003).
622. Sunstein & Thaler, supranote 622, at 1162-67.
623. MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG
DIFFERENCE 259 (2000).
624. Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is An Oxymoron, 99 Nw. U. L. REV.
1245, 1258 (2004-05). He also argues that choosing welfare over liberty is not justified and
that libertarian paternalism shifts resources from rational to irrational people. Id.at 1248.
625. Hayek understood that true individualism "regards man not as a highly rational and
intelligent but as a very irrational and fallible being, whose individual errors are corrected
only in the course of a social process, and which aims at making the best of a very imperfect
material." F. A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM: TRUE AND FALSE, THE TWELFTH FINLAY LECTURE
DELMVERED AT UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN, ON DECEMBER 17, 1945 9 (1948).
626. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. SCHWARTZ & SHARON BEGLEY, THE MIND AND THE BRAIN:
NEUROPLASTICITY AND THE POWER OF MENTAL FORCE (2003).

Number 3]

ADAPTIVE POLICYMAKING

learn rather than to inherit as hard-wired competencies."6 2 7 People can and
do learn, and improve their skills, due to the functional plasticity of the
brain.628
Importantly, even if people cannot always overcome their cognitive
constraints, they should be given the opportunity to make "wrong"
decisions, and thereby learn, adapt, and improve in their ability to make
future decisions. "[L]iberty accords people ownership of their story,
including their errors and vices, and thereby allows them to learn the
contours of action, experience, and consequence." 629 Moreover, because
policymakers suffer from similar cognitive constraints, direct state
involvement in citizen choice likely introduces its own distortions.
That said, it may make sense to incorporate some minimal "nudges"
to delineate certain types of consumer decisions 63 0 -especially those that
are difficult, infrequent, or have delayed effects-which may require
greater assistance. After all, "choice architecture" may be unavoidable in
some cases. While the first premise of this tinkering tool is to improve
decision making in a neutral context, deliberate framing and default rules
should be considered only in specific situations-such as with financial or
health care information-where a stand-back approach proves to be
inadequate to achieve the social goal of more informed (and informing)
decision making. Hopefully, this balancing of interests actually would
strengthen, rather than hinder, the liberty and autonomy of the individual.

VI. CONCLUSION
While far short of furnishing a comprehensive overview or definitive
answers to specific policy questions, this Article hopefully at least has
provided some useful grounding for a more adaptive form of policymaking.
In Emergence Economics, we showed how market systems are more rich,
dynamic, and unpredictable than Old School Economics and its proponents
had assumed. Here, I have explained how public officials should look to
not just an expansive view of markets, but also a more well-rounded view
of policymaking. Not only are markets more complicated than generally
thought, but public policy is about more than markets. And all of this
incredible nuance and complexity springs from a myriad of daily human
interactions that often elude the simplistic categories of "market" or "state."

627. SEABRIGHT, supra note 164, at 243.
628. Erin Ann O'Hara, Brain Plasticity and Spanish Moss in BiolegalAnalysis, 53 FLA.
L. REv. 905, 923 (2001) (arguing that there are limits to our ability to manipulate
environments to change the physical structure of the brain).
629. Daniel B. Klein, Statist Quo Bias, 1 ECON J. WATCH 260, 263 (Aug. 2004),
availableat http://www.econjounmalwatch.org/pdf/KleinCommentAugust2004.pdf.
630. THALER & SuNSTE1N, supranote 622, at 76-77.
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Much like the market itself, the cycle of political decision making is
non-linear, dynamic, and complex-a "garbage can" of people and
processes, in Kingdon's memorable phrase.63' Still, the right organizations
selecting the right institutions, and employing the right frames and tools,
can best assess the available constraints and opportunities. This boils down
to the limiting of active policy functions in order to devise market inputs,
while constantly adjusting to the market's emergent phenomena.
This Article has argued that a guiding public policy framework can be
achieved successfully using a "tinker, don't tamper" formula. Where
markets are contestable, and enabling institutions well-functioning,
policymakers generally should avoid dictating (tampering with) the
primary evolutionary forces of market players differentiating, selecting,
and amplifying particular business plans and technologies. Instead, and
only where necessary, policymakers should rely on enabling (tinkering
with) tailored market gaps and inputs to what can be thought of as the
"econosphere." The fundamental point is to improve the market's ability to
formulate and present different options to agents, while leaving the
selection processes undisturbed.
Thus, absent state or market failure, the government's role, at best,
should be to experiment with the optimal background conditions for a
dynamic, unpredictable, and evolving environment. In particular, adaptive
policymakers should determine whether and how to tinker with the
market's inputs, connectivity, incentives, and feedback-and then stand
back to let the process itself unfold. With empowered agents working
through connected networks via evolutionary processes, we are far more
likely to unlock the full-blown emergence of new ideas and innovation of
economic growth and other net effects.
Unfortunately, our nation's leaders just now are beginning to realize
how a financial system bereft of the proper institutional arrangements can
go so drastically awry, leaving no choice but to step in and dictate massive
structural interventions. Such a fate was not inevitable. Only when private
markets and public policies learn to work constructively with each other,
and not in needless conflict, can the resulting emergent benefits be more
fully realized in our everyday lives.

631.

KINGDON,

supra note 124, at 84.

